Most Marketplace Plans Included At Least 25 Percent Of Local-Area Physicians, But Enrollment Disparities Remained

Preventing Financial Strain for Low- and Moderate-Income Adults: a Comparison of Medicaid, Marketplace, and Employer-Sponsored Insurance

BACKGROUND

Medicaid expansion and subsidized private plans purchased on the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) Marketplaces accounted for most of the ACA's coverage gains.

OBJECTIVE

Compare access to care and financial strain between Medicaid and Marketplace plans, and benchmark these against employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) plans.

DESIGN

Cross-sectional survey PARTICIPANTS: A nationally representative, non-institutionalized sample of 37,219 non-elderly adults with incomes up to 400% of the federal poverty level between 2015 and 2018, and a sub-group of individuals with chronic diseases.

MAIN MEASURES

Self-reported barriers to accessing care, cost-related medication non-adherence, and financial strain.

KEY RESULTS

Marketplace enrollees were more likely than Medicaid enrollees to delay or avoid care due to cost (19.3% vs 10.0%; adjusted difference (AD), 8.6 [95% CI, 6.8 to 10.4]) and report difficulties affording specialty care (7.7% vs 6.6%; AD, 1.8% [95% CI, 0.3% to 3.3%]), while there were no differences in having insurance accepted by a doctor or ability to afford dental care. Marketplace enrollees were also more likely to report cost-related medication non-adherence (21.5% vs 20.0%; AD, 4.0 [CI, 1.5 to 6.4]), be very worried about not being able to pay medical costs in case of a serious accident (32.3% vs 25.8%; AD, 6.4 [CI, 4.2 to 8.6]), have expenses exceeding $2000 (22.4% vs 5.4%; AD, 8.3 [CI, 6.2 to 10.3]), and have problems paying medical bills (18.4% vs 15.6%; AD, 1.8 [CI, 0.3 to 3.9]). Marketplace-Medicaid differences were larger among persons with a chronic disease. Individuals in ESI plans fared better for most, but not all, outcomes.

CONCLUSION

Medicaid offers better protections than Marketplace plans on most measures of access and financial strain.

Provider networks and health plan premium variation

OBJECTIVE

To examine how plan premiums are associated with physician network breadth, hospital network breadth, and hospital network quality on the Affordable Care Act's Health Insurance Marketplaces in all 50 states and the DC in 2016.

DATA SOURCES

Data on plan premiums and characteristics came from 2016 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Health Insurance Exchange (HIX) Compare. Provider network information was obtained from Vericred. Hospital characteristics were obtained from CMS Hospital Compare and the American Hospital Association (AHA) survey.

STUDY DESIGN

We analyzed how plan premiums were associated with variations in physician network breadth, hospital network breadth, and hospital network quality using ordinary least square regressions with state-rating area fixed effects and carrier fixed effects.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Plan premiums were positively associated with physician network breadth and hospital network breadth. We find the following statistically significant results: a one standard deviation increase in physician network breadth was linked to a premium increase of 2.8 percent or $101 per year; a one standard deviation increase in hospital network breadth was linked to a premium increase of 2.4 percent or $86 per year. There was no significant association between premiums and hospital network quality, as measured by hospital star ratings and the inclusion of teaching hospitals or the top-20 hospitals nationwide.

CONCLUSIONS

Physician network breadth and hospital network breadth contributed positively to plan premiums. The roles of the two types of provider network breadth are quantitatively similar. Premiums appear to be insensitive to hospital network quality.

What are consumers willing to pay for a broad network health plan?: Evidence from covered California

Health Insurance Marketplaces have received considerable attention for their narrow network health plans. Yet, little is known about consumer tastes for network breadth and how they affect plan selection. I estimate demand for health plans in California's Marketplace, Covered California. Using 2017 individual enrollment data and provider network directories, I develop a geospatial measure of network breadth that reflects the physical locations of households and network providers. I find that households are sensitive to network breath in their plan choices. Mean willingness to pay for a broad network plan relative to a narrow network plan, defined as a two standard deviation, 17.44 percentage point increase in network breadth, is $45.83 in post-subsidy monthly premiums. Variation in WTP indicates a selection mechanism exists whereby older households sort into broader network plans. I also find that households are highly premium sensitive, which may be a result of plan standardization in Covered California.

The Regulatory Failure to Define Essential Health Benefits

Basic principles of economics suggest that health insurers should seek to avoid covering sick individuals and attempt to minimize the amount they have to spend if, despite the insurer's best efforts, such individuals enroll in coverage. The drafters of the Affordable Care Act recognized this natural tendency of insurers and put in place multiple provisions aimed at avoiding such behavior. One such tool was the requirement that all health insurers in the individual and small group markets cover an identical, comprehensive set of benefits known as the Essential Health Benefits ("EHBs"). EHBs were designed to ensure that consumers are able to access comprehensive coverage, but also to prevent insurers from trying to avoid high-risk enrollees by designing plans that appeal only to the healthy. Congress did not, however, statutorily define the full package of benefits, instead delegating primary authority for that task to the Department of Health & Human Services ("HHS"). This article argues that HHS has implemented the EHB requirements in a manner that appears structurally incapable of achieving the goals of the statute. By utilizing a vague definition of benefits, allowing benefit substitutions, and failing to limit use of service-level selection tools, HHS has permitted insurers to compete for low-risk insureds, avoid paying for certain high-cost treatments, and prevented consumers from making fully informed purchasing decisions.

Racial Discrimination in Health Care and Utilization of Health Care: a Cross-sectional Study of California Adults

BACKGROUND

Racial and ethnic discrimination in health care have been associated with suboptimal use of health care. However, limited research has examined how facets of health care utilization influence, and are influenced by, discrimination.

OBJECTIVE

This study aimed to determine if type of insurance coverage and location of usual source of care used were associated with perceptions of racial or ethnic discrimination in health care. Additionally, this study examined if perceived racial or ethnic discrimination influenced delaying or forgoing prescriptions or medical care.

DESIGN

Data from the 2015-2016 California Health Interview Survey were used. Logistic regression models estimated odds of perceiving racial or ethnic discrimination from insurance type and location of usual source of care. Logistic regression models estimated odds of delaying or forgoing medical care or prescriptions.

PARTICIPANTS

Responses for 39,171 adults aged 18 and over were used.

MAIN MEASURES

Key health care utilization variables were as follows: current insurance coverage, location of usual source of care, delaying or forgoing medical care, and delaying or forgoing prescriptions. We examined if these effects differed by race. Ever experiencing racial or ethnic discrimination in the health care setting functioned as a dependent and independent variable in analyses.

KEY RESULTS

When insurance type and location of care were included in the same model, only the former was associated with perceived discrimination. Specifically, those with Medicaid had 66% higher odds of perceiving discrimination, relative to those with employer-sponsored coverage (AOR = 1.66; 95% CI 1.11, 2.47). Race did not moderate the impact of discrimination. Perceived discrimination was associated with higher odds of delaying or forgoing both prescriptions (AOR = 1.97; 95% CI 1.26, 3.09) and medical care (AOR = 1.84; 95% CI 1.31, 2.59).

CONCLUSIONS

Health care providers have an opportunity to improve the experiences of their patients, particularly those with publicly sponsored coverage.

Do individuals respond to cost-sharing subsidies in their selections of marketplace health insurance plans?

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) provides assistance to low-income consumers through both premium subsidies and cost-sharing reductions (CSRs). Low-income consumers' lack of health insurance literacy or information regarding CSRs may lead them to not take-up CSR benefits for which they are eligible. We use administrative data from 2014 to 2016 on roughly 22 million health insurance plan choices of low-income individuals enrolled in ACA Marketplace coverage to assess whether they behave in a manner consistent with being aware of the availability of CSRs. We take advantage of discontinuous changes in the schedule of CSR benefits to show that consumers are highly sensitive to the value of CSRs when selecting insurance plans and that a very low percentage select dominated plans. These findings suggest that CSR subsidies are salient to consumers and that the program is well designed to account for any lack of health insurance literacy among the low-income population it serves.