Changes in cesarean section rate before and after the end of the Korean Value Incentive Program

BACKGROUND

The Korean government implemented a value incentive program providing incentives to providers based on C-section rates, with the rates being publicized. The program ended in 2014 after the administration decided that the effects of the incentive program were limited. In this report, we analyzed changes in C-section rates with the value incentive program.

METHODS

The analysis used claim data from Korea's National Health Insurance. The study period (2011-2016) was divided into two phases: before and after the program. This study included 95 providers that were tertiary or general hospitals having more than 200 deliveries per year during the study period. The dependent variable was the risk-adjusted C-section rate. Independent variables included time and hospital characteristics such as hospital type, district, and ownership. Interrupted time series analysis was performed to analyze the data.

RESULTS

Our results showed that risk-adjusted C-section rates increased immediately after the end of the incentive program for C-sections. The immediate effect of intervention, a change of 1.73% (P < .05), was statistically significant, as was the trend after intervention, at 0.21% (P < .0001). The slope showed an increase after the intervention to 0.25% per medical institution, which was contrary to the trend of the preintervention decline (negative slope).

CONCLUSION

Risk-adjusted C-section rates increased immediately after the discontinuation of a value incentive program. Tertiary hospitals showed greater increases in C-section rates than general hospitals after the intervention.

Volatility and Persistence of Value-Based Purchasing Adjustments: A Challenge to Integrating Population Health and Community Benefit Into Business Operations

With the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, Medicare's Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) began a transition to value-based purchasing (VBP) that rewards or penalizes hospitals based on patient satisfaction, clinical processes of care, outcomes, and efficiency metrics. However, hospital-level volatility vs. persistence in value-based payments year-over-year could result in unpredictable cash flows that negatively influence investment behavior, drive underinvestment in community benefit/population health management initiatives, and make management of the factors that drive the VBP adjustment more challenging. To evaluate the volatility and persistence of hospital VBP adjustments, the sample includes VBP adjustments and the associated domain scores for the 2,547 hospitals that participated in the program from 2013 to 2016. The sample includes urban (74%), teaching (29.1%), system affiliated (46.5%), and not-for-profit (63.6%) facilities. Volatility was measured using basic descriptive statistics, relative risk ratios, and a fixed effect, autoregressive, dynamic panel model that robust-clustered the standard errors. There is substantial change in a given facility's total VBP score with an average standard deviation of 10.74 (on a 100-point scale) that is driven by significant volatility in all metrics but particularly by efficiency and outcomes metrics. Relative risk ratios have dropped substantially over the life of the program, and there is low persistence of VBP scores from one period to the next. Findings indicate that if hospitals receive a positive adjustment in 1 year, they are almost as likely to receive a negative adjustment as a positive adjustment the following year. Furthermore, using a fixed-effect dynamic panel model that controls for autocorrelation, we find that only 13.5% of a facility's prior year IPPS adjustment (positive or negative) carries forward to the next year. The low persistence makes investment in population health management and community benefit more challenging.

Is There a Relationship Between Value-Based Purchasing and Hospital Profitability? An Exploratory Study of Missouri Hospitals

Recent US legislation is attempting to transition inpatient Medicare payments to a value-based purchasing (VBP) program. The VBP program is a pay-for-performance (P4P) system that incentivizes hospitals to improve patient satisfaction, health outcomes, and adherence to clinical protocols while simultaneously holding down costs. Our study evaluates (1) the impact of financial performance on the VBP adjustments and (2) whether there is a correlation between the VBP adjustment and the financial performance of Missouri hospitals that opted into the program. While upward and downward adjustments to the inpatient base rate may be related to hospital financial performance, prior financial performance may also be related to the adjustments. Financial health may allow facilities to invest and position the hospital for favorable future P4P adjustments. The results of our analysis indicate the VBP adjustment to the inpatient base rate is very small (±0.18%), clustered around zero, and is not correlated with financial performance. We also find that financial performance and improvement in the years prior to the adjustment are not related to the VBP adjustment or its respective components. This suggests that CMS is avoiding penalizing less profitable facilities, but the adjustment is also so small and tightly clustered around zero that it is failing to provide an adequate incentive to hospitals. The costs of improving patient satisfaction, clinical process adherence, health care outcomes, and efficiency above that of peers coupled with the growing number of metrics being used to calculate the VBP adjustments call into question the financial incentives of the hospital VBP program.

An overview of reviews evaluating the effectiveness of financial incentives in changing healthcare professional behaviours and patient outcomes

BACKGROUND

There is considerable interest in the effectiveness of financial incentives in the delivery of health care. Incentives may be used in an attempt to increase the use of evidence-based treatments among healthcare professionals or to stimulate health professionals to change their clinical behaviour with respect to preventive, diagnostic and treatment decisions, or both. Financial incentives are an extrinsic source of motivation and exist when an individual can expect a monetary transfer which is made conditional on acting in a particular way. Since there are numerous reviews performed within the healthcare area describing the effects of various types of financial incentives, it is important to summarise the effectiveness of these in an overview to discern which are most effective in changing health professionals' behaviour and patient outcomes.

OBJECTIVES

To conduct an overview of systematic reviews that evaluates the impact of financial incentives on healthcare professional behaviour and patient outcomes.

METHODS

We searched the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library); Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effectiveness (DARE); TRIP; MEDLINE; EMBASE; Science Citation Index; Social Science Citation Index; NHS EED; HEED; EconLit; and Program in Policy Decision-Making (PPd) (from their inception dates up to January 2010). We searched the reference lists of all included reviews and carried out a citation search of those papers which cited studies included in the review. We included both Cochrane and non-Cochrane reviews of randomised controlled trials (RCTs), controlled clinical trials (CCTs), interrupted time series (ITSs) and controlled before and after studies (CBAs) that evaluated the effects of financial incentives on professional practice and patient outcomes, and that reported numerical results of the included individual studies. Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the methodological quality of each review according to the AMSTAR criteria. We included systematic reviews of studies evaluating the effectiveness of any type of financial incentive. We grouped financial incentives into five groups: payment for working for a specified time period; payment for each service, episode or visit; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care; and mixed or other systems. We summarised data using vote counting.

MAIN RESULTS

We identified four reviews reporting on 32 studies. Two reviews scored 7 on the AMSTAR criteria (moderate, score 5 to 7, quality) and two scored 9 (high, score 8 to 11, quality). The reported quality of the included studies was, by a variety of methods, low to moderate. Payment for working for a specified time period was generally ineffective, improving 3/11 outcomes from one study reported in one review. Payment for each service, episode or visit was generally effective, improving 7/10 outcomes from five studies reported in three reviews; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population was generally effective, improving 48/69 outcomes from 13 studies reported in two reviews; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care was generally effective, improving 17/20 reported outcomes from 10 studies reported in two reviews; and mixed and other systems were of mixed effectiveness, improving 20/31 reported outcomes from seven studies reported in three reviews. When looking at the effect of financial incentives overall across categories of outcomes, they were of mixed effectiveness on consultation or visit rates (improving 10/17 outcomes from three studies in two reviews); generally effective in improving processes of care (improving 41/57 outcomes from 19 studies in three reviews); generally effective in improving referrals and admissions (improving 11/16 outcomes from 11 studies in four reviews); generally ineffective in improving compliance with guidelines outcomes (improving 5/17 outcomes from five studies in two reviews); and generally effective in improving prescribing costs outcomes (improving 28/34 outcomes from 10 studies in one review).

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Financial incentives may be effective in changing healthcare professional practice. The evidence has serious methodological limitations and is also very limited in its completeness and generalisability. We found no evidence from reviews that examined the effect of financial incentives on patient outcomes.