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Holes in the Geofence: Privacy Vulnerabilities in “Smart” DNS Services. PROCEEDINGS ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 2021. [DOI: 10.2478/popets-2021-0022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Smart DNS (SDNS) services advertise access to geofenced content (typically, video streaming sites such as Netflix or Hulu) that is normally inaccessible unless the client is within a prescribed geographic region. SDNS is simple to use and involves no software installation. Instead, it requires only that users modify their DNS settings to point to an SDNS resolver. The SDNS resolver “smartly” identifies geofenced domains and, in lieu of their proper DNS resolutions, returns IP addresses of proxy servers located within the geofence. These servers then transparently proxy traffic between the users and their intended destinations, allowing for the bypass of these geographic restrictions.
This paper presents the first academic study of SDNS services. We identify a number of serious and pervasive privacy vulnerabilities that expose information about the users of these systems. These include architectural weaknesses that enable content providers to identify which requesting clients use SDNS. Worse, we identify flaws in the design of some SDNS services that allow any arbitrary third party to enumerate these services’ users (by IP address), even if said users are currently offline. We present mitigation strategies to these attacks that have been adopted by at least one SDNS provider in response to our findings.
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Too Close for Comfort: Morasses of (Anti-) Censorship in the Era of CDNs. PROCEEDINGS ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 2021. [DOI: 10.2478/popets-2021-0023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Recent research claims that “powerful” nation-states may be hegemonic over significant web traffic of “underserved” nations (e.g., Brazil and India). Such traffic may be surveilled when transiting (or ending in) these powerful nations. On the other hand, content distribution networks (CDNs) are designed to bring web content closer to end-users. Thus it is natural to ask whether CDNs have led to the localization of Internet traffic within the country’s boundary, challenging the notion of nation-state hegemony.
Further, such traffic localization may inadvertently enhance a country’s ability to coerce content providers to censor (or monitor) access within its boundary. On top of that, the obvious solution, i.e., anti-censorship approaches, may sadly face a new dilemma. Traditional ones, relying on proxies, are easily discoverable. Whereas newer ones (e.g., Decoy Routing, Cache-Browser, Domain Fronting and CovertCast etc.) might not work as they require accessing web content hosted outside the censors’ boundary. We thus quantitatively analyzed the impact of web content localization on various anti-censorship systems.
Such analysis requires geolocating the websites. Thus we adapted a multilateration method, Constraint Based Geolocation (CBG), with additional heuristics. We call it as Region Specific CBG (R-CBG). In more than 89% cases, R-CBG correctly classifies hosts as inside (or outside) w.r.t. a nation. Our empirical study, involving five countries, shows that the majority (61%−92%) of popular country-specific websites are hosted within a client’s own country. Further, additional heuristics classify the majority of them to be on CDNs.
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MoneyMorph: Censorship Resistant Rendezvous using Permissionless Cryptocurrencies. PROCEEDINGS ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 2020. [DOI: 10.2478/popets-2020-0058] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Cryptocurrencies play a major role in the global financial ecosystem. Their presence across different geopolitical corridors, including in repressive regimes, has been one of their striking features. In this work, we leverage this feature for bootstrapping Censorship Resistant communication. We conceptualize the notion of stego-bootstrapping scheme and its security in terms of rareness and security against chosencovertext attacks. We present MoneyMorph, a provably secure stego-bootstrapping scheme using cryptocurrencies. MoneyMorph allows a censored user to interact with a decoder entity outside the censored region, through blockchain transactions as rendezvous, to obtain bootstrapping information such as a censorshipresistant proxy and its public key. Unlike the usual bootstrapping approaches (e.g., emailing) with heuristic security, if any, MoneyMorph employs public-key steganography over blockchain transactions to ensure provable cryptographic security. We design rendezvous over Bitcoin, Zcash, Monero, and Ethereum, and analyze their effectiveness in terms of available bandwidth and transaction cost. With its highly cryptographic structure, we show that Zcash provides 1148 byte bandwidth per transaction costing less than 0.01 USD as fee.
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Systematizing Genome Privacy Research: A Privacy-Enhancing Technologies Perspective. PROCEEDINGS ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 2018. [DOI: 10.2478/popets-2019-0006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Rapid advances in human genomics are enabling researchers to gain a better understanding of the role of the genome in our health and well-being, stimulating hope for more effective and cost efficient healthcare. However, this also prompts a number of security and privacy concerns stemming from the distinctive characteristics of genomic data. To address them, a new research community has emerged and produced a large number of publications and initiatives. In this paper, we rely on a structured methodology to contextualize and provide a critical analysis of the current knowledge on privacy-enhancing technologies used for testing, storing, and sharing genomic data, using a representative sample of the work published in the past decade. We identify and discuss limitations, technical challenges, and issues faced by the community, focusing in particular on those that are inherently tied to the nature of the problem and are harder for the community alone to address. Finally, we report on the importance and difficulty of the identified challenges based on an online survey of genome data privacy experts.
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