Scientific and technical assistance on the minimum sample size to test should an annual BSE statistical testing regime be authorised in healthy slaughtered cattle

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy - A Review from the Perspective of Food Safety

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a fatal neurodegenerative disease that belongs to transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE). Since the first case was identified in the UK in 1986, BSE spread to other countries including Japan. Its incidence peaked in 1992 in the UK and from 2001 to 2006 in many other countries, but a feed ban aimed at eliminating the recycling of the BSE agent and other control measures aimed at preventing food and feed contamination with the agent were highly effective at reducing the spread of BSE. In 2004, two types of atypical BSE, H-type BSE (H-BSE) and L-type BSE (L-BSE), which differ from classical BSE (C-BSE), were found in France and Italy. Atypical BSE, which is assumed to occur spontaneously, has also been detected among cattle in other countries including Japan. The BSE agent including atypical BSE agent is a unique food-safety hazard with different chemical and biological properties from the microbial pathogens and toxic chemicals that contaminate food. In this review, we summarize the reported findings on the tissue distribution of BSE prions in infected cattle and other aspects of BSE, as well as the control measures against the disease employed in Japan. Topics that require further studies are discussed based on the summarized findings from the perspective of food safety.

Is there a decline in bovine spongiform encephalopathy cases born after reinforced feed bans? A modelling study in EU member states

Occasional cases of classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) still continue to occur within the European Union (EU) for animals born after reinforced feed bans (BARBs), which should in theory have eliminated all risk of infection. The study aimed to determine (i) whether a common rate of decline of BSE infection was evident across EU member states, i.e. to determine whether control measures have been equally effective in all member states, (ii) whether there was any evidence of spontaneous occurrence of BSE in the data and (iii) the expected date for the last BSE case in UK. It was found that there was no significant difference in the rate of decline of BSE prevalence between member states, with a common rate of decline of 33·9% per annum (95% CI 30·9-37%) in successive annual birth cohorts. Trend analysis indicated an ultimate decline to 0 prevalence, suggesting that spontaneous occurrence does not explain the majority of cases. Projecting forward the trends from the back-calculation model indicated that there was approximately a 50% probability of further cases in the UK, and should the current rate of decline continue, there remains the possibility of further occasional cases up until 2026.

Assessing the time taken for a surveillance system to detect a re-emergence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in cattle

During the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) epidemic in July 2001 the European Commission established a surveillance scheme for the comprehensive sampling of all BSE clinical suspects, healthy slaughter (HS) animals >30months, and all emergency slaughter and fallen stock animals tested when >24months. With the exponential decline in classical BSE cases, this comprehensive surveillance system has been successively modified to become risk-based, targeting those exit streams and ages where cases from the original epidemic are most likely to be detected. Such reductions in testing are not without losses in the information subsequently collected, which could affect the sensitivity of the surveillance system to relatively small changes in the underlying prevalence of BSE across the European Union (EU). Here we report on a cohort-based approach to estimate the time taken for EU surveillance to observe a theoretical re-emergence of BSE in cattle. A number of surveillance schemes were compared. The baseline scheme considered detection being triggered by at least one case in the 'age window' 48-72 months in the fallen stock or emergency slaughter exit streams. Alternative schemes changed the start and end of this age window as well as considering testing for HS cattle. Under the baseline scheme, an estimated 15 years would lapse ([2.5th, 97.5th] percentiles=[10,24]) prior to detection, during which time 2867 infected animals ([2.5th, 97.5th]=[1722,6967]) would enter the slaughter population. These animals would be predominantly young animals (majority <24months) showing no clinical signs. This baseline scheme reduced the time to detection by 2 years, compared to a scheme where only clinical suspects were tested assuming BSE symptoms are recognised to the same degree by veterinary surgeons. Additional testing of younger animals did not improve detection as young infected animals were unlikely to test positive, but testing of older animals reduced the time to detection. Testing of HS animals >72months reduced the time to detection by one year compared to the baseline model, but would incur a high financial cost, e.g. testing HS animals >72months of age for 14 years would entail approximately 50.4 million additional tests. A limitation of the results is that there is no guarantee that current detection methods, optimised for detection of classical BSE, would identify a novel prion disease in cattle and it is currently difficult to envisage plausible routes by which a re-emergence of classical BSE could occur in Europe.

Laboratory activities involving transmissible spongiform encephalopathy causing agents: risk assessment and biosafety recommendations in Belgium

Since the appearance in 1986 of epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), a new form of neurological disease in cattle which also affected human beings, many diagnostic and research activities have been performed to develop detection and therapeutic tools. A lot of progress was made in better identifying, understanding and controlling the spread of the disease by appropriate monitoring and control programs in European countries. This paper reviews the recent knowledge on pathogenesis, transmission and persistence outside the host of prion, the causative agent of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in mammals with a particular focus on risk (re)assessment and management of biosafety measures to be implemented in diagnostic and research laboratories in Belgium. Also, in response to the need of an increasing number of European diagnostic laboratories stopping TSE diagnosis due to a decreasing number of TSE cases reported in the last years, decontamination procedures and a protocol for decommissioning TSE diagnostic laboratories is proposed.