Infants' representation of social hierarchies in absence of physical dominance

The good, the rich, and the powerful: How young children compensate victims of moral transgressions depending on moral character, wealth, and social dominance

Theories of justice suggest that it serves two main purposes: punishment and restoration. Although punishment emerges early and has been well-documented, little is known about the contexts in which young children engage in restorative practices like compensation for victims. The current study investigated whether children's engagement in compensation and punishment (which often involve a redistribution of resources) was sensitive to characteristics of the perpetrator and victim known to shape distributive justice decisions (decisions about how resources should be distributed), such as social dominance, resource inequality, and moral character. A total of 54 children aged 3 to 7 years completed a series of moral judgment experiments. Each experiment featured interactions between a perpetrator and a victim, ending with the perpetrator stealing the victim's toy. In Experiment 1 (N = 44), social dominance did not affect punishment or compensation overall, but older children compensated the dominant victim (but not the subordinate victim) less than younger children. In Experiment 2 (N = 42), children compensated the poor victim more than the rich victim, but they did not punish the rich perpetrator more than the poor perpetrator. In Experiment 3 (N = 45), children compensated the victim with a good moral character more than the victim with a bad moral character, and the victim's moral character did not influence punishment. Altogether, these findings offer new insights into how children resort to compensation for victims as a complement to, rather than an alternative to, punishment.

Toddlers' sensitivity to dominance traits from faces

In adults, seeing individual faces is sufficient to trigger dominance evaluations, even when conflict is absent. From early on, infants represent dyadic dominance relations and they can infer conflict outcomes based on a variety of cues. To date, it is unclear if toddlers also make automatic dominance trait evaluations of individual faces. Here we asked if toddlers are sensitive to dominance traits from faces, and whether their sensitivity depends on their face experience. We employed a visual preference paradigm to study 18- and 24-month-old toddlers' sensitivity to dominance traits from three types of faces: artificial, male, female. When presented with artificial faces (Experiment 1), 18- and 24-month-olds attended longer to the non-dominant faces, but only when they were in upright orientation. For real male faces (Experiment 2), toddlers showed equivalent looking durations to the dominant and non-dominant upright faces. However, when looking at female faces (Experiment 3), toddlers displayed a visual preference for the upright non-dominant faces at 24 months. To our knowledge, this is the first study to show that toddlers already display sensitivity to facial cues of dominance from 18 months of age, at least for artificial face stimuli.

Children attribute higher social status to people who have extraordinary capabilities

Throughout history, individuals believed to have extraordinary capabilities were generally highly ranked in their communities; this suggests a universal "extraordinary-dominant expectation" in human minds, which may play a key role in religious thought, even in modern societies. This study shows that 5-6-year-old children, who begin to understand real-world causalities regarding how the body and mind of human beings work, predict that individuals who exhibit extraordinary capabilities have higher social status in interactions with individuals who exhibit ordinary capabilities. In Experiment 1, we showed children two individuals achieving goals using either humanly possible or impossible methods, the latter involving simple forms of violation of intuitive psychology (knowing without seeing), physics (flying), or biology (fire breathing). The children clearly judged the latter as surprising and unusual. More importantly, the children predicted that individuals showing extraordinary capabilities will gain contested resources and play a dominant role in interactions with ordinary individuals, indicating a higher social status. Further investigations suggested that the children specifically linked extraordinary capacities to social status, as they did not attribute dominance to individuals who apply surprising/unusual but possible methods (Experiment 2), and that they did not indiscriminately attribute positive characteristics to extraordinary capabilities despite a strong extraordinary-dominant expectation being replicated (Experiment 3). These findings demonstrate that extraordinary-dominant expectations can be observed in childhood across different intuitive knowledge domains, helping understand the cognitive mechanisms of religious thought and the cognitive foundations of hierarchical social systems.

Human and animal dominance hierarchies show a pyramidal structure guiding adult and infant social inferences

This study investigates the structure of social hierarchies. We hypothesized that if social dominance relations serve to regulate conflicts over resources, then hierarchies should converge towards pyramidal shapes. Structural analyses and simulations confirmed this hypothesis, revealing a triadic-pyramidal motif across human and non-human hierarchies (114 species). Phylogenetic analyses showed that this pyramidal motif is widespread, with little influence of group size or phylogeny. Furthermore, nine experiments conducted in France found that human adults (N = 120) and infants (N = 120) draw inferences about dominance relations that are consistent with hierarchies' pyramidal motif. By contrast, human participants do not draw equivalent inferences based on a tree-shaped pattern with a similar complexity to pyramids. In short, social hierarchies exhibit a pyramidal motif across a wide range of species and environments. From infancy, humans exploit this regularity to draw systematic inferences about unobserved dominance relations, using processes akin to formal reasoning.

Infants' representation of asymmetric social influence

In social groups, some individuals have more influence than others, for example, because they are learned from or because they coordinate collective actions. Identifying these influential individuals is crucial to learn about one's social environment. Here, we tested whether infants represent asymmetric social influence among individuals from observing the imitation of movements in the absence of any observable coercion or order. We defined social influence in terms of Granger causality; that is, if A influences B, then past behaviors of A contain information that predicts the behaviors and mental states of B above and beyond the information contained in the past behaviors and mental states of B alone. Infants (12-, 15-, and 18-month-olds) were familiarized with agents (imitators) influenced by the actions of another one (target). During the test, the infants observed either an imitator who was no longer influenced by the target (incongruent test) or the target who was not influenced by an imitator (neutral test). The participants looked significantly longer at the incongruent test than at the neutral test. This result shows that infants represent and generalize individuals' potential to influence others' actions and that they are sensitive to the asymmetric nature of social influence; upon learning that A influences B, they expect that the influence of A over B will remain stronger than the influence of B over A in a novel context. Because of the pervasiveness of social influence in many social interactions and relationships, its representation during infancy is fundamental to understand and predict others' behaviors.

Children's thinking about group-based social hierarchies

Wealth, power, and status are distributed unevenly across social groups. A surge of recent research reveals that people being recognizing, representing, and reasoning about group-based patterns of inequity during the first years of life. We first synthesize recent research on what children learn about group-based social hierarchies as well as how this learning occurs. We then discuss how children not only learn about societal structures but become active participants in them. Studying the origins and development of children's thoughts and behavior regarding group-based social hierarchies provides valuable insight into how systems of inequity are perpetuated across generations and how intergroup biases related to wealth, power, and status may be mitigated and reshaped early in development.

Children’s social evaluation toward prestige-based and dominance-based powerholders

Objective

Social scientists have suggested two typical ways of acquiring social power: dominance approach (gaining social power by applying violence, coercion, threat, and punishment) and prestige approach (gaining admiration and liking by demonstrating competence and sharing experience and knowledge). However, little is known about how people recognize and evaluate the differentiated process of the approaches, and even less about the early development of these processes. In the current study, 5–6-year old children heard stories about pairs comprising a dominance-based and a prestige-based powerholder, chose one of the powerholders as their friend and leader, and predicted which powerholder will gain the contested resources.

Results

Compared to a dominance-based powerholder, children were more likely to choose a prestige-based powerholder as a friend and leader in different situations. Moreover, children predicted that prestige-based powerholders, and not dominance-based powerholders, would gain contested resources. These findings suggest that since childhood, human beings tend to be biased to not only judge prestige-based aspects as socially preferable, but also endorse the prestige-based powerholders’ priority to possess valuable resources, which subsequently strengthens their high social status. These early childhood preferences can be instrumental in providing more harmonious environments for children in educational and daily contexts.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s13104-022-06072-6.

Dominance in humans

Dominance captures behavioural patterns found in social hierarchies that arise from agonistic interactions in which some individuals coercively exploit their control over costs and benefits to extract deference from others, often through aggression, threats and/or intimidation. Accumulating evidence points to its importance in humans and its separation from prestige-an alternate avenue to high status in which status arises from information (e.g. knowledge, skill, etc.) or other non-rival goods. In this review, we provide an overview of the theoretical underpinnings of dominance as a concept within evolutionary biology, discuss the challenges of applying it to humans and consider alternative theoretical accounts which assert that dominance is relevant to understanding status in humans. We then review empirical evidence for its continued importance in human groups, including the effects of dominance-independently of prestige-on measurable outcomes such as social influence and reproductive fitness, evidence for specialized dominance psychology, and evidence for gender-specific effects. Finally, because human-specific factors such as norms and coalitions may place bounds on purely coercive status-attainment strategies, we end by considering key situations and contexts that increase the likelihood for dominance status to coexist alongside prestige status within the same individual, including how: (i) institutional power and authority tend to elicit dominance; (ii) dominance-enhancing traits can at times generate benefits for others (prestige); and (iii) certain dominance cues and ethology may lead to mis-attributions of prestige. This article is part of the theme issue 'The centennial of the pecking order: current state and future prospects for the study of dominance hierarchies'.

Small groups lead, big groups control: Perceptions of numerical group size, power, and status across development

Participants (N = 384 three- to ten-year-olds; 51% girls, 49% boys; 73% White, 18% multiracial/other, 5% Asian, and 3% Black; N = 610 adults) saw depictions of 20 individuals split into two social groups (1:19; 2:18; 5:15; or 8:12 per group) and selected which group was "in charge" (Experiment 1), "the leader" (Experiment 2), or likely to "get the stuff" (resources) in a conflict (Experiment 3). Whereas participants across ages predicted the larger group would "get the stuff," a tendency to view smaller groups as "in charge" and "the leader" strengthened with age and when the smaller group was rarer. These findings suggest the perceived relation between numerical group size and hierarchy is flexible and inform theory regarding the developmental trajectories of reasoning about power and status.