Does Choice Cause an Illusion of Control?

Previous research suggests that choice causes an illusion of control—that it makes people feel more likely to achieve preferable outcomes, even when they are selecting among options that are functionally identical (e.g., lottery tickets with an identical chance of winning). This research has been widely accepted as evidence that choice can have significant welfare effects, even when it confers no actual control. In this article, we report the results of 17 experiments that examined whether choice truly causes an illusion of control ( N = 10,825 online and laboratory participants). We found that choice rarely makes people feel more likely to achieve preferable outcomes—unless it makes the preferable outcomes actually more likely—and when it does, it is not because choice causes an illusion but because choice reflects some participants’ preexisting (illusory) beliefs that the functionally identical options are not identical. Overall, choice does not seem to cause an illusion of control.

An Assessment of the Validity of the Gamblers Belief Questionnaire

Cognitive distortions in gambling are irrational thoughts that cause an individual to overestimate their level of control over the outcome of the game and diminish the role of chance. Due to their strong relation to gambling disorders, they are a particularly important characteristic to assess and understand in gamblers. Although numerous measures of gambling-related cognitive distortions exist, studies assessing criterion validity are scarce. In this study, we develop several tests of the Gamblers Belief Questionnaire (GBQ), a versatile and widely used scale. A sample of 184 U.S. adults was recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk to complete an online study that included measurement of the GBQ and an assessment of the perceived role of skill and chance in various gambling and non-gambling activities. In addition to a confirmatory factor analysis of the scale, three novel validation tests were developed to understand whether the GBQ subscales can identify and discriminate measures of illusion of control and gambler's fallacy distortions. Our validation tests demonstrate that the scale does measure both distortions, providing information about gamblers' cognition that is unexplained by gambling problems, frequency of play, and demographics. Conversely, our analysis of the factor structure does not show good fit. We conclude that the GBQ measures gambling-related cognitive distortions, but there may be an opportunity to reduce the number of scale items and further refine precision of the two subscales.

Chinese Beliefs in Luck are Linked to Gambling Problems via Strengthened Cognitive Biases: A Mediation Test

Problematic patterns of gambling and their harms are known to have culturally specific expressions. For ethnic Chinese people, patterns of superstitious belief in this community appear to be linked to the elevated rates of gambling-related harms; however, little is known about the mediating psychological mechanisms. To address this issue, we surveyed 333 Chinese gamblers residing internationally and used a mediation analysis to explore how gambling-related cognitive biases, gambling frequency and variety of gambling forms ('scope') mediate the association between beliefs in luck and gambling problems. We found that cognitive biases and scope were significant mediators of this link but that the former is a stronger mediator than the latter. The mediating erroneous beliefs were not specific to any particular type of cognitive bias. These results suggest that Chinese beliefs in luck are expressed as gambling cognitive biases that increase the likelihood of gambling problems, and that biases that promote gambling (and its harms) are best understood within their socio-cultural context.

The Overestimation Phenomenon in a Skill-Based Gaming Context: The Case of March Madness Pools

Over 100 million people are estimated to take part in the NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament Championship bracket contests. However, relatively little is known about consumer behavior in skill-based gaming situations (e.g., sports betting). In two studies, we investigated the overestimation phenomenon in the "March Madness" context. In Study 1 (N = 81), we found that individuals who were allowed to make their own predictions were significantly more optimistic about their performance than individuals who did not make their own selections. In Study 2 (N = 197), all subjects participated in a mock competitive bracket pool. In line with the illusion of control theory, results showed that higher self-ratings of probability of winning significantly increased maximum willingness to wager but did not improve actual performance. Lastly, perceptions of high probability of winning significantly contributed to consumers' enjoyment and willingness to participate in a bracket pool in the future.

Let me take the wheel: Illusory control and sense of agency

Illusory control refers to an effect in games of chance where features associated with skilful situations increase expectancies of success. Past work has operationalized illusory control in terms of subjective ratings or behaviour, with limited consideration of the relationship between these definitions, or the broader construct of agency. This study used a novel card-guessing task in 78 participants to investigate the relationship between subjective and behavioural illusory control. We compared trials in which participants (a) had no opportunity to exercise illusory control, (b) could exercise illusory control for free, or (c) could pay to exercise illusory control. Contingency Judgment and Intentional Binding tasks assessed explicit and implicit sense of agency, respectively. On the card-guessing task, confidence was higher when participants exerted control than in the baseline condition. In a complementary model, participants were more likely to exercise control when their confidence was high, and this effect was accentuated in the pay condition relative to the free condition. Decisions to pay were positively correlated with control ratings on the Contingency Judgment task, but were not significantly related to Intentional Binding. These results establish an association between subjective and behavioural illusory control and locate the construct within the cognitive literature on agency.

Lucky Events and Beliefs in Luck: Paradoxical Effects on Confidence and Risk-Taking

The effects of a lucky event and irrational beliefs about luck were examined. In two experiments, some subjects experienced a lucky event, whereas others did not. All subjects then completed an unrelated decision task rated their confidence, and placed a bet. The effects of a lucky experience depended substantially on individual beliefs concerning the causal properties of luck. After the lucky event, those who believed in luck (i.e., thought of luck as a stable, personal attribute) were more confident and bet more, whereas those who did not believe in luck (i.e., thought luck was random) were less confident and bet less. A third experiment identified analogous effects using multiple-choice test questions that included a monetary penalty for errors. Increased expectations following initial luck were interpreted in terms of a lucky streak effect, whereas the paradoxical decrease in expectancy was viewed as an instance of the gamblers' fallacy.

Need State and the Illusion of Control

Two investigations tested the hypothesis that the need for a randomly determined outcome influences the degree of perceived skill involved in attaining the outcome, which, in turn, influences the confidence in attaining the outcome. In Study 1, food-deprived or food-satiated subjects expected to have a good or poor chance of winning a food incentive in a drawing. Compared to food-satiated subjects, food-deprived subjects thought the drawing involved more skill, and they were more confident about winning. In Study 2, state lottery players reported their incomes, how much skill they thought playing the lottery involved, and how confident they were about winning Path analyses showed that income negatively affected skill ratings, and skill ratings positively affected confidence-in-winning ratings. Results were replicated using comparable questions about a lottery-sponsored rub-off card game. Results are discussed in terms of Langer's propositions regarding the illusion of control.

Spillover Effects of Loss of Control on Risky Decision-Making

Decision making in risky situations is frequently required in our everyday lives and has been shown to be influenced by various factors, some of which are independent of the risk context. Based on previous findings and theories about the central role of perceptions of control and their impact on subsequent settings, spillover effects of subjective loss of control on risky decision-making are assumed. After developing an innovative experimental paradigm for inducing loss of control, its hypothesized effects on risky decision-making are investigated. Partially supporting the hypotheses, results demonstrated no increased levels of risk perceptions but decreased risk-taking behavior following experiences of loss of control. Thus, this study makes a methodological contribution by proposing a newly developed experimental paradigm facilitating further research on the effects of subjective loss of control, and additionally provides partial evidence for the spillover effects of loss of control experiences on risky decision-making.

Active involvement, not illusory control, increases risk taking in a gambling game

The research considers the influence of choice (the possibility for the player to choose a gamble or another) and involvement (the physical interaction with the gambling device) on risk taking in gambling games and whether this influence is mediated by illusory control over the outcome of the gamble. Results of a laboratory experiment (n = 100) show that (a) although choice does increase illusory control, this influence does not translate in increased risk taking, and (b) whilst involvement does increase risk taking, this effect is not mediated by illusory control. These results are discussed in relation to problem gambling, beliefs in the deployability of personal luck, and arousal approaches to risk taking.

Are decisions under risk malleable?

Human decision making under risk and uncertainty may depend on individual involvement in the outcome-generating process. Expected utility theory is silent on this issue. Prospect theory in its current form offers little, if any, prediction of how or why involvement in a process should matter, although it may offer ex post interpretations of empirical findings. Well-known findings in psychology demonstrate that when subjects exercise more involvement or choice in lottery procedures, they value their lottery tickets more highly. This often is interpreted as an "illusion of control," meaning that when subjects are more involved in a lottery, they may believe they are more likely to win, perhaps because they perceive that they have more control over the outcome. Our experimental design eliminates several possible alternative explanations for the results of previous studies in an experiment that varies the degree and type of involvement in lottery procedures. We find that in treatments with more involvement subjects on average place less rather than more value on their lottery tickets. One possible explanation for this is that involvement interacts with loss aversion by causing subjects to weigh losses more heavily than they would otherwise. One implication of our study is that involvement, either independently or in interaction with myopic loss aversion, may help explain the extreme risk aversion of bond investors.