The influence of prosocial priming on visual perspective taking and automatic imitation

Group membership does not modulate goal- versus movement-based imitation

It is often put forward that in-group members are imitated more strongly than out-group members. However, the validity of this claim has been questioned as recent investigations were not able to find differences for the imitation of in- versus out-group members. A central characteristic of these failed replications is their mere focus on movement-based imitation, thereby neglecting to take into consideration the superior goal of the movements. By using a computerised version of the pen-and-cups task, we disentangled movement- from goal-based imitation to shed further light onto the link between group membership and imitation. As previous research demonstrated that out-group members (as compared with in-group members) are represented psychologically distant and as psychological distance shifts the degree to which participants engage in goal- versus movement-based imitation, we predicted that in-group members (as compared with out-group members) shift the degree to which individuals imitate movements versus goals. The results did not confirm our predictions, as group membership does not modulate the degree of movement- versus goal-based imitation. Theoretical implications and the question whether imitative behaviour is socially modulated are discussed.

Imitation and interindividual differences: Belief in free will is not related to automatic imitation

It is well known that individuals have the tendency to automatically imitate each other and that such imitative behavior is fostered by perceiving intentions in others' actions. That is, past research has shown that perceiving an action as internally driven enhances the shared representation of observed and executed actions increasing automatic imitation. An interpersonal factor that increases the perception that a behavior is internally driven is belief in free will. Consequently, we hypothesized that the more individuals believe in free will, the more they automatically imitate others. To test this prediction, we conducted two high-powered (total N = 642) and preregistered studies in which we assessed automatic imitation with the imitation-inhibition task. Contrary to our predictions, belief in free will did not correlate with automatic imitation. This finding contributes to current findings challenging the assumption that automatic imitation is modulated by interindividual differences. Further theoretical implications are discussed.

Smaller Than Expected

Abstract. In two pre-registered studies, we investigated whether processes of imitative action regulation are facilitated after experiencing an episode of social exclusion. We reasoned that imitative action regulation effects should be more pronounced for participants who were socially excluded, providing them with an “automatic means” to socially reconnect with others. Participants played a virtual ball-tossing game to experimentally induce social exclusion or inclusion experiences. Subsequently, pairs of two participants engaged in an observational stimulus–response (SR) binding paradigm modeled after Giesen et al. (2014): Participants observed color categorization responses in their interaction partner (trial_n-1) and then executed (in)compatible responses in the subsequent trial (trial_n), with observation and responding occurring in alternation. Stimulus relation (repetition vs. change) from trial_n-1 to trial_n was orthogonally manipulated. In both studies, stimulus-based retrieval effects of observationally acquired SR bindings were descriptively larger in socially excluded (compared with socially included) participants. However, none of the effects were statistically significant. Even a joint analysis of both experiments did not show the expected modulation. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on social exclusion effects on imitative action regulation processes.

Group membership does not modulate automatic imitation

Individuals have the automatic tendency to imitate each other. A key prediction of different theories explaining automatic imitation is that individuals imitate in-group members more strongly than out-group members. However, the empirical basis for this prediction is rather inconclusive. Only a few experiments have investigated the influence of group membership using classic automatic imitation paradigms and these experiments led to mixed results. To put the group membership prediction to a critical test, we carried out six high-powered experiments (total N = 1538) in which we assessed imitation with the imitation-inhibition task and manipulated group membership in different ways. Evidence across all experiments indicates that group membership does not modulate automatic imitation. Moreover, we do not find support for the idea that feelings of affiliation or perceived similarity moderate the effect of group membership on automatic imitation. These results have important implications for theories explaining automatic imitation and contribute to the current discussion of whether automatic imitation can be socially modulated.

Dynamic emotional expressions do not modulate responses to gestures

The tendency to imitate the actions of others appears to be a fundamental aspect of human social interaction. Emotional expressions are a particularly salient form of social stimuli (Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001) but their relationship to imitative behaviour is currently unclear. In this paper we report the results of five studies which investigated the effect of a target's dynamic emotional stimuli on participants' tendency to respond compatibly to the target's actions. Experiment one examined the effect of dynamic emotional expressions on the automatic imitation of opening and closing hand movements. Experiment two used the same basic paradigm but added gaze direction as an additional factor. Experiment three investigated the effect of dynamic emotional expressions on compatibility responses to handshakes. Experiment four investigated whether dynamic emotional expressions modulated response to valenced social gestures. Finally, experiment five compared the effects of dynamic and static emotional expressions on participants' automatic imitation of finger lifting. Across all five studies we reliably elicited a compatibility effect however, none of the studies found a significant modulating effect of emotional expression. This null effect was also supported by a random effects meta-analysis and a series of Bayesian t-tests. Nevertheless, these results must be caveated by the fact that our studies had limited power to detect effect sizes below d = 0.4. We conclude by situating our findings within the literature, suggesting that the effect of emotional expressions on automatic imitation is, at best, minimal.

Automatic imitation does not predict levels of prosocial behaviour in a modified dictator game

Automatic imitation refers to the automatic tendency to imitate observed actions. Previous research on automatic imitation has linked it to a wide variety of social cognitive processes and functions, although the evidence is mixed and suggestive. However, no study to date has looked at the downstream behavioural effects of automatic imitation. The current research addresses this gap in the literature by exploring the possible relationship between trait-levels of automatic imitation, as measured by the automatic imitation task (AIT), and explicit prosocial behaviours, as measured by a modified dictator game (DG). Contrary to our expectations, AIT effects did not correlate with DG scores. This conclusion is supported by both equivalence tests and Bayesian analysis. However, we discuss a number of alternative explanations for our results, and caution against strong interpretations from a single study. We further discuss the implications of this finding in relation to the widespread notion that automatic imitation, and self-other control more generally, underlie social cognitive functions.

Social Cognition in Gilles de la Tourette Syndrome

Abstract. Research on the neural mechanisms underlying Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (GTS) has mostly concentrated on abnormalities in basal ganglia circuits. Recent alternative accounts, however, focused more on social and affective aspects. Individuals with GTS show peculiarities in their social and affective domain, including echophenomena, coprolalia, and nonobscene socially inappropriate behavior. This article reviews the experimental and theoretical work done on the social symptoms of GTS. We discuss the role of different social cognitive and affective functions and associated brain networks, namely, the social-decision-making system, theory-of-mind functions, and the so-called “mirror-neuron” system. Although GTS affects social interactions in many ways, and although the syndrome includes aberrant social behavior, the underlying cognitive, affective, and neural processes remain to be investigated.