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DiBerardino PAV, Filipowicz ALS, Danckert J, Anderson B. Plinko: Eliciting beliefs to build better models of statistical learning and mental model updating. Br J Psychol 2024. [PMID: 39096484 DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12724] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/24/2023] [Accepted: 07/03/2024] [Indexed: 08/05/2024]
Abstract
Prior beliefs are central to Bayesian accounts of cognition, but many of these accounts do not directly measure priors. More specifically, initial states of belief heavily influence how new information is assumed to be utilized when updating a particular model. Despite this, prior and posterior beliefs are either inferred from sequential participant actions or elicited through impoverished means. We had participants to play a version of the game 'Plinko', to first elicit individual participant priors in a theoretically agnostic manner. Subsequent learning and updating of participant beliefs was then directly measured. We show that participants hold various priors that cluster around prototypical probability distributions that in turn influence learning. In follow-up studies, we show that participant priors are stable over time and that the ability to update beliefs is influenced by a simple environmental manipulation (i.e., a short break). These data reveal the importance of directly measuring participant beliefs rather than assuming or inferring them as has been widely done in the literature to date. The Plinko game provides a flexible and fecund means for examining statistical learning and mental model updating.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - James Danckert
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
| | - Britt Anderson
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
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Children struggle beyond preschool-age in a continuous version of the ambiguous figures task. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 2019; 85:828-841. [PMID: 31858214 PMCID: PMC7900074 DOI: 10.1007/s00426-019-01278-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2019] [Accepted: 12/10/2019] [Indexed: 12/03/2022]
Abstract
Children until the age of five are only able to reverse an ambiguous figure when they are informed about the second interpretation. In two experiments, we examined whether children’s difficulties would extend to a continuous version of the ambiguous figures task. Children (Experiment 1: 66 3- to 5-year olds; Experiment 2: 54 4- to 9-year olds) and adult controls saw line drawings of animals gradually morph—through well-known ambiguous figures—into other animals. Results show a relatively late developing ability to recognize the target animal, with difficulties extending beyond preschool-age. This delay can neither be explained with improvements in theory of mind, inhibitory control, nor individual differences in eye movements. Even the best achieving children only started to approach adult level performance at the age of 9, suggesting a fundamentally different processing style in children and adults.
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Stöttinger E, Guay CL, Danckert J, Anderson B. Updating impairments and the failure to explore new hypotheses following right brain damage. Exp Brain Res 2018; 236:1749-1765. [PMID: 29651518 PMCID: PMC5982454 DOI: 10.1007/s00221-018-5259-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/05/2017] [Accepted: 04/08/2018] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
We have shown recently that damage to the right hemisphere impairs the ability to update mental models when evidence suggests an old model is no longer appropriate. We argue that this deficit is generic in the sense that it crosses multiple cognitive and perceptual domains. Here, we examined the nature of this updating impairment to determine more precisely the underlying mechanisms. We had right (RBD, N = 12) and left brain damaged (LBD, N = 10) patients perform versions of our picture-morphing task in which pictures gradually morph from one object (e.g., shark) to another (e.g., plane). Performance was contrasted against two groups of healthy older controls, one matched on age (HCO-age-matched, N = 9) and another matched on general level of cognitive ability (HCO-cognitively-matched, N = 9). We replicated our earlier findings showing that RBD patients took longer than LBD patients and HCOs to report seeing the second object in a sequence of morphing images. The groups did not differ when exposed to a morphing sequence a second time, or when responding to ambiguous images outside the morphing context. This indicates that RBD patients have little difficulty alternating between known representations or labeling ambiguous images. Instead, the difficulty lies in generating alternate hypotheses for ambiguous information. Lesion overlay analyses, although speculative given the sample size, are consistent with our fMRI work in healthy individuals in implicating the anterior insular cortex as critical for updating mental models.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elisabeth Stöttinger
- Department of Psychology, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstrasse 34, 5020, Salzburg, Austria.
| | | | - James Danckert
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, N2L 3G1, Canada
| | - Britt Anderson
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, N2L 3G1, Canada.,Centre for Theoretical Neuroscience, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, N2L 3G1, Canada
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Moënne-Loccoz C, Vergara RC, López V, Mery D, Cosmelli D. Modeling Search Behaviors during the Acquisition of Expertise in a Sequential Decision-Making Task. Front Comput Neurosci 2017; 11:80. [PMID: 28943847 PMCID: PMC5596102 DOI: 10.3389/fncom.2017.00080] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2017] [Accepted: 08/04/2017] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Our daily interaction with the world is plagued of situations in which we develop expertise through self-motivated repetition of the same task. In many of these interactions, and especially when dealing with computer and machine interfaces, we must deal with sequences of decisions and actions. For instance, when drawing cash from an ATM machine, choices are presented in a step-by-step fashion and a specific sequence of choices must be performed in order to produce the expected outcome. But, as we become experts in the use of such interfaces, is it possible to identify specific search and learning strategies? And if so, can we use this information to predict future actions? In addition to better understanding the cognitive processes underlying sequential decision making, this could allow building adaptive interfaces that can facilitate interaction at different moments of the learning curve. Here we tackle the question of modeling sequential decision-making behavior in a simple human-computer interface that instantiates a 4-level binary decision tree (BDT) task. We record behavioral data from voluntary participants while they attempt to solve the task. Using a Hidden Markov Model-based approach that capitalizes on the hierarchical structure of behavior, we then model their performance during the interaction. Our results show that partitioning the problem space into a small set of hierarchically related stereotyped strategies can potentially capture a host of individual decision making policies. This allows us to follow how participants learn and develop expertise in the use of the interface. Moreover, using a Mixture of Experts based on these stereotyped strategies, the model is able to predict the behavior of participants that master the task.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cristóbal Moënne-Loccoz
- Department of Computer Science, School of Engineering, Pontificia Universidad Católica de ChileSantiago, Chile
| | - Rodrigo C. Vergara
- Facultad de Medicina, Biomedical Neuroscience Institute, Universidad de ChileSantiago, Chile
| | - Vladimir López
- Center for Interdisciplinary Neuroscience, Pontificia Universidad Católica de ChileSantiago, Chile
- School of Psychology, Pontificia Universidad Católica de ChileSantiago, Chile
| | - Domingo Mery
- Department of Computer Science, School of Engineering, Pontificia Universidad Católica de ChileSantiago, Chile
| | - Diego Cosmelli
- Center for Interdisciplinary Neuroscience, Pontificia Universidad Católica de ChileSantiago, Chile
- School of Psychology, Pontificia Universidad Católica de ChileSantiago, Chile
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Stöttinger E, Filipowicz A, Valadao D, Culham JC, Goodale MA, Anderson B, Danckert J. A cortical network that marks the moment when conscious representations are updated. Neuropsychologia 2015; 79:113-22. [PMID: 26529489 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.10.037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/10/2015] [Revised: 10/15/2015] [Accepted: 10/30/2015] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
In order to survive in a complex, noisy and constantly changing environment we need to categorize the world (e.g., Is this food edible or poisonous?) and we need to update our interpretations when things change. How does our brain update when object categories change from one to the next? We investigated the neural correlates associated with this updating process. We used event-related fMRI while people viewed a sequence of images that morphed from one object (e.g., a plane) to another (e.g., a shark). All participants were naïve as to the identity of the second object. The point at which participants 'saw' the second object was unpredictable and uncontaminated by any dramatic or salient change to the images themselves. The moment when subjective perceptual representations changed activated a circumscribed network including the anterior insula, medial and inferior frontal regions and inferior parietal cortex. In a setting where neither the timing nor nature of the visual transition was predictable, this restricted cortical network signals the time of updating a perceptual representation. The anterior insula and mid-frontal regions (including the ACC) were activated not only at the actual time when change was reported, but also immediately before, suggesting that these areas are also involved in processing alternative options after a mismatch has been detected.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elisabeth Stöttinger
- University of Waterloo, Department of Psychology, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1.
| | - Alex Filipowicz
- University of Waterloo, Department of Psychology, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1.
| | - Derick Valadao
- University of Waterloo, Department of Psychology, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1.
| | - Jody C Culham
- The Brain and Mind Institute, The Natural Sciences Centre, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 5B7.
| | - Melvyn A Goodale
- The Brain and Mind Institute, The Natural Sciences Centre, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 5B7.
| | - Britt Anderson
- University of Waterloo, Department of Psychology, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1; Centre for Theoretical Neuroscience, University of Waterloo, Canada.
| | - James Danckert
- University of Waterloo, Department of Psychology, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1.
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