THE ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS OF ALTRUISM IN SPATIALLY HETEROGENEOUS POPULATIONS

The evolution of trans-generational altruism: kin selection meets niche construction

A cornerstone result of sociobiology states that limited dispersal can induce kin competition to offset the kin selected benefits of altruism. Several mechanisms have been proposed to circumvent this dilemma but all assume that actors and recipients of altruism interact during the same time period. Here, this assumption is relaxed and a model is developed where individuals express an altruistic act, which results in posthumously helping relatives living in the future. The analysis of this model suggests that kin selected benefits can then feedback on the evolution of the trait in a way that promotes altruistic helping at high rates under limited dispersal. The decoupling of kin competition and kin selected benefits results from the fact that by helping relatives living in the future, an actor is helping individuals that are not in direct competition with itself. A direct consequence is that behaviours which actors gain by reducing the common good of present and future generations can be opposed by kin selection. The present model integrates niche-constructing traits with kin selection theory and delineates demographic and ecological conditions under which altruism can be selected for; and conditions where the 'tragedy of the commons' can be reduced.

The evolution of cooperation and altruism--a general framework and a classification of models

One of the enduring puzzles in biology and the social sciences is the origin and persistence of intraspecific cooperation and altruism in humans and other species. Hundreds of theoretical models have been proposed and there is much confusion about the relationship between these models. To clarify the situation, we developed a synthetic conceptual framework that delineates the conditions necessary for the evolution of altruism and cooperation. We show that at least one of the four following conditions needs to be fulfilled: direct benefits to the focal individual performing a cooperative act; direct or indirect information allowing a better than random guess about whether a given individual will behave cooperatively in repeated reciprocal interactions; preferential interactions between related individuals; and genetic correlation between genes coding for altruism and phenotypic traits that can be identified. When one or more of these conditions are met, altruism or cooperation can evolve if the cost-to-benefit ratio of altruistic and cooperative acts is greater than a threshold value. The cost-to-benefit ratio can be altered by coercion, punishment and policing which therefore act as mechanisms facilitating the evolution of altruism and cooperation. All the models proposed so far are explicitly or implicitly built on these general principles, allowing us to classify them into four general categories.