Internal states: Necessary but not sufficient

Rules of Conduct for Behavior Analysts in the Presence of Hypothetical Constructs: A Commentary on Eckard and Lattal (2020)

Eckard and Lattal (2020) summarized the behavioristic view of hypothetical constructs and theories, and then, in a novel and timely manner, applied this view to a critique of internal clock models of temporal control. In our three-part commentary, we aim to contribute to the authors' discussion by first expanding upon their view of the positive contributions afforded by constructs and theories. We then refine and question their view of the perils of reifying constructs and assigning them causal properties. Finally, we suggest to behavior analysts four rules of conduct for dealing with mediational theories: tolerate constructs proposed with sufficient reason; consider them seriously, both empirically and conceptually; develop alternative, behavior-analytic models with overlapping empirical domains; and contrast the various models. Through variation and selection, behavioral science will evolve.

Swimming against the mainstream: the early years from chilly tributary to transformative mainstream

This article traces the transformative paradigm shift in the theory and practice of personal change. Within a decade, new conceptual models, analytic methodologies and modes of treatment were created. Treatments were altered in the content, locus, and agents of change. This enterprising period also witnessed a sweeping shift in the public acceptance of behaviorally oriented treatments. The present article also analyzes the evolving theorizing and applications of social cognitive theory rooted in modeling, self-regulatory, and self-efficacy mechanisms of psychosocial change. This model of change is implemented from an agentic perspective to promote personal, institutional, and society-wide changes that address some of the most urgent global problems.

Ontological and epistemological terrains revisited

The present commentary discusses the scientific legitimacy of theories confined to correlations of observables and those that specify the mechanisms governing the relations between observable events. Operant analysts frame the theoretical differences misleadingly when the operant approach is portrayed as addressing environmental influence for effecting change but cognitive approaches are depicted as disembodied from environmental influences and thus can only provide correlates with action. In point of fact, both approaches encompass environmental influences. The major issues in contention are whether human thinking is entirely or only partially shaped by environmental influences; whether the influences in the person-environment relation flow unidirectionally or bidirectionally; and whether human thought serves a determinative function or is a functionless epiphenomenon. Proponents of epiphenomenalism regard other people's thinking as functionless by-products of conditioned responses, but present their own thoughts on matters as the right ones that provide functional guides for structuring interventions. This commentary discusses the self-negating nature of the epiphenomenalism argument. It also corrects misunderstandings and misrepresentations of self-efficacy theory.