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Harrington WN, Kackos CM, Webby RJ. The evolution and future of influenza pandemic preparedness. Exp Mol Med 2021; 53:737-749. [PMID: 33953324 PMCID: PMC8099712 DOI: 10.1038/s12276-021-00603-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 72] [Impact Index Per Article: 24.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/19/2020] [Revised: 12/29/2020] [Accepted: 12/31/2020] [Indexed: 12/17/2022] Open
Abstract
The influenza virus is a global threat to human health causing unpredictable yet recurring pandemics, the last four emerging over the course of a hundred years. As our knowledge of influenza virus evolution, distribution, and transmission has increased, paths to pandemic preparedness have become apparent. In the 1950s, the World Health Organization (WHO) established a global influenza surveillance network that is now composed of institutions in 122 member states. This and other surveillance networks monitor circulating influenza strains in humans and animal reservoirs and are primed to detect influenza strains with pandemic potential. Both the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the WHO have also developed pandemic risk assessment tools that evaluate specific aspects of emerging influenza strains to develop a systematic process of determining research and funding priorities according to the risk of emergence and potential impact. Here, we review the history of influenza pandemic preparedness and the current state of preparedness, and we propose additional measures for improvement. We also comment on the intersection between the influenza pandemic preparedness network and the current SARS-CoV-2 crisis. We must continually evaluate and revise our risk assessment and pandemic preparedness plans and incorporate new information gathered from research and global crises.
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Affiliation(s)
- Walter N Harrington
- Department of Infectious Diseases, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, TN, USA
| | - Christina M Kackos
- Department of Infectious Diseases, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, TN, USA
- St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, Memphis, TN, USA
| | - Richard J Webby
- Department of Infectious Diseases, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, TN, USA.
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More S, Bicout D, Bøtner A, Butterworth A, Calistri P, Depner K, Edwards S, Garin-Bastuji B, Good M, Gortázar Schmidt C, Michel V, Miranda MA, Nielsen SS, Raj M, Sihvonen L, Spoolder H, Thulke HH, Velarde A, Willeberg P, Winckler C, Breed A, Brouwer A, Guillemain M, Harder T, Monne I, Roberts H, Baldinelli F, Barrucci F, Fabris C, Martino L, Mosbach-Schulz O, Verdonck F, Morgado J, Stegeman JA. Avian influenza. EFSA J 2017; 15:e04991. [PMID: 32625288 PMCID: PMC7009867 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4991] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Previous introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to the EU were most likely via migratory wild birds. A mathematical model has been developed which indicated that virus amplification and spread may take place when wild bird populations of sufficient size within EU become infected. Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) may reach similar maximum prevalence levels in wild bird populations to HPAIV but the risk of LPAIV infection of a poultry holding was estimated to be lower than that of HPAIV. Only few non-wild bird pathways were identified having a non-negligible risk of AI introduction. The transmission rate between animals within a flock is assessed to be higher for HPAIV than LPAIV. In very few cases, it could be proven that HPAI outbreaks were caused by intrinsic mutation of LPAIV to HPAIV but current knowledge does not allow a prediction as to if, and when this could occur. In gallinaceous poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality was identified as the most effective method for early detection of HPAI outbreaks. For effective surveillance in anseriform poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality needs to be accompanied by serological surveillance and/or a virological surveillance programme of birds found dead (bucket sampling). Serosurveillance is unfit for early warning of LPAI outbreaks at the individual holding level but could be effective in tracing clusters of LPAIV-infected holdings. In wild birds, passive surveillance is an appropriate method for HPAIV surveillance if the HPAIV infections are associated with mortality whereas active wild bird surveillance has a very low efficiency for detecting HPAIV. Experts estimated and emphasised the effect of implementing specific biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of AIV entering into a poultry holding. Human diligence is pivotal to select, implement and maintain specific, effective biosecurity measures.
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More S, Bicout D, Bøtner A, Butterworth A, Calistri P, Depner K, Edwards S, Garin-Bastuji B, Good M, Gortázar Schmidt C, Michel V, Miranda MA, Saxmose Nielsen S, Raj M, Sihvonen L, Spoolder H, Thulke HH, Velarde A, Willeberg P, Winckler C, Adlhoch C, Baldinelli F, Breed A, Brouwer A, Guillemain M, Harder T, Monne I, Roberts H, Cortinas Abrahantes J, Mosbach-Schulz O, Verdonck F, Morgado J, Stegeman A. Urgent request on avian influenza. EFSA J 2017; 15:e04687. [PMID: 32625275 PMCID: PMC7009852 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2016.4687] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N8 is currently causing an epizootic in Europe, infecting many poultry holdings as well as captive and wild bird species in more than 10 countries. Given the clear clinical manifestation, passive surveillance is considered the most effective means of detecting infected wild and domestic birds. Testing samples from new species and non‐previously reported areas is key to determine the geographic spread of HPAIV H5N8 2016 in wild birds. Testing limited numbers of dead wild birds in previously reported areas is useful when it is relevant to know whether the virus is still present in the area or not, e.g. before restrictive measures in poultry are to be lifted. To prevent introduction of HPAIV from wild birds into poultry, strict biosecurity implemented and maintained by the poultry farmers is the most important measure. Providing holding‐specific biosecurity guidance is strongly recommended as it is expected to have a high impact on the achieved biosecurity level of the holding. This is preferably done during peace time to increase preparedness for future outbreaks. The location and size of control and in particular monitoring areas for poultry associated with positive wild bird findings are best based on knowledge of the wider habitat and flight distance of the affected wild bird species. It is recommended to increase awareness among poultry farmers in these established areas in order to enhance passive surveillance and to implement enhanced biosecurity measures including poultry confinement. There is no scientific evidence suggesting a different effectiveness of the protection measures on the introduction into poultry holdings and subsequent spread of HPAIV when applied to H5N8, H5N1 or other notifiable HPAI viruses. This publication is linked to the following EFSA Supporting Publications article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/sp.efsa.2016.EN-1142/full
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Kosmider R, Smith J, Gillings S, Snow L, Breed AC, Irvine RM, Hill A. Updated risk of H5N1 HPAI incursion to poultry in Great Britain via wild birds. Vet Rec 2016; 179:464. [PMID: 27634350 DOI: 10.1136/vr.103700] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/09/2016] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- R Kosmider
- Department for Epidemiological Sciences, Animal & Plant Health Agency, Addlestone, UK
| | - J Smith
- International Disease Monitoring Team, Animal & Plant Health Agency, London, UK
| | - S Gillings
- British Trust for Ornithology, Thetford, UK
| | - L Snow
- Department for Epidemiological Sciences, Animal & Plant Health Agency, Addlestone, UK
| | - A C Breed
- Department for Epidemiological Sciences, Animal & Plant Health Agency, Addlestone, UK
| | - R M Irvine
- Surveillance Intelligence Unit, Animal & Plant Health Agency, Addlestone, UK
| | - A Hill
- Department for Epidemiological Sciences, Animal & Plant Health Agency, Addlestone, UK
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Abstract
In March 2013 the first cases of human avian influenza A(H7N9) were reported to the World Health Organization. Since that time, over 650 cases have been reported. Infections are associated with considerable morbidity and mortality, particularly within certain demographic groups. This rapid increase in cases over a brief time period is alarming and has raised concerns about the pandemic potential of the H7N9 virus. Three major factors influence the pandemic potential of an influenza virus: (1) its ability to cause human disease, (2) the immunity of the population to the virus, and (3) the transmission potential of the virus. This paper reviews what is currently known about each of these factors with respect to avian influenza A(H7N9). Currently, sustained human-to-human transmission of H7N9 has not been reported; however, population immunity to the virus is considered very low, and the virus has significant ability to cause human disease. Several statistical and geographical modelling studies have estimated and predicted the spread of the H7N9 virus in humans and avian species, and some have identified potential risk factors associated with disease transmission. Additionally, assessment tools have been developed to evaluate the pandemic potential of H7N9 and other influenza viruses. These tools could also hypothetically be used to monitor changes in the pandemic potential of a particular virus over time.
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