Attention to Stimuli of Learned versus Innate Biological Value Relies on Separate Neural Systems

Pupillary Responses Reflect Dynamic Changes in Multiple Cognitive Factors During Associative Learning in Primates

Associative learning involves complex interactions of multiple cognitive factors. While adult subjects can articulate these factors verbally, for model animals such as macaques, we rely on behavioral outputs. In our study, we used pupillary responses as an alternative measure to capture these underlying cognitive changes. We recorded the dynamic changes in the pupils of three male macaques when they learned the associations between visual stimuli and reward sizes under the classical Pavlovian experimental paradigm. We found that during the long-term learning process, the gradual changes in the pupillary response reflect the changes in the cognitive state of the animals. The pupillary response can be explained by a linear combination of components corresponding to multiple cognitive factors. These components reflect the impact of visual stimuli on the pupils, the prediction of reward values associated with the visual stimuli, and the macaques' understanding of the current experimental reward rules. The changing patterns of these factors during interday and intraday learning clearly demonstrate the enhancement of current reward-stimulus association and the weakening of previous reward-stimulus association. Our study shows that the dynamic response of pupils can serve as an objective indicator to characterize the psychological changes of animals, understand their learning process, and provide important tools for exploring animal behavior during the learning process.

We know what attention is!

Attention is one of the most thoroughly investigated psychological phenomena, yet skepticism about attention is widespread: we do not know what it is, it is too many things, there is no such thing. The deficiencies highlighted are not about experimental work but the adequacy of the scientific theory of attention. Combining common scientific claims about attention into a single theory leads to internal inconsistency. This paper demonstrates that a specific functional conception of attention is incorporated into the tasks used in standard experimental paradigms. In accepting these paradigms as valid probes of attention, we commit to this common conception. The conception unifies work at multiple levels of analysis into a coherent scientific explanation of attention. Thus, we all know what attention is.