Suppression of mutually incompatible proprioceptive and visual action effects in tool use

The Simon effect under reversed visual feedback

Our aim was to study the processes involved in the spatial coding of the body during actions producing multiple simultaneous effects. We specifically aimed to challenge the intentional-based account, which proposes that the effects used to code responses are those deemed relevant to the agent's goal. Accordingly, we used a Simon paradigm (widely recognized as a suitable method to investigate the spatial coding of responses) combined with a setup inducing a multimodal discrepancy between visual and tactile/proprioceptive effects (known to be crucial for body schema construction and action control). To be more precise, the setup allowed to horizontally reverse the visual effects of the hands compared to the tactile/proprioceptive effects (e.g., the right hand was seen as being on the left). In Experiment 1, the visual effects were not reversed. However, in Experiment 2, the visual effects were reversed, and the task emphasized the relevance of these effects to the participants. In Experiment 3, the visual effects were also reversed, but the task emphasized the relevance of tactile/proprioceptive effects. A Simon effect, based on the location of the tactile/proprioceptive effects, was observed in Experiments 1 and 3. However, in Experiment 2, the Simon effect was partially driven by the location of the visual effects. These findings collectively support that the agent's intention plays a prominent role in the representation of their body during action. This work also suggests a promising avenue for research in linking action and body representations.

Why motor imagery is not really motoric: towards a re-conceptualization in terms of effect-based action control

Overt and imagined action seem inextricably linked. Both have similar timing, activate shared brain circuits, and motor imagery influences overt action and vice versa. Motor imagery is, therefore, often assumed to recruit the same motor processes that govern action execution, and which allow one to play through or simulate actions offline. Here, we advance a very different conceptualization. Accordingly, the links between imagery and overt action do not arise because action imagery is intrinsically motoric, but because action planning is intrinsically imaginistic and occurs in terms of the perceptual effects one want to achieve. Seen like this, the term 'motor imagery' is a misnomer of what is more appropriately portrayed as 'effect imagery'. In this article, we review the long-standing arguments for effect-based accounts of action, which are often ignored in motor imagery research. We show that such views provide a straightforward account of motor imagery. We review the evidence for imagery-execution overlaps through this new lens and argue that they indeed emerge because every action we execute is planned, initiated and controlled through an imagery-like process. We highlight findings that this new view can now explain and point out open questions.

The multisensory nature of human action imagery

Imagination can appeal to all our senses and may, therefore, manifest in very different qualities (e.g., visual, tactile, proprioceptive, or kinesthetic). One line of research addresses action imagery that refers to a process by which people imagine the execution of an action without actual body movements. In action imagery, visual and kinesthetic aspects of the imagined action are particularly important. However, other sensory modalities may also play a role. The purpose of the paper will be to address issues that include: (i) the creation of an action image, (ii) how the brain generates images of movements and actions, (iii) the richness and vividness of action images. We will further address possible causes that determine the sensory impression of an action image, like task specificity, instruction and experience. In the end, we will outline open questions and future directions.

Environment-Related and Body-Related Components of the Minimal Self

Perceptual changes that an agent produces by efferent activity can become part of the agent’s minimal self. Yet, in human agents, efferent activities produce perceptual changes in various sensory modalities and in various temporal and spatial proximities. Some of these changes occur at the “biological” body, and they are to some extent conveyed by “private” sensory signals, whereas other changes occur in the environment of that biological body and are conveyed by “public” sensory signals. We discuss commonalties and differences of these signals for generating selfhood. We argue that despite considerable functional overlap of these sensory signals in generating self-experience, there are reasons to tell them apart in theorizing and empirical research about development of the self.

Precision control for a flexible body representation

Adaptive body representation requires the continuous integration of multisensory inputs within a flexible 'body model' in the brain. The present review evaluates the idea that this flexibility is augmented by the contextual modulation of sensory processing 'top-down'; which can be described as precision control within predictive coding formulations of Bayesian inference. Specifically, I focus on the proposal that an attenuation of proprioception may facilitate the integration of conflicting visual and proprioceptive bodily cues. Firstly, I review empirical work suggesting that the processing of visual vs proprioceptive body position information can be contextualised 'top-down'; for instance, by adopting specific attentional task sets. Building up on this, I review research showing a similar contextualisation of visual vs proprioceptive information processing in the rubber hand illusion and in visuomotor adaptation. Together, the reviewed literature suggests that proprioception, despite its indisputable importance for body perception and action control, can be attenuated top-down (through precision control) to facilitate the contextual adaptation of the brain's body model to novel visual feedback.

How Action Shapes Body Ownership Momentarily and Throughout the Lifespan

Objects which a human agent controls by efferent activities (such as real or virtual tools) can be perceived by the agent as belonging to his or her body. This suggests that what an agent counts as “body” is plastic, depending on what she or he controls. Yet there are possible limitations for such momentary plasticity. One of these limitations is that sensations stemming from the body (e.g., proprioception) and sensations stemming from objects outside the body (e.g., vision) are not integrated if they do not sufficiently “match”. What “matches” and what does not is conceivably determined by long–term experience with the perceptual changes that body movements typically produce. Children have accumulated less sensorimotor experience than adults have. Consequently, they express higher flexibility to integrate body-internal and body-external signals, independent of their “match” as suggested by rubber hand illusion studies. However, children’s motor performance in tool use is more affected by mismatching body-internal and body-external action effects than that of adults, possibly because of less developed means to overcome such mismatches. We review research on perception-action interactions, multisensory integration, and developmental psychology to build bridges between these research fields. By doing so, we account for the flexibility of the sense of body ownership for actively controlled events and its development through ontogeny. This gives us the opportunity to validate the suggested mechanisms for generating ownership by investigating their effects in still developing and incomplete stages in children. We suggest testable predictions for future studies investigating both body ownership and motor skills throughout the lifespan.