Accidental infection of laboratory worker with vaccinia virus

Genomic identification of human vaccinia virus keratoconjunctivitis and its importance as a laboratory-acquired infection

Context:

Vaccinia virus (VACV) is a member of orthopoxvirus genus of the family Poxviridae. VACVs are enveloped, double-stranded DNA viruses. Several species of this family, for example, molluscum contagiosum, smallpox, deerpox, horsepox, rabbitpox, and VACVs may cause conjunctivitis.

Aims:

Given the high incidence of keratoconjunctivitis in Iran (approximately 3.6%–53.9%) and insufficient clinical diagnostic measures, laboratory tests for detection of its causes and determination of accurate keratoconjunctivitis/conjunctivitis prevalence due to different pathogens are essential.

Settings and Design:

In this research, conjunctival samples collected from 100 patients with keratoconjunctivitis signs were referred to an eye hospital of Iran.

Subjects and Methods:

After DNA extraction, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was carried out for detection of VACV. PCR-positive products were further subjected to DNA sequencing.

Statistical Analysis Used:

The results were analyzed using Chi-square test.

Results:

In this study, 28% of the samples were positive and a statistically significant relationship obtained between working in medical or research laboratories and VACV prevalence (P < 0.05).

Conclusions:

This study showed a high rate of VACV keratoconjunctivitis, and therefore, further studies for its prevention and control are necessary.

Biosafety Recommendations on the Handling of Animal Cell Cultures

The first steps in tissue culture are dating back to the beginning of the nineteenth century when biosafety measures did not yet exist. Later on, animal cell culture became essential for scientific research, diagnosis and biotechnological activities. Along with this development, biosafety concerns have emerged pointing to the risks for human health and in a lesser extent for the environment associated to the handling of animal cell cultures. The management of these risks requires a thorough risk assessment of both the cell cultures and the type of manipulation prior the start of any activity. It involves a case-by-case evaluation of both the intrinsic properties of the cell culture genetically modified or not and the probability that it may inadvertently or intentionally become infected with pathogenic micro-organisms. The latter hazard is predominant when adventitious contaminants are pathogenic or have a better capacity to persist in unfavourable conditions. Consequently, most of the containment measures primarily aim at protecting cells from adventitious contamination. Cell cultures known to harbour an infectious etiologic agent should be manipulated in compliance with containment measures recommended for the etiologic agent itself. The manipulation of cell cultures from human or primate origin necessitates the use of a type II biosafety cabinet. The scope of this chapter is to highlight aspects relevant for the risk assessment and to summarize the main biosafety recommendations and the recent technological advances allowing a mitigation of the risk for the handling of animal cell cultures.

Viral infections in workers in hospital and research laboratory settings: a comparative review of infection modes and respective biosafety aspects

OBJECTIVES

To compare modes and sources of infection and clinical and biosafety aspects of accidental viral infections in hospital workers and research laboratory staff reported in scientific articles.

METHODS

PubMed, Google Scholar, ISI Web of Knowledge, Scirus, and Scielo were searched (to December 2008) for reports of accidental viral infections, written in English, Portuguese, Spanish, or German; the authors' personal file of scientific articles and references from the articles retrieved in the initial search were also used. Systematic review was carried out with inclusion criteria of presence of accidental viral infection's cases information, and exclusion criteria of absence of information about the viral etiology, and at least probable mode of infection.

RESULTS

One hundred and forty-one scientific articles were obtained, 66 of which were included in the analysis. For arboviruses, 84% of the laboratory infections had aerosol as the source; for alphaviruses alone, aerosol exposure accounted for 94% of accidental infections. Of laboratory arboviral infections, 15.7% were acquired percutaneously, whereas 41.6% of hospital infections were percutaneous. For airborne viruses, 81% of the infections occurred in laboratories, with hantavirus the leading causative agent. Aerosol inhalation was implicated in 96% of lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus infections, 99% of hantavirus infections, and 50% of coxsackievirus infections, but infective droplet inhalation was the leading mode of infection for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus and the mucocutaneous mode of infection was involved in the case of infection with influenza B. For blood-borne viruses, 92% of infections occurred in hospitals and 93% of these had percutaneous mode of infection, while among laboratory infections 77% were due to infective aerosol inhalation. Among blood-borne virus infections there were six cases of particular note: three cases of acute hepatitis following hepatitis C virus infection with a short period of incubation, one laboratory case of human immunodeficiency virus infection through aerosol inhalation, one case of hepatitis following hepatitis G virus infection, and one case of fulminant hepatitis with hepatitis B virus infection following exposure of the worker's conjunctiva to hepatitis B virus e antigen-negative patient saliva. Of the 12 infections with viruses with preferential mucocutaneous transmission, seven occurred percutaneously, aerosol was implicated as a possible source of infection in two cases, and one atypical infection with Macacine herpesvirus 1 with fatal encephalitis as the outcome occurred through a louse bite. One outbreak of norovirus infection among hospital staff had as its probable mode of infection the ingestion of inocula spread in the environment by fomites.

CONCLUSIONS

The currently accepted and practiced risk analysis of accidental viral infections based on the conventional dynamics of infection of the etiological agents is insufficient to cope with accidental viral infections in laboratories and to a lesser extent in hospitals, where unconventional modes of infection are less frequently present but still have relevant clinical and potential epidemiological consequences. Unconventional modes of infection, atypical clinical development, or extremely severe cases are frequently present together with high viral loads and high virulence of the agents manipulated in laboratories. In hospitals by contrast, the only possible association of atypical cases is with the individual resistance of the worker. Current standard precaution practices are insufficient to prevent most of the unconventional infections in hospitals analyzed in this study; it is recommended that special attention be given to flaviviruses in these settings.

Evidence-based biosafety: a review of the principles and effectiveness of microbiological containment measures

We examined the available evidence on the effectiveness of measures aimed at protecting humans and the environment against the risks of working with genetically modified microorganisms (GMOs) and with non-GMO pathogenic microorganisms. A few principles and methods underlie the current biosafety practice: risk assessment, biological containment, concentration and enclosure, exposure minimization, physical containment, and hazard minimization. Many of the current practices are based on experience and expert judgment. The effectiveness of biosafety measures may be evaluated at the level of single containment equipment items and procedures, at the level of the laboratory as a whole, or at the clinical-epidemiological level. Data on the containment effectiveness of equipment and laboratories are scarce and fragmented. Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) are therefore important for evaluating the effectiveness of biosafety. For the majority of LAIs there appears to be no direct cause, suggesting that failures of biosafety were not noticed or that containment may have been insufficient. The number of reported laboratory accidents associated with GMOs is substantially lower than that of those associated with non-GMOs. It is unknown to what extent specific measures contribute to the overall level of biosafety. We therefore recommend that the evidence base of biosafety practice be strengthened.

Ocular vaccinia infection in laboratory worker, Philadelphia, 2004

We report a case of ocular vaccinia infection in an unvaccinated laboratory worker. The patient was infected by a unique strain used in an experiment performed partly outside a biosafety cabinet. Vaccination should continue to be recommended, but laboratories with unvaccinated workers should also implement more stringent biosafety practices.

Comparison of methods for detection of vaccinia virus in patient specimens

We analyzed a shell vial culture assay (SVA), real-time PCR, and a direct fluorescent antibody assay (DFA) for rapid detection of vaccinia virus from vaccination sites of Dryvax vaccine recipients. Of 47 samples assayed, 100% were positive by PCR, 89% were positive by SVA, and 40% were positive by DFA. DFA was limited by the need for adequate numbers of cells, with 32% of samples inadequate for interpretation. DFA performed better with specimens from patients who had not previously received the vaccine. PCR was positive for longer times postvaccination than was SVA. Infectious virus could be recovered after 45 min of acetone fixation of shell vial coverslips. Commercially available polyclonal antibodies cross-reacted with other orthopoxviruses and herpes simplex 1, but commercially available monoclonal antibodies were specific for vaccinia virus. In summary, PCR was the most sensitive test for detecting vaccinia virus in clinical specimens, while the DFA was the most rapid but the least sensitive test.

Laboratory-confirmed transmission of vaccinia virus infection through sexual contact with a military vaccinee

A laboratory-confirmed, inadvertent transmission of vaccinia virus from an unusual source highlights the importance of epidemiologic tracing, proper biosafety practices in the clinical diagnostic laboratories, and educating clinicians and laboratorians to potential bioterrorism-initiated outbreaks as well as look-alike disease discrimination.