Heuristic versus systematic processing of information in detecting deception: questioning the truth bias

Testing the Effects of a Preceding Self-Control Task on Decision-Making in Soccer Refereeing

The present study tested the assumption that the momentary level of self-control strength affects the accuracy rates in a sports-related judgment and decision-making task. A total of N = 27 participants rated the veracity of 28 video-taped statements of soccer players who were interviewed by a non-visible referee after a critical game-related situation. In half of the videos, the players were lying, and in the other half, they were telling the truth. Participants were tested twice: once with temporarily depleted self-control strength and once with temporarily available self-control strength (order counterbalanced; measurements separated by exactly 7 days). Self-control strength was experimentally manipulated with the Stroop task. In line with two-process models of information processing, we hypothesized that under ego depletion, information is processed in a rather heuristic manner, leading to lower accuracy rates. Contrary to our expectations, the level of temporarily available self-control strength did not have an effect on accuracy rates. Limitations and implications for future research endeavors are discussed.

Approach, Avoidance, and the Perception of Credibility

Based on a functional approach to credibility judgments, the authors hypothesize that receivers’ judgments of senders’ credibility involve an evaluative dimension (i.e., good–bad) and are associated with approach and avoidance tendencies. In three experiments (total N = 645), participants (receivers) judged the credibility of suspects (senders) denying involvement in a mock theft. While watching or reading the message, receivers performed an approach-related (arm flexion) or an avoidance-related (arm extension) motor action. Although receivers’ affective evaluations of senders (good–bad) correlated strongly with credibility judgments in all three experiments, the results of the arm position manipulation were mixed. In Experiment 1, receivers in an arm flexion (vs. arm extension) state judged the sender as more credible, but only when informed beforehand about the upcoming credibility judgment. In Experiment 2 and 3, however, there was no evidence of an arm position effect on credibility judgments. A cross-experimental meta-analysis revealed that the effect of the manipulation was statistically indistinguishable from zero, Hedges’ g = 0.07, 95% CI [−0.09, 0.22], and provided strong support for the null hypothesis. Multiple interpretations of the results are discussed.

Analyzing Decision Logs to Understand Decision Making in Serious Crime Investigations

Objective To study decision making by detectives when investigating serious crime through the examination of decision logs to explore hypothesis generation and evidence selection. Background Decision logs are used to record and justify decisions made during serious crime investigations. The complexity of investigative decision making is well documented, as are the errors associated with miscarriages of justice and inquests. The use of decision logs has not been the subject of an empirical investigation, yet they offer an important window into the nature of investigative decision making in dynamic, time-critical environments. Method A sample of decision logs from British police forces was analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively to explore hypothesis generation and evidence selection by police detectives. Results Analyses revealed diversity in documentation of decisions that did not correlate with case type and identified significant limitations of the decision log approach to supporting investigative decision making. Differences emerged between experienced and less experienced officers' decision log records in exploration of alternative hypotheses, generation of hypotheses, and sources of evidential inquiry opened over phase of investigation. Conclusion The practical use of decision logs is highly constrained by their format and context of use. Despite this, decision log records suggest that experienced detectives display strategic decision making to avoid confirmation and satisficing, which affect less experienced detectives. Application Potential applications of this research include both training in case documentation and the development of new decision log media that encourage detectives, irrespective of experience, to generate multiple hypotheses and optimize the timely selection of evidence to test them.

Assessment of response bias in neurocognitive evaluations

BACKGROUND

In clinical neuropsychological practice, assessment of response validity (e.g., effort, over-reporting, under-reporting) is an essential component of the assessment process. By contrast, other health care professionals, including those in neurorehabilitation settings, often omit assessment of this topic from their evaluations or only rely on subjective impressions.

OBJECTIVE

To provide the first comprehensive review of response validity assessment in the neurorehabilitation literature, including why the topic is often avoided, what methods are commonly used, and how to decrease false positives.

METHODS

A literature review and documentation of personal experience and perspectives was used to review this topic.

RESULTS

There is a well-established literature on the necessity and utility of assessing response validity, particularly in patients who have external incentives to embellish their presentation or to under-report symptoms. There are many reasons why non-neuropsychologists typically avoid assessment of this topic. This poses a significant problem, particularly when patients exaggerate or malinger, because it can lead to misdiagnosis and it risks increasing the cost of healthcare by performing unnecessary tests and treatments, unfair distribution of disability/compensation resources, and a reduced access to these and other health resources by patients who genuinely need them.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a significant need for non-neuropsychologists to develop and incorporate symptom and performance validity assessments in clinical evaluations, including those in neurorehabilitation settings.

A reverse order interview does not aid deception detection regarding intentions

Promising recent research suggests that more cognitively demanding interviews improve deception detection accuracy. Would these cognitively demanding techniques work in the same way when discriminating between true and false future intentions? In Experiment 1 participants planned to complete a task, but instead were intercepted and interviewed about their intentions. Participants lied or told the truth, and were subjected to high (reverse order) or low (sequential order) cognitive load interviews. Third-party observers watched these interviews and indicated whether they thought the person was lying or telling the truth. Subjecting participants to a reverse compared to sequential interview increased the misidentification rate and the appearance of cognitive load in truth tellers. People lying about false intentions were not better identified. In Experiment 2, a second set of third-party observers rated behavioral cues. Consistent with Experiment 1, truth tellers, but not liars, exhibited more behaviors associated with lying and fewer behaviors associated with truth telling in the reverse than sequential interview. Together these results suggest that certain cognitively demanding interviews may be less useful when interviewing to detect false intentions. Explaining a true intention while under higher cognitive demand places truth tellers at risk of being misclassified. There may be such a thing as too much cognitive load induced by certain techniques

Increasing skepticism toward potential liars: effects of existential threat on veracity judgments and the moderating role of honesty norm activation

With the present research, we investigated effects of existential threat on veracity judgments. According to several meta-analyses, people judge potentially deceptive messages of other people as true rather than as false (so-called truth bias). This judgmental bias has been shown to depend on how people weigh the error of judging a true message as a lie (error 1) and the error of judging a lie as a true message (error 2). The weight of these errors has been further shown to be affected by situational variables. Given that research on terror management theory has found evidence that mortality salience (MS) increases the sensitivity toward the compliance of cultural norms, especially when they are of focal attention, we assumed that when the honesty norm is activated, MS affects judgmental error weighing and, consequently, judgmental biases. Specifically, activating the norm of honesty should decrease the weight of error 1 (the error of judging a true message as a lie) and increase the weight of error 2 (the error of judging a lie as a true message) when mortality is salient. In a first study, we found initial evidence for this assumption. Furthermore, the change in error weighing should reduce the truth bias, automatically resulting in better detection accuracy of actual lies and worse accuracy of actual true statements. In two further studies, we manipulated MS and honesty norm activation before participants judged several videos containing actual truths or lies. Results revealed evidence for our prediction. Moreover, in Study 3, the truth bias was increased after MS when group solidarity was previously emphasized.

Unconscious deception detection measured by finger skin temperature and indirect veracity judgments-results of a registered report

A pre-registered experiment was conducted to examine psychophysiological responses to being lied to. Bridging research on social cognition and deception detection, we hypothesized that observing a liar compared to a truth-teller would decrease finger skin temperature of observers. Participants first watched two targets while not forewarned that they would later be asked to judge (direct and indirect) veracity, and then watched another two targets while forewarned about this. During both these phases finger skin temperature was measured. Findings pertaining to temperature partly confirmed our main hypothesis. When participants were observing a liar, irrespective of being forewarned, on average finger skin temperature declined over time. In the forewarned phase, temperature trajectories of truth-tellers were higher than those of liars, however, in the not forewarned phase, this pattern was reversed. Results confirmed our further hypotheses that participants judge liars as less likeable and less trustworthy than truth-tellers-an indication of indirect deception detection. Our hypothesis that the effect size for trustworthiness would be bigger than that of liking was not supported by the data. Additionally, and also confirming our hypothesis, participants performed around chance level when directly judging whether the target person was lying. Exploratory analyses are reported with regard to truth bias and dependency between direct and indirect veracity judgments. Limitations and directions for future work related to the existence of psychophysiological indicators of deception detection are discussed.

Wer kann den Lügner entlarven? Need for Cognition und die Fähigkeit von Lehramtsstudierenden Wahrheit und Lüge zu erkennen

Zwei Studien untersuchen den Zusammenhang von Need for Cognition und der Fähigkeit, Lüge und Wahrheit zu erkennen, bei Lehramtsstudierenden. Den Grundannahmen von Zwei-Prozess-Modellen entsprechend führt ein höheres Need for Cognition zur vermehrten Nutzung inhaltlicher Informationen bei Glaubwürdigkeitsurteilen. Personen mit niedrigerem Need for Cognition nutzen dagegen vorrangig stereotype nonverbale Informationen für ihre Urteile. Bisherige Arbeiten zeigen, dass die Nutzung inhaltlicher Informationen im Vergleich zu stereotypen nonverbalen Hinweisreizen bei der Entdeckung von Täuschungen erfolgversprechender ist. Daher wurde die Hypothese aufgestellt und getestet, dass ein höheres Need for Cognition bei Lehramtsstudierenden mit einer besseren Erkennensleistung von wahren und erlogenen Aussagen einhergeht. Die Ergebnisse von Studie 1 bestätigten diese Hypothese. Studie 2 zeigte darüber hinaus, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen Need for Cognition und Erkennensleistung nur dann auftrat, wenn die Aussagen durch die Quellen nicht vorbereitet werden konnten. Mögliche Implikationen dieser Ergebnisse für die Schulpraxis werden diskutiert.

Online Decision-Making in Receiving Spam Emails Among College Students

Decision-making in the real world has been extensively studied, whereas decision-making in the cyber world is relatively unknown. The present study investigated how email users made their decisions to read or delete spam emails, unsolicited junk emails sent indiscriminately, when they received various kinds of emails in the everyday life. An experimental survey was designed to manipulate two variables, decision-making strategy (intuitive or rational decision) and information availability (limited or detailed information), and administrated via a professional survey website PsycData to 171 college students. It was found that (a) rational decision strategy outperformed intuitive decision strategy, (b) better decision was made with detailed information than with limited information, (c) the effect size of information availability was approximately ten times as large as that of decision-making strategy, and (d) no interaction effects was present between decision-making strategy and information availability. Practical implications are discussed.

Regression toward the Mean or Heuristic Processing in Detecting Deception?: Reply to Elaad (2010)

Masip, et al. (2009) conducted a study in which observers had to make truth–lie judgments at the beginning, middle, or end of a series of videotaped statements. They found a decline in truth judgments over time and explained this finding in terms of information processing mode. Recently, Elaad (2010) challenged this explanation and contended that the decline could be a result of regression toward the mean. In the present paper, it is argued that because Masip, et al. took multiple Moment 1 judgments over time and then averaged across judgments, regression toward the mean was extremely unlikely. Furthermore, the decrease in truth judgments was found under several separate conditions; this cannot be explained by random fluctuations alone. Finally, Masip, et al.'s data were re-analyzed adjusting for the effects of regression toward the mean. The outcomes of these analyses were the same as those reported in the original article.

Truth Bias and Regression toward the Mean Phenomenon in Detecting Deception

A 2009 study by Masip, et al. contended that the truth bias appears in brief communications. They demonstrated a strong truth bias when truth–lie judgments were made at the beginning of the judged statement. Over time, a decrease in the truth bias and an increase in accuracy were observed. The improvement was explained by systematic information processing. The present paper suggests an alternative explanation, which rests on the phenomenon of regression toward the mean.