Mimicking and anticipating others' actions is linked to Social Information Processing

Seeing Through Each Other's Hearts: Inferring Others' Heart Rate as a Function of Own Heart Rate Perception and Perceived Social Intelligence

Successful social interactions require a good understanding of the emotional states of other people. This information is often not directly communicated but must be inferred. As all emotional experiences are also imbedded in the visceral or interoceptive state of the body (i.e., accelerating heart rate during arousal), successfully inferring the interoceptive states of others may open a window into their emotional state. But how well can people do that? Here, we replicate recent results showing that people can discriminate between the cardiac states (i.e., the resting heartrate) of other people by simply looking at them. We further tested whether the ability to infer the interoceptive states of others depends on one's own interoceptive abilities. We measured people's performance in a cardioception task and their self-reported interoceptive accuracy. Whilst neither was directly associated to their ability to infer the heartrate of another person, we found a significant interaction. Specifically, overestimating one's own interoceptive capacities was associated with a worse performance at inferring the heartrate of others. In contrast, underestimating one's own interoceptive capacities did not have such influence. This pattern suggests that deficient beliefs about own interoceptive capacities can have detrimental effects on inferring the interoceptive states of other people.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42761-022-00151-4.

Social Action Effects: Representing Predicted Partner Responses in Social Interactions

The sociomotor framework outlines a possible role of social action effects on human action control, suggesting that anticipated partner reactions are a major cue to represent, select, and initiate own body movements. Here, we review studies that elucidate the actual content of social action representations and that explore factors that can distinguish action control processes involving social and inanimate action effects. Specifically, we address two hypotheses on how the social context can influence effect-based action control: first, by providing unique social features such as body-related, anatomical codes, and second, by orienting attention towards any relevant feature dimensions of the action effects. The reviewed empirical work presents a surprisingly mixed picture: while there is indirect evidence for both accounts, previous studies that directly addressed the anatomical account showed no signs of the involvement of genuinely social features in sociomotor action control. Furthermore, several studies show evidence against the differentiation of social and non-social action effect processing, portraying sociomotor action representations as remarkably non-social. A focus on enhancing the social experience in future studies should, therefore, complement the current database to establish whether such settings give rise to the hypothesized influence of social context.

Imagining is Not Observing: The Role of Simulation Processes Within the Mimicry-Liking Expressway

Individuals automatically mimic a wide range of different behaviors, and such mimicking behavior has several social benefits. One of the landmark findings in the literature is that being mimicked increases liking for the mimicker. Research in cognitive neuroscience demonstrated that mentally simulating motor actions is neurophysiologically similar to engaging in these actions. Such research would predict that merely imagining being mimicked produces the same results as actually experiencing mimicry. To test this prediction, we conducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, being mimicked increased liking for the mimicker only when mimicry was directly experienced, but not when it was merely imagined. Experiment 2 replicated this finding within a high-powered online sample: merely imagining being mimicked does not produce the same effects as being actually mimicked. Theoretical and practical implications of these experiments are discussed.

Imitation and interindividual differences: Belief in free will is not related to automatic imitation

It is well known that individuals have the tendency to automatically imitate each other and that such imitative behavior is fostered by perceiving intentions in others' actions. That is, past research has shown that perceiving an action as internally driven enhances the shared representation of observed and executed actions increasing automatic imitation. An interpersonal factor that increases the perception that a behavior is internally driven is belief in free will. Consequently, we hypothesized that the more individuals believe in free will, the more they automatically imitate others. To test this prediction, we conducted two high-powered (total N = 642) and preregistered studies in which we assessed automatic imitation with the imitation-inhibition task. Contrary to our predictions, belief in free will did not correlate with automatic imitation. This finding contributes to current findings challenging the assumption that automatic imitation is modulated by interindividual differences. Further theoretical implications are discussed.

Group membership does not modulate automatic imitation

Individuals have the automatic tendency to imitate each other. A key prediction of different theories explaining automatic imitation is that individuals imitate in-group members more strongly than out-group members. However, the empirical basis for this prediction is rather inconclusive. Only a few experiments have investigated the influence of group membership using classic automatic imitation paradigms and these experiments led to mixed results. To put the group membership prediction to a critical test, we carried out six high-powered experiments (total N = 1538) in which we assessed imitation with the imitation-inhibition task and manipulated group membership in different ways. Evidence across all experiments indicates that group membership does not modulate automatic imitation. Moreover, we do not find support for the idea that feelings of affiliation or perceived similarity moderate the effect of group membership on automatic imitation. These results have important implications for theories explaining automatic imitation and contribute to the current discussion of whether automatic imitation can be socially modulated.

Anticipating actions and corticospinal excitability: A preregistered motor TMS experiment

Past research on action observation and imitation suggests that observing a movement activates a corresponding motor representation in the observer. However, recent research suggests that individuals may not only reflexively simulate the observed behavior but also simulate and engage in anticipated action without another person actually engaging in it. For example, it has been demonstrated that observing a triggering event (i.e., nose wrinkling) that potentially leads to the anticipation of an action (i.e., nose scratching) increases the likelihood that the observer will perform that action. In the present research, we applied motor Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to investigate such anticipated social action effects at the neurophysiological level within a trial-by-trial measure. While a pilot study suggests that observing nose wrinkling elicits stronger motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in participants' biceps muscles than observing control events, this effect could not be fully replicated in a preregistered study. Although a post hoc meta-analysis across both studies supports the general hypothesis, these results need to be taken cautiously. Implications of the results reported in the manuscript are discussed.