Pay-for-performance schemes that use patient and provider categories would reduce payment disparities

Effects of individual and neighborhood social risks on diabetes pay-for-performance program under a single-payer health system

BACKGROUND

Enrollment in and adherence to a diabetes pay-for-performance (P4P) program can lead to desirable processes and outcomes of diabetes care. However, knowledge is limited on the potential exclusion of patients with individual or neighborhood social risks or interruption of services in the disease-specific P4P program without mandatory participation under a single-payer health system.

OBJECTIVE

To investigate the impact of individual and neighborhood social risks on exclusion from and adherence to the diabetes P4P program of patients with type 2 diabetes (T2D) in Taiwan.

METHODS

This study used data from Taiwan's 2009-2017 population-based National Health Insurance Research Database, 2010 Population and Housing Census, and 2010 Income Tax Statistics. A retrospective cohort study was conducted, and study populations were identified from 2012 to 2014. The first cohort comprised 183,806 patients with newly diagnosed T2D, who had undergone follow up for 1 year; the second cohort consisted of 78,602 P4P patients who had undergone follow up for 2 years after P4P enrollment. Binary logistic regression models were used to examine the associations of social risks with exclusion from and adherence to the diabetes P4P program.

RESULTS

T2D patients with higher individual social risks were more likely to be excluded from the P4P program, but those with higher neighborhood-level social risks were slightly less likely to be excluded. T2D patients with the higher individual- or neighborhood-level social risks showed less likelihood of adhering to the program, and the person-level coefficient was stronger in magnitude than the neighborhood-level one.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results indicate the importance of individual social risk adjustment and special financial incentives in disease-specific P4P programs. Strategies for improving program adherence should consider individual and neighborhood social risks.

Measuring Equity in the Hospital Setting: An HCAHPS Application of the Health Equity Summary Score

BACKGROUND

Health care quality varies by patient factors, including race-and-ethnicity and preferred language. Addressing inequities requires identifying them and incentivizing equity.

OBJECTIVES

We apply an approach first implemented in the Medicare Advantage setting to measure equity in patient experiences by race-and-ethnicity [Asian American and Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (AA and NHPI), Black, Hispanic, vs. White] and language preference (English-preferring vs. another-language-preferring). We identify characteristics of hospitals providing high-quality equitable care.

RESEARCH DESIGN

We estimated, standardized, and combined performance measures into a Health Equity Summary Score (HESS) using 2016-2019 Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey data. The HCAHPS HESS considered current cross-sectional performance, within-hospital improvement, and overall improvement by race-and-ethnicity and language preference.

SUBJECTS

A total of 3333 US hospitals with 2019 HCAHPS Star Ratings.

RESULTS

The HCAHPS HESS was calculable for 44% of hospitals. High-scoring (4-5 diamonds on a 1-diamond to 5-diamond scale) hospitals tended to be smaller than intermediate-scoring [3 diamonds (14% of high-scoring hospitals had <100 beds vs. 7% of intermediate-scoring hospitals, P <0.001) and were less often for-profit (20% vs. 31%, P <0.001)]. While a significant percentage (29%) of patients served by high-scoring hospitals were AA and NHPI, Black, or Hispanic, and 9% were another-language-preferring, there were smaller proportions of Black and Hispanic patients in high-scoring versus other hospitals. HESS performance was negatively associated with the percentage of patients preferring another language to English. HESS scores were moderately correlated with overall Star Ratings ( r =0.70).

CONCLUSIONS

The HCAHPS HESS and practices of high-scoring hospitals could promote more equitable patient experiences.

The role of pay-for-performance in reducing healthcare disparities: A narrative literature review

As American healthcare shifts to value-based payment, Pay-for-Performance (P4P) has become an important and controversial topic. One of the main controversies pertains to its potential to narrow or widen existing healthcare disparities depending on how the program is designed and implemented. It is thus imperative to understand which design features are most likely to reduce disparities. We conducted a systematic literature review from 2004 to 2021 of P4P's impact on disparities. Given the interdisciplinary nature of P4P research, multiple search strategies were combined, and many study designs were eligible for analysis. The literature was then qualitatively analyzed, with themes and major findings developed using Grounded Theory. Six major design features emerged as most promising in leveraging P4P to reduce disparities: 1) Risk/Case-Mix Adjustment; 2) Stratified Performance Measures/Stratification; 3) Disparity Reduction Metrics; 4) Exception Reporting; 5) Pay-for-Improvement; and 6) Population-Specific Metrics. Each design feature has its own mechanism, strengths, and weaknesses. We identify and define these features' direct and indirect effects on healthcare disparities. The interaction of each design feature with one another, with P4P as a whole, and within the larger reimbursement system can have considerable effects on disparities. Promising strategies exist to leverage P4P to narrow disparities for clinically and socially complex patients. The six design features discussed in this review help P4P programs address structural disadvantages faced by such patients and their providers. In regard to health equity, these design features can transform P4P from being part of the problem to being part of the solution.

Hospital value-based payment programs and disparity in the United States: A review of current evidence and future perspectives

Beginning in the early 2010s, an array of Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) programs has been developed in the United States (U.S.) to contain costs and improve health care quality. Despite documented successes in these efforts in some instances, there have been growing concerns about the programs' unintended consequences for health care disparities due to their built-in biases against health care organizations that serve a disproportionate share of disadvantaged patient populations. We explore the effects of three Medicare hospital VBP programs on health and health care disparities in the U.S. by reviewing their designs, implementation history, and evidence on health care disparities. The available empirical evidence thus far suggests varied impacts of hospital VBP programs on health care disparities. Most of the reviewed studies in this paper demonstrate that hospital VBP programs have the tendency to exacerbate health care disparities, while a few others found evidence of little or no worsening impacts on disparities. We discuss several policy options and recommendations which include various reform approaches and specific programs ranging from those addressing upstream structural barriers to health care access, to health care delivery strategies that target service utilization and health outcomes of vulnerable populations under the VBP programs. Future studies are needed to produce more explicit, conclusive, and consistent evidence on the impacts of hospital VBP programs on disparities.

Predicting Race And Ethnicity To Ensure Equitable Algorithms For Health Care Decision Making

Algorithms are currently used to assist in a wide array of health care decisions. Despite the general utility of these health care algorithms, there is growing recognition that they may lead to unintended racially discriminatory practices, raising concerns about the potential for algorithmic bias. An intuitive precaution against such bias is to remove race and ethnicity information as an input to health care algorithms, mimicking the idea of "race-blind" decisions. However, we argue that this approach is misguided. Knowledge, not ignorance, of race and ethnicity is necessary to combat algorithmic bias. When race and ethnicity are observed, many methodological approaches can be used to enforce equitable algorithmic performance. When race and ethnicity information is unavailable, which is often the case, imputing them can expand opportunities to not only identify and assess algorithmic bias but also combat it in both clinical and nonclinical settings. A valid imputation method, such as Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding, can be applied to standard data collected by public and private payers and provider entities. We describe two applications in which imputation of race and ethnicity can help mitigate potential algorithmic biases: equitable disease screening algorithms using machine learning and equitable pay-for-performance incentives.

Incentivizing Excellent Care to At-Risk Groups with a Health Equity Summary Score

BACKGROUND

Social risk factors (SRFs) such as minority race-and-ethnicity or low income are associated with quality-of-care, health, and healthcare outcomes. Organizations might prioritize improving care for easier-to-treat groups over those with SRFs, but measuring, reporting, and further incentivizing quality-of-care for SRF groups may improve their care.

OBJECTIVE

To develop, as a proof-of-concept, a Health Equity Summary Score (HESS): a succinct, easy-to-understand score that could be used to promote high-quality care to those with SRFs in Medicare Advantage (MA) health plans, which provide care for almost twenty million older and disabled Americans and collect extensive quality measure and SRF data.

DESIGN

We estimated, standardized, and combined performance scores for two sets of quality measures for enrollees in 2013-2016 MA health plans, considering both current levels of care, within-plan improvement, and nationally benchmarked improvement for those with SRFs (specifically, racial-and-ethnic minority status and dual-eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid).

PARTICIPANTS

All MA plans with publicly reported quality scores and 500 or more 2016 enrollees.

MAIN MEASURES

Publicly reported clinical quality and patient experience measures.

KEY RESULTS

Almost 90% of plans measured for MA Star Ratings received a HESS; plans serving few patients with SRFs were excluded. The summary score was moderately positively correlated with publicly reported overall Star Ratings (r = 0.66-0.67). High-scoring plans typically had sizable enrollment of both racial-and-ethnic minorities (38-42%) and dually eligible beneficiaries (29-38%).

CONCLUSIONS

We demonstrated the feasibility of developing and estimating a HESS that is intended to promote and incentivize excellent care for racial-and-ethnic minorities and dually eligible MA enrollees. The HESS measures SRF-specific performance and does not simply duplicate overall plan Star Ratings. It also identifies plans that provide excellent care to large numbers of those with SRFs. Our methodology could be extended to other SRFs, quality measures, and settings.

Payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings

BACKGROUND

Changes to the method of payment for healthcare providers, including pay-for-performance schemes, are increasingly being used by governments, health insurers, and employers to help align financial incentives with health system goals. In this review we focused on changes to the method and level of payment for all types of healthcare providers in outpatient healthcare settings. Outpatient healthcare settings, broadly defined as 'out of hospital' care including primary care, are important for health systems in reducing the use of more expensive hospital services.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the impact of different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings on the quantity and quality of health service provision, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, cost of service provision, and adverse effects.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase (searched 5 March 2019), and several other databases. In addition, we searched clinical trials platforms, grey literature, screened reference lists of included studies, did a cited reference search for included studies, and contacted study authors to identify additional studies. We screened records from an updated search in August 2020, with any potentially relevant studies categorised as awaiting classification.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient care settings.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the payment methods comparisons and outcomes, and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different outcome categories. Where feasible, we used meta-analysis to synthesise the effects of payment interventions under the same category. Where it was not possible to perform meta-analysis, we have reported means/medians and full ranges of the available point estimates. We have reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative difference (as per cent change or mean difference (MD)) for continuous outcomes.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 27 studies in the review: 12 randomised trials, 13 controlled before-and-after studies, one interrupted time series, and one repeated measure study. Most healthcare providers were primary care physicians. Most of the payment methods were implemented by health insurance schemes in high-income countries, with only one study from a low- or middle-income country. The included studies were categorised into four groups based on comparisons of different payment methods. (1) Pay for performance (P4P) plus existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings P4P incentives probably improve child immunisation status (RR 1.27, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.19 to 1.36; 3760 patients; moderate-certainty evidence) and may slightly increase the number of patients who are asked more detailed questions on their disease by their pharmacist (MD 1.24, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.54; 454 patients; low-certainty evidence). P4P may slightly improve primary care physicians' prescribing of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medicines compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.07, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.12; 362 patients; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effects of extra P4P incentives on mean blood pressure reduction for patients and costs for providing services compared with an existing payment method (very low-certainty evidence). Outcomes related to workload or other health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial found that compared to the control group, the performance of incentivised professionals was not sustained after the P4P intervention had ended. (2) Fee for service (FFS) compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings We are uncertain about the effect of FFS on the quantity of health services delivered (outpatient visits and hospitalisations), patient health outcomes, and total drugs cost compared to an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. The quality of service provision and health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial reported that physicians paid via FFS may see more well patients than salaried physicians (low-certainty evidence), possibly implying that more unnecessary services were delivered through FFS. (3) FFS mixed with existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings FFS mixed payment method may increase the quantity of health services provided compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07 to 1.76; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effect of FFS mixed payment on quality of services provided, patient health outcomes, and health professional outcomes compared with an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. Cost outcomes and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. (4) Enhanced FFS compared with FFS for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings Enhanced FFS (higher FFS payment) probably increases child immunisation rates (RR 1.25, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.48; moderate-certainty evidence). We are uncertain whether higher FFS payment results in more primary care visits and about the effect of enhanced FFS on the net expenditure per year on covered children with regular FFS (very low-certainty evidence). Quality of service provision, patient outcomes, health professional outcomes, and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

For healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings, P4P or an increase in FFS payment level probably increases the quantity of health service provision (moderate-certainty evidence), and P4P may slightly improve the quality of service provision for targeted conditions (low-certainty evidence). The effects of changes in payment methods on health outcomes is uncertain due to very low-certainty evidence. Information to explore the influence of specific payment method design features, such as the size of incentives and type of performance measures, was insufficient. Furthermore, due to limited and very low-certainty evidence, it is uncertain if changing payment models without including additional funding for professionals would have similar effects. There is a need for further well-conducted research on payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings in low- and middle-income countries; more studies comparing the impacts of different designs of the same payment method; and studies that consider the unintended consequences of payment interventions.

Accurate Measurement In California's Safety-Net Health Systems Has Gaps And Barriers

Patient safety in ambulatory care has not been routinely measured. California implemented a pay-for-performance program in safety-net hospitals that incentivized measurement and improvement in key areas of ambulatory safety: referral completion, medication safety, and test follow-up. We present two years of program data (collected during July 2015-June 2017) and show both suboptimal performance in aspects of ambulatory safety and questionable reliability in data reporting. Performance was better in areas that required limited coordination or patient engagement-for example, annual medication monitoring versus follow-up after high-risk mammograms. Health care systems that lack seamlessly integrated electronic health records and patient registries encountered barriers to reporting reliable ambulatory safety data, particularly for measures that integrated multiple data elements. These data challenges precluded accurate performance measurement in many areas. Policy makers and safety advocates need to support the development of information systems and measures that facilitate the accurate ascertainment of the health systems, patients, and clinical tasks at greatest risk for ambulatory safety failures.

Payment Reform and Health Disparities: Changes in Dialysis Modality under the New Medicare Dialysis Payment System

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the effect of the Medicare dialysis payment reform on potential disparities in the selection of peritoneal dialysis (PD) for the treatment of end-stage renal disease (ESRD).

DATA SOURCES

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) ESRD Medical Evidence Form, Medicare claims, and other CMS data for 2008-2013.

STUDY DESIGN

We examined the association of patient age, race/ethnicity, urban/rural location, pre-ESRD care, comorbidities, insurance, and other factors with the selection of PD as initial dialysis modality across prereform (2008-2009), interim (2010), and postreform (2011-2013) time periods.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Selection of PD increased among diverse patient subgroups following the payment reform. However, the lower PD selection observed with older age, black race, Hispanic ethnicity, less pre-ESRD care, and Medicaid insurance before the reform largely remained in the initial postreform years.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite recent growth in PD, there may be ongoing disparities in access to PD that have largely not been mitigated by the payment reform. There is potential for modifying provider financial incentives to achieve policy goals related to cost and quality of care. However, even with a substantial shift in financial incentives, separate initiatives to reduce existing disparities in care may be needed.

Pay-for-Performance: Disappointing Results or Masked Heterogeneity?

Research on the effects of pay-for-performance (P4P) in health care indicates largely disappointing results. This central finding, however, may mask important heterogeneity in the effects of P4P. We conducted a literature review to assess whether hospital and physician performance in P4P vary by patient and catchment area factors, organizational and structural capabilities, and P4P program characteristics. Several findings emerged: organizational size, practice type, teaching status, and physician age and gender modify performance in P4P. For physician practices and hospitals, a higher proportion of poor and minority patients is consistently associated with worse performance. Other theoretically influential characteristics-including information technology and staffing levels-yield mixed results. Inconsistent and contradictory effects of bonus likelihood, bonus size, and marginal costs on performance in P4P suggest organizations have not responded strategically to financial incentives. We conclude that extant heterogeneity in the effects of P4P does not fundamentally alter current assessments about its effectiveness.

Impact of Provider Incentives on Quality and Value of Health Care

The use of financial incentives to improve quality in health care has become widespread. Yet evidence on the effectiveness of incentives suggests that they have generally had limited impact on the value of care and have not led to better patient outcomes. Lessons from social psychology and behavioral economics indicate that incentive programs in health care have not been effectively designed to achieve their intended impact. In the United States, Medicare's Hospital Readmission Reduction Program and Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, created under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), provide evidence on how variations in the design of incentive programs correspond with differences in effect. As financial incentives continue to be used as a tool to increase the value and quality of health care, improving the design of programs will be crucial to ensure their success.

National findings regarding health IT use and participation in health care delivery reform programs among office-based physicians

OBJECTIVE

Our objective was to characterize physicians' participation in delivery and payment reform programs over time and describe how participants in these programs were using health information technology (IT) to coordinate care, engage patients, manage patient populations, and improve quality.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A nationally representative cohort of physicians was surveyed in 2012 (unweighted N = 2567) and 2013 (unweighted N = 2399). Regression analyses used those survey responses to identify associations between health IT use and participation in and attrition from patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs), accountable care organizations (ACOs), and pay-for-performance programs (P4Ps).

RESULTS

In 2013, 45% of physicians participated in PCMHs, ACOs, or P4Ps. While participation in each program increased (P < .05) between 2012 and 2013, program attrition ranged from 31-40%. Health IT use was associated with greater program participation (RR = 1.07-1.16). PCMH, ACO, and P4P participants were more likely than nonparticipants to perform quality improvement and patient engagement activities electronically (RR = 1.09-1.14); only ACO participants were more likely to share information electronically (RR = 1.07-1.09).

DISCUSSION

Participation in delivery and payment reform programs increased between 2012 and 2013. Participating physicians were more likely to use health IT. There was significant attrition from and switching between PCMHs, ACOs, and P4Ps.

CONCLUSION

This work provides the basis for understanding physician participation in and attrition from delivery and payment reform programs, as well as how health IT was used to support those programs. Understanding health IT use by program participants may help to identify factors enabling a smooth transition to alternative payment models.

How Financial and Reputational Incentives Can Be Used to Improve Medical Care

OBJECTIVES

Narrative review of the impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) and public reporting (PR) on health care outcomes, including spillover effects and impact on disparities.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The impact of P4P and PR is dependent on the underlying payment system (fee-for-service, salary, capitation) into which these schemes are introduced. Both have the potential to improve care, but they can also have substantial unintended consequences. Evidence from the behavioral economics literature suggests that individual physicians will vary in how they respond to incentives. We also discuss issues to be considered when including patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) or patient-reported experience measures into P4P and PR schemes.

CONCLUSION

We provide guidance to payers and policy makers on the design of P4P and PR programs so as to maximize their benefits and minimize their unintended consequences. These include involving clinicians in the design of the program, taking into account the payment system into which new incentives are introduced, designing the structure of reward programs to maximize the likelihood of intended outcomes and minimize the likelihood of unintended consequences, designing schemes that minimize the risk of increasing disparities, providing stability of incentives over some years, and including outcomes that are relevant to patients' priorities. In addition, because of the limitations of PR and P4P as effective interventions in their own right, it is important that they are combined with other policies and interventions intended to improve quality to maximize their likely impact.

Community health needs assessments: filling data gaps for population health research and management

INTRODUCTION

Community health needs assessments (CHNA) are completed to meet varied regulatory and statutory requirements for local public health departments, tax-exempt 501(c)(3) hospitals, and Federally Qualified Health Centers. Although compliance is a motivating factor, these entities are committed to understanding the communities they serve and to developing strategies to address health needs and inequities in health and health care.

FILLING DATA GAPS

CHNAs have the potential to improve the health of communities and populations by giving crucial qualitative and quantitative context to hospital and patient data, thereby enhancing opportunities for health services and clinical outcomes researchers. Filling in these data gaps can help to improve population health by highlighting community-and social determinant-related dynamics relevant to the improved health of the community.

CHNAS AND EHRS FOR POPULATION HEALTH

Successful models exist that that have used CHNAs and the resulting data to improve population health management and reduce inequities, as do health systems that have used the EHR and community-based performance measurement data to achieve population health goals.