A different view on the Necker cube-Differences in multistable perception dynamics between Asperger and non-Asperger observers

Cognitive flexibility moderates the relationship between openness-to-experience and perceptual reversals of Necker cube

It is not clear whether personality is related to basic perceptual processes at the level of automatic bottom-up processes or controlled top-down processes. Two experiments examined how personality influences perceptual dynamics, focusing on how cognitive flexibility moderates the relationship between personality and perceptual reversals of the Necker cube. The participants viewed stimuli either passively or with the intent to either hold or switch the orientation of the Necker cube. The influence of openness was predominantly evident in conditions necessitating intentional control over perceptual reversals. The link between openness and intentional perceptual reversals was always moderated by cognitive flexibility, which was measured in three different ways. No relationship was detected between personality traits and reversals in the passive viewing condition, suggesting that relatively spontaneous adaptation-inhibition processes may not be personality-dependent. Overall, our research sheds light on the nuanced influence of personality traits on perceptual experiences, mediated by cognitive flexibility.

Top-down biological motion perception does not differ between adults scoring high versus low on autism traits

The perception of biological motion is an important social cognitive ability. Models of biological motion perception recognize two processes that contribute to the perception of biological motion: a bottom-up process that binds optic-flow patterns into a coherent percept of biological motion and a top-down process that binds sequences of body-posture 'snapshots' over time into a fluent percept of biological motion. The vast majority of studies on autism and biological motion perception have used point-light figure stimuli, which elicit biological motion perception predominantly via bottom-up processes. Here, we investigated whether autism is associated with deviances in the top-down processing of biological motion. For this, we tested a sample of adults scoring low vs high on autism traits on a recently validated EEG paradigm in which apparent biological motion is combined with frequency tagging (Cracco et al., 2022) to dissociate between two percepts: 1) the representation of individual body postures, and 2) their temporal integration into movements. In contrast to our hypothesis, we found no evidence for a diminished temporal body posture integration in the high-scoring group. We did, however, find a group difference that suggests that adults scoring high on autism traits have a visual processing style that focuses more on a single percept (i.e. either body postures or movements, contingent on saliency) compared to adults scoring low on autism traits who instead seemed to represent the two percepts included in the paradigm in a more balanced manner. Although unexpected, this finding aligns well with the autism literature on perceptual stability.

Studying perceptual bias in favor of the from-above Necker cube perspective in a goal-directed behavior

When viewing a completely ambiguous image, different interpretations can switch involuntarily due to internal top-down processing. In the case of the Necker cube, an entirely ambiguous stimulus, observers often display a bias in perceptual switching between two interpretations based on their perspectives: one with a from-above perspective (FA) and the other with a from-below perspective (FB). Typically, observers exhibit a priori top-down bias in favor of the FA interpretation, which may stem from a statistical tendency in everyday life where we more frequently observe objects from above. However, it remains unclear whether this perceptual bias persists when individuals voluntarily decide on the Necker cube's interpretation in goal-directed behavior, and the impact of ambiguity in this context is not well-understood. In our study, we instructed observers to voluntarily identify the orientation of a Necker cube while manipulating its ambiguity from low (LA) to high (HA). Our investigation aimed to test two hypotheses: (i) whether the perspective (FA or FB) would result in a bias in response time, and (ii) whether this bias would depend on the level of stimulus ambiguity. Additionally, we analyzed electroencephalogram (EEG) signals to identify potential biomarkers that could explain the observed perceptual bias. The behavioral results confirmed a perceptual bias in favor of the from-above perspective, as indicated by shorter response times. However, this bias diminished for stimuli with high ambiguity. For the LA stimuli, the occipital theta-band power consistently exceeded the frontal theta-band power throughout most of the decision-making time. In contrast, for the HA stimuli, the frontal theta-band power started to exceed the occipital theta-band power during the 0.3-s period preceding the decision. We propose that occipital theta-band power reflects evidence accumulation, while frontal theta-band power reflects its evaluation and decision-making processes. For the FB perspective, occipital theta-band power exhibited higher values and dominated over a longer duration, leading to an overall increase in response time. These results suggest that more information and more time are needed to encode stimuli with a FB perspective, as this template is less common for the observers compared to the template for a cube with a FA perspective.

Spontaneous Necker-cube reversals may not be that spontaneous

Introduction

During observation of the ambiguous Necker cube, our perception suddenly reverses between two about equally possible 3D interpretations. During passive observation, perceptual reversals seem to be sudden and spontaneous. A number of theoretical approaches postulate destabilization of neural representations as a pre-condition for reversals of ambiguous figures. In the current study, we focused on possible Electroencephalogram (EEG) correlates of perceptual destabilization, that may allow prediction of an upcoming perceptual reversal.

Methods

We presented ambiguous Necker cube stimuli in an onset-paradigm and investigated the neural processes underlying endogenous reversals as compared to perceptual stability across two consecutive stimulus presentations. In a separate experimental condition, disambiguated cube variants were alternated randomly, to exogenously induce perceptual reversals. We compared the EEG immediately before and during endogenous Necker cube reversals with corresponding time windows during exogenously induced perceptual reversals of disambiguated cube variants.

Results

For the ambiguous Necker cube stimuli, we found the earliest differences in the EEG between reversal trials and stability trials already 1 s before a reversal occurred, at bilateral parietal electrodes. The traces remained similar until approximately 1100 ms before a perceived reversal, became maximally different at around 890 ms (p = 7.59 × 10^-6, Cohen's d = 1.35) and remained different until shortly before offset of the stimulus preceding the reversal. No such patterns were found in the case of disambiguated cube variants.

Discussion

The identified EEG effects may reflect destabilized states of neural representations, related to destabilized perceptual states preceding a perceptual reversal. They further indicate that spontaneous Necker cube reversals are most probably not as spontaneous as generally thought. Rather, the destabilization may occur over a longer time scale, at least 1 s before a reversal event, despite the reversal event as such being perceived as spontaneous by the viewer.

Priming and reversals of the perceived ambiguous orientation of a structure-from-motion shape and relation to personality traits

We demonstrate contributions of top-down and bottom-up influences in perception as explored by priming and counts of perceived reversals and mixed percepts, as probed by an ambiguously slanted structure-from-motion (SFM) test-cylinder. We included three different disambiguated primes: a SFM cylinder, a still image of a cylinder, and an imagined cylinder. In Experiment 1 where the prime and test sequentially occupied the same location, we also administered questionnaires with the Big-5 trait openness and vividness of visual imagery to probe possible relations to top-down driven priming. Since influences of gaze or position in the prime conditions in Experiment 1 could not be ruled out completely, Experiment 2 was conducted where the test cylinder appeared at a randomly chosen position after the prime. In Experiment 2 we also measured the number of perceptual reversals and mixed percepts during prolonged viewing of our ambiguous SFM-cylinder, and administered questionnaires to measure all Big-5 traits, autism, spatial and object imagery, and rational or experiential cognitive styles, associated with bottom-up and top-down processes. The results revealed contributions of position-invariant and cue-invariant priming. In addition, residual contributions of low-level priming was found when the prime and test were both defined by SFM, and were presented at the same location, and the correlation between the SFM priming and the other two priming conditions were weaker than between the pictorial and imagery priming. As previously found with ambiguous binocular rivalry stimuli, we found positive correlations between mixed percepts and the Big-5 dimension openness to experience, and between reversals, mixed percepts and neuroticism. Surprisingly, no correlations between the scores from the vividness of imagery questionnaires and influence from any of the primes were obtained. An intriguing finding was the significant differences between the positive correlation from the experiential cognitive style scores, and the negative correlation between rational style and the cue invariant priming. Among other results, negative correlations between agreeableness and all priming conditions were obtained. These results not only support the notion of multiple processes involved in the perception of ambiguous SFM, but also link these processes in perception to specific personality traits.

Altered EEG variability on different time scales in participants with autism spectrum disorder: an exploratory study

One of the great challenges in psychiatry is finding reliable biomarkers that may allow for more accurate diagnosis and treatment of patients. Neural variability received increasing attention in recent years as a potential biomarker. In the present explorative study we investigated temporal variability in visually evoked EEG activity in a cohort of 16 adult participants with Asperger Syndrome (AS) and 19 neurotypical (NT) controls. Participants performed a visual oddball task using fine and coarse checkerboard stimuli. We investigated various measures of neural variability and found effects on multiple time scales. (1) As opposed to the previous studies, we found reduced inter-trial variability in the AS group compared to NT. (2) This effect builds up over the entire course of a 5-min experiment and (3) seems to be based on smaller variability of neural background activity in AS compared to NTs. The here reported variability effects come with considerably large effect sizes, making them promising candidates for potentially reliable biomarkers in psychiatric diagnostics. The observed pattern of universality across different time scales and stimulation conditions indicates trait-like effects. Further research with a new and larger set of participants are thus needed to verify or falsify our findings.

Visual consciousness dynamics in adults with and without autism

Sensory differences between autism and neuro-typical populations are well-documented and have often been explained by either weak-central-coherence or excitation/inhibition-imbalance cortical theories. We tested these theories with perceptual multi-stability paradigms in which dissimilar images presented to each eye generate dynamic cyclopean percepts based on ongoing cortical grouping and suppression processes. We studied perceptual multi-stability with Interocular Grouping (IOG), which requires the simultaneous integration and suppression of image fragments from both eyes, and Conventional Binocular Rivalry (CBR), which only requires global suppression of either eye, in 17 autistic adults and 18 neurotypical participants. We used a Hidden-Markov-Model as tool to analyze the multistable dynamics of these processes. Overall, the dynamics of multi-stable perception were slower (i.e. there were longer durations and fewer transitions among perceptual states) in the autistic group compared to the neurotypical group for both IOG and CBR. The weighted Markovian transition distributions revealed key differences between both groups and paradigms. The results indicate overall lower levels of suppression and decreased levels of grouping in autistic than neurotypical participants, consistent with elements of excitation/inhibition imbalance and weak-central-coherence theories.

Long-term priors influence visual perception through recruitment of long-range feedback

Perception results from the interplay of sensory input and prior knowledge. Despite behavioral evidence that long-term priors powerfully shape perception, the neural mechanisms underlying these interactions remain poorly understood. We obtained direct cortical recordings in neurosurgical patients as they viewed ambiguous images that elicit constant perceptual switching. We observe top-down influences from the temporal to occipital cortex, during the preferred percept that is congruent with the long-term prior. By contrast, stronger feedforward drive is observed during the non-preferred percept, consistent with a prediction error signal. A computational model based on hierarchical predictive coding and attractor networks reproduces all key experimental findings. These results suggest a pattern of large-scale information flow change underlying long-term priors’ influence on perception and provide constraints on theories about long-term priors’ influence on perception.

Priors learnt from lifetime experiences influence perception. The authors show that when perception is congruent with a long-term prior, there is increased top-down input in the ventral visual stream, whereas bottom-up input is enhanced when perception is incongruent with prior.

Divergent Thinking Influences the Perception of Ambiguous Visual Illusions

This study investigated the relationships between personality and creativity in the perception of two different ambiguous visual illusions. Previous research has suggested that Industriousness and Openness/Intellect (as measured by the Big Five Aspects Scale) are both associated with individual differences in perceptual switching rates for binocular rivalry stimuli. Here, we examined whether these relationships generalise to the Necker Cube and the Spinning Dancer illusions. In the experimental phase of this study, participants viewed these ambiguous figures under both static and dynamic, as well as free-view and fixation, conditions. As predicted, perceptual switching rates were higher: (a) for the static Necker Cube than the Spinning Dancer, and (b) in free-view compared with fixation conditions. In the second phase of the study, personality type and divergent thinking were measured using the Big Five Aspects Scale and the Alternate Uses Task, respectively. Higher creativity/divergent thinking (as measured by the Alternate Uses Task) was found to predict greater switching rates for the static Necker Cube (but not the Spinning Dancer) under both free-view and fixation conditions. These findings suggest that there are differences in the perceptual processing of creative individuals.

Psychotic Experiences in Schizophrenia and Sensitivity to Sensory Evidence

Perceptual inference depends on an optimal integration of current sensory evidence with prior beliefs about the environment. Alterations of this process have been related to the emergence of positive symptoms in schizophrenia. However, it has remained unclear whether delusions and hallucinations arise from an increased or decreased weighting of prior beliefs relative to sensory evidence. To investigate the relation of this prior-to-likelihood ratio to positive symptoms in schizophrenia, we devised a novel experimental paradigm which gradually manipulates perceptually ambiguous visual stimuli by disambiguating stimulus information. As a proxy for likelihood precision, we assessed the sensitivity of individual participants to sensory evidence. As a surrogate for the precision of prior beliefs in perceptual stability, we measured phase duration in ambiguity. Relative to healthy controls, patients with schizophrenia showed a stronger increment in congruent perceptual states for increasing levels of disambiguating stimulus evidence. Sensitivity to sensory evidence correlated positively with the individual patients' severity of perceptual anomalies and hallucinations. Moreover, the severity of such experiences correlated negatively with phase duration. Our results indicate that perceptual anomalies and hallucinations are associated with a shift of perceptual inference toward sensory evidence and away from prior beliefs. This reduced prior-to-likelihood ratio in sensory processing may contribute to the phenomenon of aberrant salience, which has been suggested to give rise to the false inferences underlying psychotic experiences.

Large EEG amplitude effects are highly similar across Necker cube, smiley, and abstract stimuli

The information available through our senses is noisy, incomplete, and ambiguous. Our perceptual systems have to resolve this ambiguity to construct stable and reliable percepts. Previous EEG studies found large amplitude differences in two event-related potential (ERP) components 200 and 400 ms after stimulus onset when comparing ambiguous with disambiguated visual information ("ERP Ambiguity Effects"). These effects so far generalized across classical ambiguous figures from different visual categories at lower (geometry, motion) and intermediate (Gestalt perception) levels. The present study aimed to examine whether these ERP Effects are restricted to ambiguous figures or whether they also occur for different degrees of visibility. Smiley faces with low and high visibility of emotional expressions, as well as abstract figures with low and high visibility of a target curvature were presented. We thus compared ambiguity effects in geometric cube stimuli with visibility in emotional faces, and with visibility in abstract figures. ERP Effects were replicated for the geometric stimuli and very similar ERP Effects were found for stimuli with emotional face expressions but also for abstract figures. Conclusively, the ERP amplitude effects generalize across fundamentally different stimulus categories and show highly similar effects for different degrees of stimulus ambiguity and stimulus visibility. We postulate the existence of a high-level/meta-perceptual evaluation instance, beyond sensory details, that estimates the certainty of a perceptual decision. The ERP Effects may reflect differences in evaluation results.

Cueing the Necker cube: Pupil dilation reflects the viewing-from-above constraint in bistable perception

We hypothesized that a perceptually ambiguous or bistable object (Necker cube) can be more effectively biased to assume a point of view-from-above (VFA) than from below the object by cueing attention. Participants viewed a Necker cube in which one surface was temporarily shaded so as to prime a specific perspective on the cube. Subsequently, the standard (wireframe) Necker cube was viewed for 3 seconds, and participants reported what perspective they had seen initially and whether their perception shifted to the alternative perspective during the brief viewing. Concomitantly, pupil size was monitored with an eye-tracker to obtain an index of cognitive effort. There were two conditions: passive viewing and forced attention to sustain the initially primed perspective. We confirmed the presence of a VFA bias with forced attention, which was accompanied by reduced attentional effort, as indexed by a reduced pupil diameter, compared with the view-from-below. Participants showed no bias during passive viewing. We suggest that the level of intensive attention, when retrieving and maintaining a specific view from memory, is mirrored in the size of the eye pupils and may reflect ecological constraints on visual perception.

Novel method to measure temporal windows based on eye movements during viewing of the Necker cube

Bistable stimuli can give rise to two different interpretations between which our perception will alternate. Recent results showed a strong coupling between eye movements and reports of perceptual alternations with motion stimuli, which provides useful tools to objectively assess perceptual alternations. However, motion might entrain eye movements, and here we check with a static picture, the Necker cube, whether eye movements and perceptual reports (manual responses) reveal similar or different alternation rates, and similar or different sensitivity to attention manipulations. Using a cluster analysis, ocular temporal windows were defined based on the dynamics of ocular fixations during viewing of the Necker cube and compared to temporal windows extracted from manual responses. Ocular temporal windows were measured also with a control condition, where the physical stimulus presented to viewers alternated between two non-ambiguous versions of the Necker cube. Attention was manipulated by asking subjects to either report spontaneous alternations, focus on one percept, or switch as fast as possible between percepts. The validity of the ocular temporal windows was confirmed by the correspondence between ocular fixations when the physical stimulus changed and when the bistable Necker cube was presented. Ocular movements defined smaller time windows than time windows extracted from manual responses. The number of manual and ocular windows both increased between the spontaneous condition and the switch condition. However, only manual, and not ocular windows, increased in duration in the focus condition. Manual responses involve decisional mechanisms, and they may be decoupled from automatic oscillations between the two percepts, as suggested by the fact that both the number and duration of ocular windows remained stable between the spontaneous and focus conditions. In all, the recording of eye movements provides an objective measure of time windows, and reveals faster perceptual alternations with the Necker cube and less sensitivity to attention manipulations than manual responses.

What happens in the brain of meditators when perception changes but not the stimulus?

During the observation of an ambiguous figure our perception alternates between mutually exclusive interpretations, although the stimulus itself remains unchanged. The rate of these endogenous reversals has been discussed as reflecting basic aspects of endogenous brain dynamics. Recent evidence indicates that extensive meditation practice evokes long-term functional and anatomic changes in the brain, also affecting the endogenous brain dynamics. As one of several consequences the rate of perceptual reversals during ambiguous figure perception decreases. In the present study we compared EEG-correlates of endogenous reversals of ambiguous figures between meditators and non-meditating controls in order to better understand timing and brain locations of this altered endogenous brain dynamics. A well-established EEG paradigm was used to measure the neural processes underlying endogenous perceptual reversals of ambiguous figures with high temporal precision. We compared reversal-related ERPs between experienced meditators and non-meditating controls. For both groups we found highly similar chains of reversal-related ERPs, starting early in visual areas, therewith replicating previous findings from the literature. Meditators, however, showed an additional frontal ERP signature already 160 ms after stimulus onset (Frontal Negativity). We interpret the additional, meditation-specific ERP results as evidence that extensive meditation practice provides control of frontal brain areas over early sensory processing steps. This may allow meditators to overcome phylogenetically evolved perceptual and attentional processing automatisms.