Representation of Behavioral Tactics and Tactics-Action Transformation in the Primate Medial Prefrontal Cortex

Simultaneous oscillatory encoding of "hot" and "cold" information during social interactions in the monkey medial prefrontal cortex

Social interactions in primates require social cognition abilities such as anticipating the partner's future choices as well as pure cognitive skills involving processing task-relevant information. The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) has been implicated in these cognitive processes. Here, we investigated the neural oscillations underlying the complex social behaviors involving the interplay of social roles (Actor vs. Observer) and interaction types (whether working with a "Good" or "Bad" partner). We found opposite power modulations of the beta and gamma bands by social roles, indicating dedicated processing for task-related information. Concurrently, the interaction type was conveyed by lower frequencies, which are commonly associated with neural circuits linked to performance and reward monitoring. Thus, the mPFC exhibits parallel coding of both "cold" processes (purely cognitive) and "hot" processes (reward and social-related). This allocation of neural resources gives the mPFC a key neural node, flexibly integrating multiple sources of information during social interactions.

Non-overlapping sets of neurons encode behavioral response determinants across different tasks in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex

Higher mammals are able to simultaneously learn and perform a wide array of complex behaviors, which raises questions about how the neural representations of multiple tasks coexist within the same neural network. Do neurons play invariant roles across different tasks? Alternatively, do the same neurons play different roles in different tasks? To address these questions, we examined neuronal activity in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex of primates while they were performing two versions of arm-reaching tasks that required the selection of multiple behavioral tactics (i.e., the internal protocol of action selection), a critical requirement for the activation of this area. During the performance of these tasks, neurons in the pmPFC exhibited selective activity for the tactics, visuospatial information, action, or their combination. Surprisingly, in 82% of the tactics-selective neurons, the selective activity appeared in a particular task but not in both. Such task-specific neuronal representation appeared in 72% of the action-selective neurons. In addition, 95% of the neurons representing visuospatial information showed such activity exclusively in one task but not in both. Our findings indicate that the same neurons can play different roles across different tasks even though the tasks require common information, supporting the latter hypothesis.

Non-additive activity modulation during a decision making task involving tactic selection

Human brain imaging has revealed that stimulus-induced activity does generally not simply add to the pre-stimulus activity, but rather builds in a non-additive way on this activity. Here we investigate this subject at the single neuron level and address the question whether and to what extent a strong form of non-additivity where activity drops post-cue is present in different areas of monkey cortex, including prefrontal and agranular frontal areas, during a perceptual decision making task involving action and tactic selection. Specifically we analyze spike train data recorded in vivo from the posterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (pmPFC), the supplementary motor area (SMA) and the presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA). For each neuron, we compute the ratio of the trial-averaged pre-stimulus spike count to the trial-averaged post-stimulus count. We also perform the ratio and averaging procedures in reverse order. We find that the statistics of these quantities behave differently across areas. pmPFC involved in tactic selection shows stronger non-additivity compared to the two other areas which more generically just increase their firing rate pos-stimulus. pmPFC behaved more similarly to pre-SMA, a likely consequence of the reciprocal connections between these areas. The trial-averaged ratio statistic was reproduced by a surrogate inhomogeneous Poisson process in which the measured trial-averaged firing rate for a given neuron is used as its time-dependent rate. Principal component analysis (PCA) of the trial-averaged firing rates of neuronal ensembles further reveals area-specific time courses of response to the stimulus, including latency to peak neural response, for the typical population activity. Our work demonstrates subtle forms of area-specific non-additivity based on the fine variability structure of pre- and post-stimulus spiking activity on the single neuron level. It also reveals significant differences between areas for PCA and surrogate analysis, complementing previous observations of regional differences based solely on post-stimulus responses. Moreover, we observe regional differences in non-additivity which are related to the monkey's successful tactic selection and decision making.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11571-021-09702-0.

The Role of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex in Moderating Neural Representations of Self and Other in Primates

As a frontal node in the primate social brain, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) plays a critical role in coordinating one's own behavior with respect to that of others. Current literature demonstrates that single neurons in the MPFC encode behavior-related variables such as intentions, actions, and rewards, specifically for self and other, and that the MPFC comes into play when reflecting upon oneself and others. The social moderator account of MPFC function can explain maladaptive social cognition in people with autism spectrum disorder, which tips the balance in favor of self-centered perspectives rather than taking into consideration the perspective of others. Several strands of evidence suggest a hypothesis that the MPFC represents different other mental models, depending on the context at hand, to better predict others' emotions and behaviors. This hypothesis also accounts for aberrant MPFC activity in autistic individuals while they are mentalizing others.

Neuronal Representations of Tactic-Based Sensorimotor Transformations in the Primate Medial Prefrontal, Presupplementary, and Supplementary Motor Areas: A Comparative Study

Adaptive context-dependent behaviors necessitate the flexible selection of multiple behavioral tactics, i.e., internal protocols for selecting an action. Previous primate studies have shown that the posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pmPFC) contributes to the selection, retention, and use of tactics, but the manner in which this area employs selected tactics to convert sensory information into action and how that manner differs from downstream cortical motor areas have yet to be fully elucidated. To address this issue, the present study recorded neuronal activity in two monkeys as they performed a two-choice arm reaching task that required the selection of multiple tactics when converting spatial cue information into the direction of arm reaching. Neuronal populations in both pmPFC and presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA) represented tactics during their selection, maintenance in memory, and their use in determining an action. Additionally, they represented the monkeys' action in the behavioral epoch in which the direction of reaching was determined. A striking contrast between the pmPFC and the pre-SMA was the representation of the spatial cue location in the former and its absence in the latter area. In individual neurons, neurons in pmPFC and pre-SMA had either single or mixed representation of tactics and action. Some of the pmPFC neurons additionally encoded cue location. Finally, neurons in the supplementary motor area mainly represented the action. Taken together, the present results indicate that, of these three areas, the pmPFC plays a cardinal role during the integration of behavioral tactics and visuospatial information when selecting an action.

Neural activity in macaque medial frontal cortex represents others' choices

Predicting the behavior of others is a fundamental skill in primate social life. We tested the role of medial frontal cortex in the prediction of other agents’ behavior in two male macaques, using a monkey-human interactive task in which their actor-observer roles were intermixed. In every trial, the observer monitored the actor’s choice to reject it for a different one when he became the actor on the subsequent trial. In the delay period preceding the action, we identified neurons modulated by the agent’s identity, as well as a group of neurons encoding the agent’s future choice, some of which were neurons that showed differential patterns of activity between agents. The ability of these neurons to flexibly move from ‘self-oriented’ to ‘other-oriented’ representations could correspond to the “other side of the coin” of the simulative mirroring activity. Neurons that changed coding scheme, together with neurons exclusively involved in the prediction of the other agent’s choice, show a neural substrate for predicting or anticipating others’ choices beyond simulation.

Computational Architecture of the Parieto-Frontal Network Underlying Cognitive-Motor Control in Monkeys

The statistical structure of intrinsic parietal and parieto-frontal connectivity in monkeys was studied through hierarchical cluster analysis. Based on their inputs, parietal and frontal areas were grouped into different clusters, including a variable number of areas that in most instances occupied contiguous architectonic fields. Connectivity tended to be stronger locally: that is, within areas of the same cluster. Distant frontal and parietal areas were targeted through connections that in most instances were reciprocal and often of different strength. These connections linked parietal and frontal clusters formed by areas sharing basic functional properties. This led to five different medio-laterally oriented pillar domains spanning the entire extent of the parieto-frontal system, in the posterior parietal, anterior parietal, cingulate, frontal, and prefrontal cortex. Different information processing streams could be identified thanks to inter-domain connectivity. These streams encode fast hand reaching and its control, complex visuomotor action spaces, hand grasping, action/intention recognition, oculomotor intention and visual attention, behavioral goals and strategies, and reward and decision value outcome. Most of these streams converge on the cingulate domain, the main hub of the system. All of them are embedded within a larger eye–hand coordination network, from which they can be selectively set in motion by task demands.

Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

Despite the long scholarly discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality, and faith, explanations of what a belief and what believing is are still lacking. Recently, cognitive neuroscience research addressed the human capacity of believing. We present evidence suggesting that believing is a human brain function which results in probabilistic representations with attributes of personal meaning and value and thereby guides individuals’ behavior. We propose that the same mental processes operating on narratives and rituals constitute belief systems in individuals and social groups. Our theoretical model of believing is suited to account for secular and non-secular belief formation.

Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

Despite the long scholarly discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality, and faith, explanations of what a belief and what believing is are still lacking. Recently, cognitive neuroscience research addressed the human capacity of believing. We present evidence suggesting that believing is a human brain function which results in probabilistic representations with attributes of personal meaning and value and thereby guides individuals' behavior. We propose that the same mental processes operating on narratives and rituals constitute belief systems in individuals and social groups. Our theoretical model of believing is suited to account for secular and non-secular belief formation.