Role of Guanxi (interpersonal relationship) in bribe-taking behaviors: evidence from China

Bribery, an illegal conspiracy between two transactional parties, has a wide range of destructive effects on society. From an interpersonal interaction perspective, we explored how Guanxi (interpersonal relationships, including direct and indirect ones) influences individuals, especially government officials' bribe-taking probability, using behavioral experiments and questionnaires. The findings suggested that direct Guanxi promoted individuals' acceptance of bribes (Study 1a), and indirect Guanxi had the same role and effect sizes (Study 1b). However, the mechanisms were slightly different. Government officials were more likely to accept bribes from family members and friends (direct Guanxi) (than strangers) because they had more trust and felt more responsible and obligated to help them (Study 2). However, accepting bribes from those who contacted them through their family or friends (indirect Guanxi) (vs. strangers) was only driven by trust (Study 3). The present study explores the lubricant role of Guanxi in corruption, extends the literature on why bribery occurs from a new perspective, and provides suggestions for fighting corruption.

Dishonesty as a signal of trustworthiness: Honesty-Humility and trustworthy dishonesty

Trustworthiness is a foundation of well-functioning relationships and societies, and thus often perceived as a socially normative behaviour. Correspondingly, a broad array of research found that people tend to act in a trustworthy way and signal their trustworthiness to others, and that trustworthiness is rewarded. Herein, we explore whether this motivation to behave trustworthily can have socially undesirable effects in terms of leading to dishonesty targeted at fulfilling the trustor's expectations (i.e. trustworthy dishonesty). Furthermore, we examine how the basic trait of Honesty-Humility, which has consistently been found to be linked to both higher honesty and trustworthiness, relates to trustworthy dishonesty, where honesty and trustworthiness are at odds. Specifically, we conducted three pre-registered studies (N = 7080), introducing a novel behavioural game, the lying-trust game, where participants had a chance to lie to act trustworthily. In two studies, we found that, when offered 'full trust', participants high in Honesty-Humility (i.e. the top 10%) engaged in trustworthy dishonesty, i.e. lied in order to avoid maximizing their own incentive at the cost of minimizing the incentive of their trustor. This pattern was not present when the trustor offered minimal trust only, as well as among participants low in Honesty-Humility (i.e. the bottom 10%).

The Reputational Consequences of Generalized Trust

The present research examines the reputational consequences of generalized trust. High-trust individuals are seen as moral and sociable, but not necessarily competent. When controlling for other traits, there is a negative relationship between trust and perceived competence (Studies 1 and 2). Compared with optimism, generalized trust has stronger effects on morality and sociability (Study 2). Furthermore, people judge those who do not discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy groups (unconditional trustors) more negatively than those who only trust groups that are, in fact, trustworthy (conditional trustors). Unconditional trust and unconditional distrust are both viewed negatively (Study 3), even after controlling for attitudinal similarity (Study 4). Critically, both generalized trust and discriminant ability (i.e., conditional trust) have independent reputational benefits (Study 5). These studies suggest that generalized trust plays an important role in how we perceive and judge others.

Prospection in Individual and Interpersonal Corruption Dilemmas

Corruption represents 1 of the main societal challenges of our time. At present, there is no theoretical framework distinguishing the prospective decision-making processes involved in different acts of corruption. We differentiate between 2 broad categories of corrupt acts that have different implications for prospective cognition: individual corrupt acts, which refer to a power holder individually abusing entrusted power; and interpersonal corrupt acts, which refer to a power holder abusing entrusted power in collaboration with other corrupt agents. We model the decision structure as 2 inherently different social dilemmas: individual corruption requires a power holder to prospect own and collective consequences, whereas interpersonal corruption requires a prospection of self-interest, the interest of corrupt partner(s) conflict and collective interests (nested social dilemma). Individual and interpersonal corruption rest on different prospective decision-making processes, which we illustrate along intrapersonal factors (prospection of costs and benefits, self-control, guilt) and interpersonal factors (social norms, trust). We explore the advantages of this novel distinction for theory development, experimental corruption research, as well as anticorruption efforts.