Prediction Errors in Depression: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis

Less bang for my buck: Diminished anticipated enjoyment contributes to dysphoria-linked deficit in activity behavioural engagement choice

This study experimentally investigated the role of anticipated enjoyment and effort in mediating dysphoria-related deficit in activity engagement behavioural choice. Using a novel activity information processing task (about a fictional "new" Nintendo Wii sports game called "Tornado Ball"), N = 249 participants (n = 95 High Dysphoria; n = 154 Low Dysphoria) were presented information about the benefits (enjoyable features) and costs (mental and physical effort barriers) as product reviews from another player. The order of cost vs. benefit information was manipulated such that participants either heard cost information before benefit information, or vice versa. They then rated what their anticipated enjoyment and effort will be if they were to play Tornado Ball, before being given the opportunity to choose to try it themselves or not. The High Dysphoria group reported lower anticipated enjoyment (but not higher effort) relative to the Low Dysphoria group, but only when cost information was presented first. Importantly, a moderated mediation showed that the High Dysphoria group reported lower tendency to choose activity engagement (game play) as a function of having lower anticipated enjoyment, but only when cost information was presented first. The present finding indicate that reduced anticipated enjoyment may causally contribute to dysphoria-linked deficits in activity engagement behavioural choice.

“Ich denke, also sage ich vorher”: Wie “Predictive Processing-Modelle den Einsatz von Verhaltensexperimenten bei Depressionen optimieren können

Verhaltensexperimente stellen eine wichtige Interventionsform bei depressiven Störungen dar, um dysfunktionale Annahmen zu modifizieren. Häufig ist jedoch zu beobachten, dass Patient*innen trotz einer fachgerechten Durchführung von Verhaltensexperimenten weiter an negativen Annahmen festhalten. Vor diesem Hintergrund diskutieren wir in diesem Artikel, wie der Einsatz von Verhaltensexperimenten bei Depressionen optimiert werden kann und beziehen uns dabei auf ein neues Störungsmodell, das interessante Implikationen hierzu liefern könnte. Dieses Störungsmodell aus der neurowissenschaftlichen Forschung zu “Predictive Processing” geht davon aus, dass depressive Störungen durch zwei Kernaspekte gekennzeichnet sind: (1) stark negative Erwartungen, die im Sinne von selbsterfüllenden Pro­phezeiungen zu negativen Erlebnissen führen und zuneh­mend “immun” gegen gegenteilige Erfahrungen machen; (2) das Fehlen von positiven Erwartungen, wodurch die Wahr­scheinlichkeit von positiven Erlebnissen reduziert wird. Darauf aufbauend beschreiben wir zunächst, dass zur Modifikation negativer Erwartungen in einer ausführlichen Vorbesprechung erarbeitet werden sollte, welche möglichen positiven Erfahrungen aus dem Verhaltensexperiment die Patient*innen als glaubwürdig betrachten und zur Veränderung ihrer negativen Erwartungen nutzen würden. Auf diese sollte bei der Durchführung besonders geachtet werden, damit positive Erwartungsverletzungen auch als solche wahrgenommen werden. Zum anderen stellen wir dar, dass es nicht ausreichend ist, nur negative Erwartungen zu redu­zieren, sondern auch explizit positive Erwartungen durch weitere Verhaltensexperimente gefördert werden sollten.

When Beliefs Face Reality: An Integrative Review of Belief Updating in Mental Health and Illness

Belief updating is a relatively nascent field of research that examines how people adjust their beliefs in light of new evidence. So far, belief updating has been investigated in partly unrelated lines of research from different psychological disciplines. In this article, we aim to integrate these disparate lines of research. After presenting some prominent theoretical frameworks and experimental designs that have been used for the study of belief updating, we review how healthy people and people with mental disorders update their beliefs after receiving new information that supports or challenges their views. Available evidence suggests that both healthy people and people with particular mental disorders are prone to certain biases when updating their beliefs, although the nature of the respective biases varies considerably and depends on several factors. Anomalies in belief updating are discussed in terms of both new insights into the psychopathology of various mental disorders and societal implications, such as irreconcilable political and societal controversies due to the failure to take information into account that disconfirms one’s own view. We conclude by proposing a novel integrative model of belief updating and derive directions for future research.