Can subjects maintain a constant criterion in a memory task?

In two recognition memory experiments, subjects rated how certain they were that a given test item had been shown previously. Subjects either received standard instructions about their rating criteria or were explicitly instructed to maintain criteria defined in the manner of Healy and Jones (1973) or along the lines of signal detection theory. When a priori probability varied, subjects in all instruction groups held constant the criteria defined by signal detection theory at the expense of shifting the criteria proposed by Healy and Jones. The results were taken as evidence for the psychological validity of recognition memory analyses based on signal detection theory.

A comparison of recognition memory to numerical decision: How prior probabilities affect cutoff location

In two experiments, a recognition memory task, in which subjects judged whether a given five-digit number had been shown previously, was compared to a numerical decision task, in which subjects judged whether a given five-digit number represented the height of a man or a woman. Subjects were found to shift β (the cutoff point along the decision axis) with changes in prior probabilities in the direction specified by signal detection theory in the numerical decision task but not in the recognition memory task. An explanation of the results, in terms of a difference in ď (discriminability) between the two tasks, was ruled out. In contrast, explanations which cannot be ruled out involve differences between the tasks in the amount of practice required for the subject to learn the manner in which the stimuli are distributed along the decision continuum, and differences in the availability of an alternative basis for response other than the decision continuum.

The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice

The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.

The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice

The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.

Arithmetical Estimation “Ad Absurdum”

An “absurd” arithmetical estimation task, which totally eliminated any skill facet, was used in an experiment designed to test the hypothesis that only when any application of known algorithms is clearly impossible, do Ss take into account shifts in payoff matrices in their decision processes. Ss' behavior in this absurd task was compared with that of Ss in a previously described arithmetical estimation task under severe time restrictions. Ten Ss comprised the experimental group while 6 Ss served as controls, each S performing 150 decisions. It was found that 50% of the Ss in the experimental group showed the expected rational shift in their behavior; there were no shifts by controls. Ritualistic skill-based strategy under adverse environmental conditions is discussed.