Market failure? Individual insurance markets for older Americans

The Effect of Medicare Eligibility on Spousal Insurance Coverage

A majority of married couples in the USA take advantage of the fact that employers often provide health insurance coverage to spouses. When older spouses become eligible for Medicare, however, many of them can no longer provide their younger spouses with coverage. In this paper, we study how spousal eligibility for Medicare affects the health insurance and health care access of younger spouses. We find that spousal eligibility for Medicare results in younger spouses no longer having employers pay for their insurance and being less likely to have employer-sponsored coverage. Instead, younger spouses switch to privately purchased coverage, which tends to be worse than what they had before their spouses became eligible for Medicare. We also find suggestive evidence that younger spouses are less likely to use health care services after their older spouses become eligible for Medicare.

Healthcare use and voluntary health insurance after retirement in Thailand

BACKGROUND

The dramatic changes occurring in the age structure of the Thai population make providing healthcare services for the elderly a major challenge for decision makers. Because the number of the elderly will be increasing, together with the number of retired workers, under the Social Health Insurance (SHI) scheme, there will be the unmet needs for healthcare use after retirement. The SHI scheme does not cover workers after retirement unless they could use free healthcare for the elderly. In addition, the government budget is tight regarding the support of universal healthcare and long-term care services for all of the elderly. Therefore, the government could support retired workers who have the ability to pay by facilitating voluntary health insurance.

OBJECTIVE

The main objectives of the present study are to analyze the characteristics of workers that need health insurance after retirement and to identify the factors explaining healthcare use to offer healthcare services to meet the workers' needs and expectations.

METHODS

Four hundred insured workers under the Social Health Insurance (SHI) Scheme in Thailand were interviewed using a structured questionnaire. The Anderson-Newman model of healthcare use is the conceptual framework used in this study to understand the factors that explain healthcare use patterns of workers. Multiple regressions are employed extensively to evaluate the variables that predict healthcare use.

RESULTS

According to the survey, a person that purchases voluntary health insurance is likely to be female, have a higher personal income, and healthy. The characteristics related to healthcare use were poor health status, a high personal income, and peeople afflicted by chronic illness.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a gap between healthcare service use and the demand for voluntary health insurance. People that have a high income are more likely to purchase voluntary health insurance, while people in worse health and afflicted by chronic illness may have greater difficulty purchasing voluntary health insurance because they face higher premiums or are denied coverage by insurers.

Individual insurance benefits to be available under health reform would have cut out-of-pocket spending in 2001-08

Under the Affordable Care Act, individual health insurance will probably become more generous and more like employment-related insurance. Currently, individual insurance typically has less generous benefits than employment-related insurance. This study compared out-of-pocket spending on health care between individual and employment-related insurance, controlling for numerous characteristics such as health status. Then it simulated the impact of full implementation of provisions of the Affordable Care Act on adults who currently have individual insurance, including important subgroups-adults with chronic conditions, the near-elderly (ages 55-64), and low-income populations. If adults who had individual insurance during 2001-08 had instead had benefits similar to those under the Affordable Care Act, their average annual out-of-pocket spending on medical care and drugs might have been $280 less. The near-elderly and people with low incomes might have saved $589 and $535, respectively. An important improvement would have been the reduced probability of incurring very high out-of-pocket spending. The likelihood of having out-of-pocket expenditures on care exceeding $6,000 would have been reduced for all adults with individual insurance, and the likelihood of having expenditures exceeding $4,000 would have been reduced for many.

Individual insurance and access to care

Starting in 2014, more Americans will have private, nonemployment-related insurance ("individual insurance"). Using the nationally representative Medical Expenditure Panel Survey for 2002 through 2007, this paper compares access to care between nonelderly adults with individual insurance and those with employment-related insurance. Adults with individual and employment-related insurance report similar, often good, access to care. The study employs bivariate probit models to account for omitted variables correlated with access and type of insurance, and controls for differences in health status, attitudes, and socioeconomic characteristics. Results show that individual insurance may reduce access in some dimensions, but all effects are imprecisely estimated, so that none is statistically significant.

Employer-sponsored health insurance for early retirees: impacts on retirement, health, and health care

The proportion of large employers offering retiree health insurance in the US has declined by half in the past 20 years. This paper examines the potential implications of this change by estimating the effects of a retiree health insurance (RHI) offer on a comprehensive set of labor, health and health care use outcomes in the near-elderly population. An RHI offer increases the probability of early retirement by 37% for both men and women. While the results suggest that an RHI offer has little, if any, effect on health, there is strong evidence that RHI provides significant protection from high out-of-pocket medical costs. In the top 40% of the out-of-pocket spending distribution, those with an offer of retiree coverage spend 22% less on average. Estimates of the value of RHI of over $4,000 per year suggest that increasing opportunities for the near-elderly to purchase coverage at actuarially-fair prices through the individual market or public programs could significantly increase insurance coverage and reduce financial risk for this age group.

Use of health services by previously uninsured Medicare beneficiaries

BACKGROUND

Previously uninsured adults who enroll in the Medicare program at the age of 65 years may have greater morbidity, requiring more intensive and costlier care over subsequent years, than they would if they had been previously insured.

METHODS

We used longitudinal data from the nationally representative Health and Retirement Study to assess self-reported health care use and expenditures from 1992 through 2004 among 5158 adults who were privately insured or uninsured before Medicare coverage began at the age of 65 years. We used propensity-score methods to compare health care use and expenditures for previously insured and uninsured beneficiaries who were similar across numerous characteristics at 59 to 60 years of age and adjusted for differences in supplemental and prescription-drug coverage after 65 years of age.

RESULTS

Among 2951 adults with hypertension, diabetes, heart disease, or stroke diagnosed before 65 years of age, previously uninsured adults who acquired Medicare coverage at the age of 65 reported significantly greater increases in the numbers of doctor visits (P<0.001) and hospitalizations (P=0.001) and in total medical expenditures (P=0.02) than did previously insured adults. Significant differential increases were not evident among the 2207 adults without these conditions (P>0.12 for all comparisons). In analyses adjusted for supplemental and prescription-drug coverage, previously uninsured adults with these conditions reported more doctor visits (13% relative difference, P=0.04), more hospitalizations (20% relative difference, P=0.04), and higher total medical expenditures (51% relative difference, P=0.09) from ages 65 to 72 years than did previously insured adults.

CONCLUSIONS

The costs of expanding health insurance coverage for uninsured adults before they reach the age of 65 years may be partially offset by subsequent reductions in health care use and spending for these adults after the age of 65, particularly if they have cardiovascular disease or diabetes before the age of 65 years.

Health insurance take-up by the near-elderly

OBJECTIVE

To examine the effect of price on the demand for health insurance by early retirees between the ages of 55 and 64.

DATA SOURCE

Administrative health plan enrollment data from a medium-sized U.S. employer.

STUDY DESIGN

The analysis takes advantage of a natural experiment created by the firm's health insurance contribution policy. The amount the firm contributes toward retiree health insurance coverage depends on when a person retired and her years of service at that date. As a result of this policy, there is considerable variation in out-of-pocket premiums faced by individuals in the data. This variation is independent of the nonprice attributes of the health insurance plans offered and is plausibly exogenous to individual characteristics that are likely to affect the demand for insurance. A probit model is used to estimate the decision to take-up employer-sponsored health insurance by early retirees between the ages of 55 and 64. Demand for insurance is measured as a function of out-of-pocket premiums and a set of individual characteristics.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

We find that price has a small but statistically significant effect on the decision to take up coverage. Estimated price elasticities range from -0.10 to -0.16, depending on the sample.

CONCLUSIONS

The implied elasticities are comparable with results found in previous studies using very different data. Our estimates indicate that policy proposals for a Medicare buy-in or a nongroup tax credit will have a modest impact on take-up rates of near-elderly retirees.

Health and the cost of nongroup insurance

This analysis estimates a selection-adjusted model of the premium for nongroup insurance to measure the effect of health status on the cost of nongroup insurance. Using data from two recent national surveys, the probability of buying nongroup insurance is about 50% lower for people in fair or poor health compared to similar people in excellent health. Correcting for selection, premiums are about 15% higher for people with modest health problems, and 43% to 50% higher for people with major health problems compared to those in excellent health. We use the selection-corrected premiums to simulate the effects on the price and affordability of nongroup insurance for the uninsured under two recent tax credit proposals.

Racial and ethnic disparities in the purchase of nongroup health insurance: the roles of community and family-level factors

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the influence of community- and family-level factors on racial/ethnic disparities in the uptake of nongroup (individual) health insurance.

DATA SOURCES

Responses to the 1996-1997 Community Tracking Study Household Survey plus community-level descriptors from several sources including census data, the Area Resource File, and community and migrant health center Medicare cost reports.

STUDY DESIGN

Logistic regression was used to compare families in which at least one person had nongroup health insurance to families without nongroup insurance in which at least one person was uninsured. Sequential models were constructed examining family- and community-level factors.

RESULTS

Twenty-three percent of families with otherwise-uninsured persons purchased nongroup insurance, ranging from 11% to 41% among the 60 communities sampled. Disadvantaged minority group members, especially Spanish-speaking Hispanics, had half or less the odds of whites of purchasing nongroup insurance. Education had a weaker association with purchasing nongroup insurance among minority group members than among whites. Community-level factors had minimal effect on disparities in uptake, although greater housing segregation was associated with lower uptake among blacks.

CONCLUSIONS

Minority group members are much less likely to purchase nongroup insurance than whites. Family income and community factors do not explain this gap. Programs aimed at stimulating voluntary insurance purchase will continue to underenroll disadvantaged minorities if nonfinancial barriers to acquiring insurance coverage, including the interplay between race/ethnicity and education, are not better understood and addressed.

Association between health insurance coverage of office visit and cancer screening among women

BACKGROUND

Little is known regarding the nuances of insurance benefit design that may affect the receipt of clinical preventive services.

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate whether differences in insurance coverage of physician office visits influences the receipt of cancer screening in women who have full coverage for the screening services.

DESIGN

Cohort study of women enrolled in fee-for-service (FFS) or Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) health plans, where FFS plans have less generous office visit coverage, for the period 1995 to 1997.

SETTINGS AND PARTICIPANTS

General Motors Corporation's employees and their dependents.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Papanicolaou and mammography rates in women aged 21 to 64 years (n = 139,294) and 52 to 64 years (n = 56,554), respectively.

RESULTS

Compared with FFS plans, enrollees in PPO plans were significantly more likely to obtain a Papanicolaou smear and mammogram (adjusted relative risk [RRa] = 1.22; 95% CI, 1.21-1.24; and RRa, 1.17; 95% CI, 1.15-1.18, respectively). The association was more pronounced among hourly individuals (RRa, 1.27; 95% CI, 1.26-1.29 for Papanicolaou smears; RRa, 1.17; 95% CI, 1.16-1.19 for mammograms) than among salaried individuals (RRa, 1.10; 95% CI, 1.08-1.12 for Papanicolaou smears and RRa, 1.10; 95% CI, 1.06-1.12 for mammograms), corresponding to a greater differential in office visit coverage among the hourly group.

CONCLUSIONS

Benefit structure appears to have an important effect on receipt of cancer screening in women. The findings highlight the need to ensure that future reforms of the health care system do not adversely affect the use of preventive services.

Individual insurance: how much financial protection does it provide?

This paper examines the comparative financial protection provided by individual and group health insurance. Data sources include two national surveys of employer-based health plans and e-health insurance listings for individual coverage on the World Wide Web. Data on the use and cost of services are from the National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES), a national household survey of Americans. We estimate that individual insurance pays on average 63 percent of the health care bill, whereas group health insurance pays 75 percent. Deductibles are much higher in individual insurance, and covered benefits are more meager. At 200 percent of poverty, the top 25 percent of health care users with individual coverage would spend 11 percent of their income for out-of-pocket health care expenses, as opposed to 6 percent for persons with group coverage.

Of magic wands and kaleidoscopes: fixing problems in the individual market

Policy analysts sometimes imagine that problems in the individual market can be fixed by waving a magic wand that makes the individual market function more like the group market. However, prior studies reveal that purchasing cooperatives fail to achieve substantial economies of scale; market reforms that reduce the impact of medical underwriting are difficult to implement in the individual market; and it may not be as easy as imagined to induce people to purchase over the Internet or from new or smaller companies that are at higher risk for exiting the market. The best solution is to limit the use of subsidies to certain purchasing options, such as with purchasing cooperatives that abide by rating, issuance, and renewability rules. What is not acceptable is to hand people subsidies and send them to the unstructured and relatively unregulated individual market, nor will it work to give people unhindered choice between two basically different market segments.

Strengths and limitations of competitive versus non-competitive models of integrated capitated fundholding

Integrated budget-holding (fundholding) based on risk-adjusted capitation is commonly proposed as a central element of health system reform. Two contrasting models have been developed: the competitive model where fundholders or health plans compete for enrollees; and the non-competitive model, where plan membership is determined according to an objective attribute such as place of residence. Under the competitive model, efficiency is sought through consumer choice of plan. A range of regulatory elements may also be introduced to moderate undesirable elements of competition. Under the non-competitive model, efficiency is achieved through government regulation and the fact that the fundholder has continuing responsibility for the health of a defined population, supported by micro-management tools (such as quality assurance and selective payment arrangements). In theory, the non-competitive model encourages population-based health services planning. While both models assume risk-adjusted capitated funding, the requirements of any formula are more stringent under the competitive model. Economic theory, as well as documented health system experience, can help identify the relative strengths and limitations of each model. Concerns with the competitive model relate primarily to the capacity to develop robust risk adjusters for capitation sufficient to reduce the incentives for patient risk selection. Possible reductions in the quality of care are also a concern, compounded by difficulties for consumers in discriminating between plans. Efficiency under the non-competitive model requires a strong and appropriate regulatory/policy framework and effective use of micro-management tools. Funding equity objectives can be met through either model by the adoption of income-related contributions, but under the competitive model this may be compromised by incentives for the fundholders to select low-risk patients. Evidence drawn from regional fundholding in New South Wales (NSW, Australia), the US Veterans Health Agency and the literature on managed care in the USA illustrate these concerns. The problem of risk selection in the competitive model is a major theoretical concern, confirmed by the empirical evidence. This, together with concerns regarding other aspects of performance, suggests that the non-competitive model may be preferable, at least as an interim step in reform in public or mixed systems. Future research on this issue is clearly required.