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Sun Y, Keskinocak P, Steimle LN, Kovacs SD, Wassilak SG. Modeling the spread of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 outbreaks and interventions: A case study of Nigeria. Vaccine X 2024; 18:100476. [PMID: 38617838 PMCID: PMC11011220 DOI: 10.1016/j.jvacx.2024.100476] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/09/2023] [Revised: 03/12/2024] [Accepted: 03/15/2024] [Indexed: 04/16/2024] Open
Abstract
Background Despite the successes of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, substantial challenges remain in eradicating the poliovirus. The Sabin-strain (live-attenuated) virus in oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) can revert to circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) in under-vaccinated communities, regain neurovirulence and transmissibility, and cause paralysis outbreaks. Since the cessation of type 2-containing OPV (OPV2) in 2016, there have been cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks in four out of six geographical World Health Organization regions, making these outbreaks a significant public health threat. Preparing for and responding to cVDPV2 outbreaks requires an updated understanding of how different factors, such as outbreak responses with the novel type of OPV2 (nOPV2) and the existence of under-vaccinated areas, affect the disease spread. Methods We built a differential-equation-based model to simulate the transmission of cVDPV2 following reversion of the Sabin-strain virus in prolonged circulation. The model incorporates vaccinations by essential (routine) immunization and supplementary immunization activities (SIAs), the immunity induced by different poliovirus vaccines, and the reversion process from Sabin-strain virus to cVDPV. The model's outcomes include weekly cVDPV2 paralytic case counts and the die-out date when cVDPV2 transmission stops. In a case study of Northwest and Northeast Nigeria, we fit the model to data on the weekly cVDPV2 case counts with onset in 2018-2021. We then used the model to test the impact of different outbreak response scenarios during a prediction period of 2022-2023. The response scenarios included no response, the planned response (based on Nigeria's SIA calendar), and a set of hypothetical responses that vary in the dates at which SIAs started. The planned response scenario included two rounds of SIAs that covered almost all areas of Northwest and Northeast Nigeria except some under-vaccinated areas (e.g., Sokoto). The hypothetical response scenarios involved two, three, and four rounds of SIAs that covered the whole Northwest and Northeast Nigeria. All SIAs in tested outbreak response scenarios used nOPV2. We compared the outcomes of tested outbreak response scenarios in the prediction period. Results Modeled cVDPV2 weekly case counts aligned spatiotemporally with the data. The prediction results indicated that implementing the planned response reduced total case counts by 79% compared to no response, but did not stop the transmission, especially in under-vaccinated areas. Implementing the hypothetical response scenarios involving two rounds of nOPV2 SIAs that covered all areas further reduced cVDPV2 case counts in under-vaccinated areas by 91-95% compared to the planned response, with greater impact from completing the two rounds at an earlier time, but it did not stop the transmission. When the first two rounds were completed in early April 2022, implementing two additional rounds stopped the transmission in late January 2023. When the first two rounds were completed six weeks earlier (i.e., in late February 2022), implementing one (two) additional round stopped the transmission in early February 2023 (late November 2022). The die out was always achieved last in the under-vaccinated areas of Northwest and Northeast Nigeria. Conclusions A differential-equation-based model of poliovirus transmission was developed and validated in a case study of Northwest and Northeast Nigeria. The results highlighted (i) the effectiveness of nOPV2 in reducing outbreak case counts; (ii) the need for more rounds of outbreak response SIAs that covered all of Northwest and Northeast Nigeria in 2022 to stop the cVDPV2 outbreaks; (iii) that persistent transmission in under-vaccinated areas delayed the progress towards stopping outbreaks; and (iv) that a quicker outbreak response would avert more paralytic cases and require fewer SIA rounds to stop the outbreaks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuming Sun
- H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Pinar Keskinocak
- H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Lauren N. Steimle
- H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Kalkowska DA, Wassilak SGF, Wiesen E, F Estivariz C, Burns CC, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Complexity of options related to restarting oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in national immunization programs after OPV cessation. Gates Open Res 2023; 7:55. [PMID: 37547300 PMCID: PMC10403636 DOI: 10.12688/gatesopenres.14511.1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 03/09/2023] [Indexed: 08/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Background: The polio eradication endgame continues to increase in complexity. With polio cases caused by wild poliovirus type 1 and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses of all three types (1, 2 and 3) reported in 2022, the number, formulation, and use of poliovirus vaccines poses challenges for national immunization programs and vaccine suppliers. Prior poliovirus transmission modeling of globally-coordinated type-specific cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) assumed creation of Sabin monovalent OPV (mOPV) stockpiles for emergencies and explored the potential need to restart OPV if the world reached a specified cumulative threshold number of cases after OPV cessation. Methods: We document the actual experience of type 2 OPV (OPV2) cessation and reconsider prior modeling assumptions related to OPV restart. We develop updated decision trees of national immunization options for poliovirus vaccines considering different possibilities for OPV restart. Results: While OPV restart represented a hypothetical situation for risk management and contingency planning to support the 2013-2018 Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) Strategic Plan, the actual epidemiological experience since OPV2 cessation raises questions about what, if any, trigger(s) could lead to restarting the use of OPV2 in routine immunization and/or plans for potential future restart of type 1 and 3 OPV after their respective cessation. The emergency use listing of a genetically stabilized novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) and continued evaluation of nOPV for types 1 and/or 3 add further complexity by increasing the combinations of possible OPV formulations for OPV restart. Conclusions: Expanding on a 2019 discussion of the logistical challenges and implications of restarting OPV, we find a complex structure of the many options and many issues related to OPV restart decisions and policies as of early 2023. We anticipate many challenges for forecasting prospective vaccine supply needs during the polio endgame due to increasing potential combinations of poliovirus vaccine choices.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Steven GF Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Eric Wiesen
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Concepcion F Estivariz
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Cara C Burns
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USA, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Kalkowska DA, Wassilak SGF, Pallansch MA, Burns CC, Wiesen E, Durry E, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Outbreak response strategies with type 2-containing oral poliovirus vaccines. Vaccine 2023; 41 Suppl 1:A142-A152. [PMID: 36402659 PMCID: PMC10284582 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2022.10.060] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2022] [Revised: 09/13/2022] [Accepted: 10/24/2022] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Despite exhaustive and fully-financed plans to manage the risks of globally coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) containing type 2 (OPV2) prior to 2016, as of 2022, extensive, continued transmission of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) type 2 (cVDPV2) remains. Notably, cumulative cases caused by cVDPV2 since 2016 now exceed 2,500. Earlier analyses explored the implications of using different vaccine formulations to respond to cVDPV2 outbreaks and demonstrated how different properties of novel OPV2 (nOPV2) might affect its performance compared to Sabin monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2). These prior analyses used fixed assumptions for how outbreak response would occur, but outbreak response implementation can change. We update an existing global poliovirus transmission model to explore different options for responding with different vaccines and assumptions about scope, delays, immunization intensity, target age groups, and number of rounds. Our findings suggest that in order to successfully stop all cVDPV2 transmission globally, countries and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative need to address the deficiencies in emergency outbreak response policy and implementation. The polio program must urgently act to substantially reduce response time, target larger populations - particularly in high transmission areas - and achieve high coverage with improved access to under-vaccinated subpopulations. Given the limited supplies of nOPV2 at the present, using mOPV2 intensively immediately, followed by nOPV2 intensively if needed and when sufficient quantities become available, substantially increases the probability of ending cVDPV2 transmission globally.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Steven G F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Cara C Burns
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Eric Wiesen
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Elias Durry
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA, Badizadegan K. Looking back at prospective modeling of outbreak response strategies for managing global type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) cessation. Front Public Health 2023; 11:1098419. [PMID: 37033033 PMCID: PMC10080024 DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.1098419] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/14/2022] [Accepted: 03/03/2023] [Indexed: 04/11/2023] Open
Abstract
Introduction Detection of poliovirus transmission and ongoing oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use continue to delay poliomyelitis eradication. In 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of type 2 OPV (OPV2) for preventive immunization and limited its use to emergency outbreak response. In 2019, GPEI partners requested restart of some Sabin OPV2 production and also accelerated the development of a genetically modified novel OPV2 vaccine (nOPV2) that promised greater genetic stability than monovalent Sabin OPV2 (mOPV2). Methods We reviewed integrated risk, economic, and global poliovirus transmission modeling performed before OPV2 cessation, which recommended multiple risk management strategies to increase the chances of successfully ending all transmission of type 2 live polioviruses. Following OPV2 cessation, strategies implemented by countries and the GPEI deviated from model recommended risk management strategies. Complementing other modeling that explores prospective outbreak response options for improving outcomes for the current polio endgame trajectory, in this study we roll back the clock to 2017 and explore counterfactual trajectories that the polio endgame could have followed if GPEI had: (1) managed risks differently after OPV2 cessation and/or (2) developed nOPV2 before and used it exclusively for outbreak response after OPV2 cessation. Results The implementation of the 2016 model-based recommended outbreak response strategies could have ended (and could still substantially improve the probability of ending) type 2 poliovirus transmission. Outbreak response performance observed since 2016 would not have been expected to achieve OPV2 cessation with high confidence, even with the availability of nOPV2 prior to the 2016 OPV2 cessation. Discussion As implemented, the 2016 OPV2 cessation failed to stop type 2 transmission. While nOPV2 offers benefits of lower risk of seeding additional outbreaks, its reduced secondary spread relative to mOPV2 may imply relatively higher coverage needed for nOPV2 than mOPV2 to stop outbreaks.
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Thompson KM, Badizadegan K. Health economic analyses of secondary vaccine effects: a systematic review and policy insights. Expert Rev Vaccines 2021; 21:297-312. [PMID: 34927511 DOI: 10.1080/14760584.2022.2017287] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/02/2023]
Abstract
INTRODUCTION : Numerous analyses demonstrate substantial health economic impacts of primary vaccine effects (preventing or mitigating clinical manifestations of the diseases they target), but vaccines may also be associated with secondary effects, previously known as non-specific, heterologous, or off-target effects. AREAS COVERED : We define key concepts to distinguish primary and secondary vaccine effects for health economic analyses, summarized terminology used in different fields, and perform a systematic review of health economic analyses focused on secondary vaccine effects (SVEs). EXPERT OPINION : Health economists integrate evidence from multiple fields, which often use incomplete or inconsistent definitions. Like regulators and policy makers, health economists require high-quality evidence of specific effects. Consistent with the limited evidence on mechanisms of action for SVEs, the associated health economic literature remains highly limited, with 4 studies identified by our systematic review. The lack of specific and well-controlled evidence that supports quantification of specific SVEs limits the consideration of these effects in vaccine research, development, regulatory, and recommendation decisions and health economic analyses.
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA, Badizadegan K. Hypothetical emergence of poliovirus in 2020: part 2. exploration of the potential role of vaccines in control and eradication. Expert Rev Vaccines 2021; 20:449-460. [PMID: 33599178 DOI: 10.1080/14760584.2021.1891889] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/13/2022]
Abstract
OBJECTIVES The emergence of human pathogens with pandemic potential motivates rapid vaccine development. We explore the role of vaccines in control and eradication of a novel emerging pathogen. METHODS We hypothetically simulate emergence of a novel wild poliovirus (nWPV) in 2020 assuming an immunologically naïve population. Assuming different nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), we explore the impacts of vaccines resembling serotype-specific oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), novel OPV (nOPV), or inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV). RESULTS Vaccines most effectively change the trajectory of an emerging disease when disseminated early, rapidly, and widely in the background of ongoing strict NPIs, unless the NPIs successfully eradicate the emerging pathogen before it establishes endemic transmission. Without strict NPIs, vaccines primarily reduce the burden of disease in the remaining susceptible individuals and in new birth cohorts. Live virus vaccines that effectively compete with the nWPVs can reduce disease burdens more than other vaccines. When relaxation of existing NPIs occurs at the time of vaccine introduction, nWPV transmission can counterintuitively increase in the short term. CONCLUSIONS Vaccines can increase the probability of disease eradication in the context of strict NPIs. However, successful eradication will depend on specific immunization strategies used and a global commitment to eradication.
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Kalkowska DA, Pallansch MA, Wilkinson A, Bandyopadhyay AS, Konopka-Anstadt JL, Burns CC, Oberste MS, Wassilak SGF, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Updated Characterization of Outbreak Response Strategies for 2019-2029: Impacts of Using a Novel Type 2 Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Strain. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:329-348. [PMID: 33174263 PMCID: PMC7887065 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13622] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/24/2020] [Revised: 10/08/2020] [Accepted: 10/16/2020] [Indexed: 05/06/2023]
Abstract
Delays in achieving the global eradication of wild poliovirus transmission continue to postpone subsequent cessation of all oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use. Countries must stop OPV use to end all cases of poliomyelitis, including vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) and cases caused by vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of all type 2 OPV (OPV2) use in routine immunization in 2016 but did not successfully end the transmission of type 2 VDPVs (VDPV2s), and consequently continues to use type 2 OPV (OPV2) for outbreak response activities. Using an updated global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model, we characterize outbreak response options for 2019-2029 related to responding to VDPV2 outbreaks with a genetically stabilized novel OPV (nOPV2) strain or with the currently licensed monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2). Given uncertainties about the properties of nOPV2, we model different assumptions that appear consistent with the evidence on nOPV2 to date. Using nOPV2 to respond to detected cases may reduce the expected VDPV and VAPP cases and the risk of needing to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization compared to mOPV2 use for outbreak response. The actual properties, availability, and use of nOPV2 will determine its effects on type 2 poliovirus transmission in populations. Even with optimal nOPV2 performance, countries and the GPEI would still likely need to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization in OPV-using countries if operational improvements in outbreak response to stop the transmission of cVDPV2s are not implemented effectively.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A. Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Amanda Wilkinson
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | - Jennifer L. Konopka-Anstadt
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Cara C. Burns
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - M. Steven Oberste
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steven G. F. Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | - Kimberly M. Thompson
- Kid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA
- Correspondence to: Kimberly Thompson, Kid Risk, Inc., 7512 Dr. Phillips Blvd. #50-523, Orlando, FL 32819, USA,
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA. Reflections on Modeling Poliovirus Transmission and the Polio Eradication Endgame. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:229-247. [PMID: 32339327 PMCID: PMC7983882 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13484] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2019] [Revised: 03/27/2020] [Accepted: 03/27/2020] [Indexed: 05/06/2023]
Abstract
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners engaged modelers during the past nearly 20 years to support strategy and policy discussions and decisions, and to provide estimates of the risks, costs, and benefits of different options for managing the polio endgame. Limited efforts to date provided insights related to the validation of the models used for GPEI strategy and policy decisions. However, modeling results only influenced decisions in some cases, with other factors carrying more weight in many key decisions. In addition, the results from multiple modeling groups do not always agree, which supports selection of some strategies and/or policies counter to the recommendations from some modelers but not others. This analysis reflects on our modeling, and summarizes our premises and recommendations, the outcomes of these recommendations, and the implications of key limitations of models with respect to polio endgame strategy. We briefly review the current state of the GPEI given epidemiological experience as of early 2020, which includes failure of the GPEI to deliver on the objectives of its 2013-2018 strategic plan despite full financial support. Looking ahead, we provide context for why the GPEI strategy of global oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation to end all cases of poliomyelitis looks infeasible given the current state of the GPEI and the failure to successfully stop all transmission of serotype 2 live polioviruses within four years of the April-May 2016 coordinated cessation of serotype 2 OPV use in routine immunization.
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Kalkowska DA, Thompson KM. Health and Economic Outcomes Associated with Polio Vaccine Policy Options: 2019-2029. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2021; 41:364-375. [PMID: 33590519 PMCID: PMC7895457 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13664] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/13/2020] [Accepted: 12/04/2020] [Indexed: 05/08/2023]
Abstract
The polio endgame remains complicated, with many questions about future polio vaccines and national immunization policies. We simulated possible future poliovirus vaccine routine immunization policies for countries stratified by World Bank Income Levels and estimated the expected costs and cases using an updated integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission, stochastic risk, and economic model. We consider two reference cases scenarios: one that achieves the eradication of all wild polioviruses (WPVs) by 2023 and one in which serotype 1 WPV (WPV1) transmission continues. The results show that the addition of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) to routine immunization in all countries substantially increased the expected costs of the polio endgame, without substantially increasing its expected health or economic benefits. Adding a second dose of IPV to the routine immunization schedules of countries that currently include a single IPV dose further increases costs and does not appear economically justified in the reference case that does not stop WPV transmission. For the reference case that includes all WPV eradication, adding a second IPV dose at the time of successful oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation represents a cost-effective option. The risks and costs of needing to restart OPV use change the economics of the polio endgame, although the time horizon used for modeling impacts the overall economic results. National health leaders will want to consider the expected health and economic net benefits of their national polio vaccine strategies recognizing that preferred strategies may differ.
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Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA. Review of poliovirus modeling performed from 2000 to 2019 to support global polio eradication. Expert Rev Vaccines 2020; 19:661-686. [PMID: 32741232 PMCID: PMC7497282 DOI: 10.1080/14760584.2020.1791093] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2020] [Accepted: 06/22/2020] [Indexed: 01/03/2023]
Abstract
INTRODUCTION Over the last 20 years (2000-2019) the partners of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) invested in the development and application of mathematical models of poliovirus transmission as well as economics, policy, and risk analyses of polio endgame risk management options, including policies related to poliovirus vaccine use during the polio endgame. AREAS COVERED This review provides a historical record of the polio studies published by the three modeling groups that primarily performed the bulk of this work. This review also systematically evaluates the polio transmission and health economic modeling papers published in English in peer-reviewed journals from 2000 to 2019, highlights differences in approaches and methods, shows the geographic coverage of the transmission modeling performed, identified common themes, and discusses instances of similar or conflicting insights or recommendations. EXPERT OPINION Polio modeling performed during the last 20 years substantially impacted polio vaccine choices, immunization policies, and the polio eradication pathway. As the polio endgame continues, national preferences for polio vaccine formulations and immunization strategies will likely continue to change. Future modeling will likely provide important insights about their cost-effectiveness and their relative benefits with respect to controlling polio and potentially achieving and maintaining eradication.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Thompson KM. Polio endgame risks and the possibility of restarting the use of oral poliovirus vaccine. Expert Rev Vaccines 2018; 17:739-751. [PMID: 30056767 PMCID: PMC6168953 DOI: 10.1080/14760584.2018.1506333] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/07/2018] [Accepted: 07/26/2018] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
INTRODUCTION Ending all cases of poliomyelitis requires successful cessation of all oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), but the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners should consider the possibility of an OPV restart. AREAS COVERED We review the risks of continued live poliovirus transmission after OPV cessation and characterize events that led to OPV restart in a global model that focused on identifying optimal strategies for OPV cessation and the polio endgame. Numerous different types of events that occurred since the globally coordinated cessation of serotype 2-containing OPV in 2016 highlight the possibility of continued outbreaks after homotypic OPV cessation. Modeling suggests a high risk of uncontrolled outbreaks once more than around 5,000 homotypic polio cases occur after cessation of an OPV serotype, at which point restarting OPV would become necessary to protect most populations. Current efforts to sunset the GPEI and transition its responsibilities to national governments poses risks that may limit the ability to implement management strategies needed to minimize the probability of an OPV restart. EXPERT COMMENTARY OPV restart remains a real possibility, but risk management choices made by the GPEI partners and national governments can reduce the risks of this low-probability but high-consequence event.
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Tebbens RJD, Thompson KM. Using integrated modeling to support the global eradication of vaccine-preventable diseases. SYSTEM DYNAMICS REVIEW 2018; 34:78-120. [PMID: 34552305 PMCID: PMC8455164 DOI: 10.1002/sdr.1589] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/16/2017] [Accepted: 02/11/2018] [Indexed: 05/17/2023]
Abstract
The long-term management of global disease eradication initiatives involves numerous inherently dynamic processes, health and economic trade-offs, significant uncertainty and variability, rare events with big consequences, complex and inter-related decisions, and a requirement for cooperation among a large number of stakeholders. Over the course of more than 16 years of collaborative modeling efforts to support the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, we developed increasingly complex integrated system dynamics models that combined numerous analytical approaches, including differential equation-based modeling, risk and decision analysis, discrete-event and individual-based simulation, probabilistic uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, health economics, and optimization. We discuss the central role of systems thinking and system dynamics in the overall effort and the value of integrating different modeling approaches to appropriately address the trade-offs involved in some of the policy questions. We discuss practical challenges of integrating different analytical tools and we provide our perspective on the future of integrated modeling.
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Thompson KM. Modeling the costs and benefits of temporary recommendations for poliovirus exporting countries to vaccinate international travelers. Vaccine 2017; 35:3823-3833. [PMID: 28606811 PMCID: PMC5488262 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.05.090] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/22/2017] [Revised: 05/31/2017] [Accepted: 05/31/2017] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Recognizing that infectious agents readily cross international borders, the International Health Regulations Emergency Committee issues Temporary Recommendations (TRs) that include vaccination of travelers from countries affected by public health emergencies, including serotype 1 wild polioviruses (WPV1s). This analysis estimates the costs and benefits of TRs implemented by countries with reported WPV1 during 2014-2016 while accounting for numerous uncertainties. We estimate the TR costs based on programmatic data and prior economic analyses and TR benefits by simulating potential WPV1 outbreaks in the absence of the TRs using the rate and extent of WPV1 importation outbreaks per reported WPV1 case during 2004-2013 and the number of reported WPV1 cases that occurred in countries with active TRs. The benefits of TRs outweigh the costs in 77% of model iterations, resulting in expected incremental net economic benefits of $210 million. Inclusion of indirect costs increases the costs by 13%, the expected savings from prevented outbreaks by 4%, and the expected incremental net benefits by 3%. Despite the considerable costs of implementing TRs, this study provides health and economic justification for these investments in the context of managing a disease in advanced stages of its global eradication.
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Thompson KM, Duintjer Tebbens RJ. Lessons From Globally Coordinated Cessation of Serotype 2 Oral Poliovirus Vaccine for the Remaining Serotypes. J Infect Dis 2017; 216:S168-S175. [PMID: 28838198 PMCID: PMC5853947 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jix128] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/19/2016] [Revised: 03/06/2017] [Accepted: 03/13/2017] [Indexed: 12/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Comparing model expectations with the experience of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) containing serotype 2 (OPV2) cessation can inform risk management for the expected cessation of OPV containing serotypes 1 and 3 (OPV13). Methods We compare the expected post-OPV2-cessation OPV2-related viruses from models with the evidence available approximately 6 months after OPV2 cessation. We also model the trade-offs of use vs nonuse of monovalent OPV (mOPV) for outbreak response considering all 3 serotypes. Results Although too early to tell definitively, the observed die-out of OPV2-related viruses in populations that attained sufficiently intense trivalent OPV (tOPV) use prior to OPV2 cessation appears consistent with model expectations. As expected, populations that did not intensify tOPV use prior to OPV2 cessation show continued circulation of serotype 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). Failure to aggressively use mOPV to respond to circulating VDPVs results in a high risk of uncontrolled outbreaks that would require restarting OPV. Conclusions Ensuring a successful endgame requires more aggressive OPV cessation risk management than has occurred to date for OPV2 cessation. This includes maintaining high population immunity to transmission up until OPV13 cessation, meeting all prerequisites for OPV cessation, and ensuring sufficient vaccine supply to prevent and respond to outbreaks.
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Hampton LM, du Châtellier GM, Fournier-Caruana J, Ottosen A, Rubin J, Menning L, Farrell M, Shendale S, Patel M. Considerations for the Full Global Withdrawal of Oral Polio Vaccine After Eradication of Polio. J Infect Dis 2017; 216:S217-S225. [PMID: 28838193 PMCID: PMC5853572 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jix105] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Eliminating the risk of polio from vaccine-derived polioviruses is essential for creating a polio-free world, and eliminating that risk will require stopping use of all oral polio vaccines (OPVs) once all types of wild polioviruses have been eradicated. In many ways, the experience with the global switch from trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) can inform the eventual full global withdrawal of OPV. Significant preparation will be needed for a thorough, synchronized, and full withdrawal of OPV, and such preparation would be aided by setting a reasonably firm date for OPV withdrawal as far in advance as possible, ideally at least 24 months. A shorter lead time would provide valuable flexibility for decisions about when to stop use of OPV in the context of uncertainty about whether or not all types of wild polioviruses had been eradicated, but it might increase the cost of OPV withdrawal.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lee M. Hampton
- Global Immunization Division, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
| | | | | | - Ann Ottosen
- Supply Division, UNICEF, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | | | | | - Margaret Farrell
- Program Division, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), New York, New York
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Duintjer Tebbens RJ, Thompson KM. Poliovirus vaccination during the endgame: insights from integrated modeling. Expert Rev Vaccines 2017; 16:577-586. [DOI: 10.1080/14760584.2017.1322514] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Kimberly M. Thompson
- Kid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA
- College of Medicine, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA
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18
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Thompson KM, Duintjer Tebbens RJ. How should we prepare for an outbreak of reintroduced live polioviruses? Future Virol 2017. [DOI: 10.2217/fvl-2016-0131] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/12/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Kimberly M Thompson
- Kid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL 32832, USA
- College of Medicine, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32827, USA
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19
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Thompson KM, Tebbens RJD. How should we prepare for an outbreak of reintroduced live polioviruses? Future Virol 2017; 12:41-44. [PMID: 33365053 PMCID: PMC7734199 DOI: 10.2217/fvl-2017-0131] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2016] [Accepted: 12/05/2016] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Kimberly M Thompson
- Kid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL 32832, USA.,College of Medicine, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32827, USA
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Comprehensive screening for immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus: an essential oral poliovirus vaccine cessation risk management strategy. Epidemiol Infect 2016; 145:217-226. [PMID: 27760579 PMCID: PMC5197684 DOI: 10.1017/s0950268816002302] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/18/2022] Open
Abstract
If the world can successfully control all outbreaks of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus that may occur soon after global oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation, then immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived polioviruses (iVDPVs) from rare and mostly asymptomatic long-term excretors (defined as ⩾6 months of excretion) will become the main source of potential poliovirus outbreaks for as long as iVDPV excretion continues. Using existing models of global iVDPV prevalence and global long-term poliovirus risk management, we explore the implications of uncertainties related to iVDPV risks, including the ability to identify asymptomatic iVDPV excretors to treat with polio antiviral drugs (PAVDs) and the transmissibility of iVDPVs. The expected benefits of expanded screening to identify and treat long-term iVDPV excretors with PAVDs range from US$0.7 to 1.5 billion with the identification of 25–90% of asymptomatic long-term iVDPV excretors, respectively. However, these estimates depend strongly on assumptions about the transmissibility of iVDPVs and model inputs affecting the global iVDPV prevalence. For example, the expected benefits may decrease to as low as US$260 million with the identification of 90% of asymptomatic iVDPV excretors if iVDPVs behave and transmit like partially reverted viruses instead of fully reverted viruses. Comprehensive screening for iVDPVs will reduce uncertainties and maximize the expected benefits of PAVD use.
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