Are Market GM Plants an Unrecognized Platform for Bioterrorism and Biocrime?

Cryptographic approaches to authenticating synthetic DNA sequences

In a bioeconomy that relies on synthetic DNA sequences, the ability to ensure their authenticity is critical. DNA watermarks can encode identifying data in short sequences and can be combined with error correction and encryption protocols to ensure that sequences are robust to errors and securely communicated. New digital signature techniques allow for public verification that a sequence has not been modified and can contain sufficient information for synthetic DNA to be self-documenting. In translating these techniques from bacteria to more complex genetically modified organisms (GMOs), special considerations must be made to allow for public verification of these products. We argue that these approaches should be widely implemented to assert authorship, increase the traceability, and detect the unauthorized use of synthetic DNA.

GMOs or non-GMOs? The CRISPR Conundrum

CRISPR-Cas9, the "genetic scissors", is being presaged as a revolutionary technology, having tremendous potential to create designer crops by introducing precise and targeted modifications in the genome to achieve global food security in the face of climate change and increasing population. Traditional genetic engineering relies on random and unpredictable insertion of isolated genes or foreign DNA elements into the plant genome. However, CRISPR-Cas based gene editing does not necessarily involve inserting a foreign DNA element into the plant genome from different species but introducing new traits by precisely altering the existing genes. CRISPR edited crops are touching markets, however, the world community is divided over whether these crops should be considered genetically modified (GM) or non-GM. Classification of CRISPR edited crops, especially transgene free crops as traditional GM crops, will significantly affect their future and public acceptance in some regions. Therefore, the future of the CRISPR edited crops is depending upon their regulation as GM or non-GMs, and their public perception. Here we briefly discuss how CRISPR edited crops are different from traditional genetically modified crops. In addition, we discuss different CRISPR reagents and their delivery tools to produce transgene-free CRISPR edited crops. Moreover, we also summarize the regulatory classification of CRISPR modifications and how different countries are regulating CRISPR edited crops. We summarize that the controversy of CRISPR-edited plants as GM or non-GM will continue until a universal, transparent, and scalable regulatory framework for CRISPR-edited plants will be introduced worldwide, with increased public awareness by involving all stakeholders.

The worsening divergence of biotechnology: the importance of risk culture

In the last 20 years, the field of biotechnology has made significant progress and attracted substantial investments, leading to different paths of technological modernization among nations. As a result, there is now an international divide in the commercial and intellectual capabilities of biotechnology, and the implications of this divergence are not well understood. This raises important questions about why global actors are motivated to participate in biotechnology modernization, the challenges they face in achieving their goals, and the possible future direction of global biotechnology development. Using the framework of prospect theory, this paper explores the role of risk culture as a fundamental factor contributing to this divergence. It aims to assess the risks and benefits associated with the early adoption of biotechnology and the regulatory frameworks that shape the development and acceptance of biotechnological innovations. By doing so, it provides valuable insights into the future of biotechnology development and its potential impact on the global landscape.

An Outlook on Global Regulatory Landscape for Genome-Edited Crops

The revolutionary technology of CRISPR/Cas systems and their extraordinary potential to address fundamental questions in every field of biological sciences has led to their developers being awarded the 2020 Nobel Prize for Chemistry. In agriculture, CRISPR/Cas systems have accelerated the development of new crop varieties with improved traits-without the need for transgenes. However, the future of this technology depends on a clear and truly global regulatory framework being developed for these crops. Some CRISPR-edited crops are already on the market, and yet countries and regions are still divided over their legal status. CRISPR editing does not require transgenes, making CRISPR crops more socially acceptable than genetically modified crops, but there is vigorous debate over how to regulate these crops and what precautionary measures are required before they appear on the market. This article reviews intended outcomes and risks arising from the site-directed nuclease CRISPR systems used to improve agricultural crop plant genomes. It examines how various CRISPR system components, and potential concerns associated with CRISPR/Cas, may trigger regulatory oversight of CRISPR-edited crops. The article highlights differences and similarities between GMOs and CRISPR-edited crops, and discusses social and ethical concerns. It outlines the regulatory framework for GMO crops, which many countries also apply to CRISPR-edited crops, and the global regulatory landscape for CRISPR-edited crops. The article concludes with future prospects for CRISPR-edited crops and their products.

An Outlook on Global Regulatory Landscape for Genome-Edited Crops

The revolutionary technology of CRISPR/Cas systems and their extraordinary potential to address fundamental questions in every field of biological sciences has led to their developers being awarded the 2020 Nobel Prize for Chemistry. In agriculture, CRISPR/Cas systems have accelerated the development of new crop varieties with improved traits—without the need for transgenes. However, the future of this technology depends on a clear and truly global regulatory framework being developed for these crops. Some CRISPR-edited crops are already on the market, and yet countries and regions are still divided over their legal status. CRISPR editing does not require transgenes, making CRISPR crops more socially acceptable than genetically modified crops, but there is vigorous debate over how to regulate these crops and what precautionary measures are required before they appear on the market. This article reviews intended outcomes and risks arising from the site-directed nuclease CRISPR systems used to improve agricultural crop plant genomes. It examines how various CRISPR system components, and potential concerns associated with CRISPR/Cas, may trigger regulatory oversight of CRISPR-edited crops. The article highlights differences and similarities between GMOs and CRISPR-edited crops, and discusses social and ethical concerns. It outlines the regulatory framework for GMO crops, which many countries also apply to CRISPR-edited crops, and the global regulatory landscape for CRISPR-edited crops. The article concludes with future prospects for CRISPR-edited crops and their products.

An Outlook on Global Regulatory Landscape for Genome-Edited Crops

The revolutionary technology of CRISPR/Cas systems and their extraordinary potential to address fundamental questions in every field of biological sciences has led to their developers being awarded the 2020 Nobel Prize for Chemistry. In agriculture, CRISPR/Cas systems have accelerated the development of new crop varieties with improved traits-without the need for transgenes. However, the future of this technology depends on a clear and truly global regulatory framework being developed for these crops. Some CRISPR-edited crops are already on the market, and yet countries and regions are still divided over their legal status. CRISPR editing does not require transgenes, making CRISPR crops more socially acceptable than genetically modified crops, but there is vigorous debate over how to regulate these crops and what precautionary measures are required before they appear on the market. This article reviews intended outcomes and risks arising from the site-directed nuclease CRISPR systems used to improve agricultural crop plant genomes. It examines how various CRISPR system components, and potential concerns associated with CRISPR/Cas, may trigger regulatory oversight of CRISPR-edited crops. The article highlights differences and similarities between GMOs and CRISPR-edited crops, and discusses social and ethical concerns. It outlines the regulatory framework for GMO crops, which many countries also apply to CRISPR-edited crops, and the global regulatory landscape for CRISPR-edited crops. The article concludes with future prospects for CRISPR-edited crops and their products.

Genetic Information Insecurity as State of the Art

Genetic information is being generated at an increasingly rapid pace, offering advances in science and medicine that are paralleled only by the threats and risk present within the responsible systems. Human genetic information is identifiable and contains sensitive information, but genetic information security is only recently gaining attention. Genetic data is generated in an evolving and distributed cyber-physical system, with multiple subsystems that handle information and multiple partners that rely and influence the whole ecosystem. This paper characterizes a general genetic information system from the point of biological material collection through long-term data sharing, storage and application in the security context. While all biotechnology stakeholders and ecosystems are valuable assets to the bioeconomy, genetic information systems are particularly vulnerable with great potential for harm and misuse. The security of post-analysis phases of data dissemination and storage have been focused on by others, but the security of wet and dry laboratories is also challenging due to distributed devices and systems that are not designed nor implemented with security in mind. Consequently, industry standards and best operational practices threaten the security of genetic information systems. Extensive development of laboratory security will be required to realize the potential of this emerging field while protecting the bioeconomy and all of its stakeholders.

Facing the 2020 pandemic: What does cyberbiosecurity want us to know to safeguard the future?

As the entire world is under the grip of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), and as many are eagerly trying to explain the origins of the virus and cause of the pandemic, it is imperative to place more attention on related potential biosafety risks. Biology and biotechnology have changed dramatically during the last ten years or so. Their reliance on digitization, automation, and their cyber-overlaps have created new vulnerabilities for unintended consequences and potentials for intended exploitation that are mostly under-appreciated. This study summarizes and elaborates on these new cyberbiosecurity challenges, (1) in terms of comprehending the evolving threat landscape and determining new risk potentials, (2) in developing adequate safeguarding measures, their validation and implementation, and (3) specific critical risks and consequences, many of them unique to the life-sciences. Drawing other's expertise and my previous work, this article reviews and critically interprets our current bio-economy situation. The goal is not to attribute causative aspects of past biosafety or biosecurity events, but to highlight the fact that the bioeconomy harbors unique features that have to be more critically assessed for their potential to unintentionally cause harm to human health or environment, or to be re-tasked with an intention to cause harm. It is concluded with recommendations that will need to be considered to help ensure converging and emerging biorisk challenges, in order to minimize vulnerabilities to the life-science enterprise, public health, and national security.

On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution

This study investigates the role and functionality of special nucleotide sequences ("DNA signatures") to detect the presence of an organism and to distinguish it from all others. After highlighting vulnerabilities of the prevalent DNA signature paradigm for the identification of agricultural genetically modified (GM) organisms it will be argued that these so-called signatures really are no signatures at all - when compared to the notion of traditional (handwritten) signatures and their generalizations in the modern (digital) world. It is suggested that a recent contamination event of an unauthorized GM Bacillus subtilis strain (Paracchini et al., 2017) in Europe could have been-or the same way could be - the consequence of exploiting gaps of prevailing DNA signatures. Moreover, a recent study (Mueller, 2019) proposes that such DNA signatures may intentionally be exploited to support the counterfeiting or even weaponization of GM organisms (GMOs). These concerns mandate a re-conceptualization of how DNA signatures need to be realized. After identifying central issues of the new vulnerabilities and overlying them with practical challenges that bio-cyber hackers would be facing, recommendations are made how DNA signatures may be enhanced. To overcome the core problem of signature transferability in bioengineered mediums, it is necessary that the identifier needs to remain secret during the entire verification process. On the other hand, however, the goal of DNA signatures is to enable public verifiability, leading to a paradoxical dilemma. It is shown that this can be addressed with ideas that underlie special cryptographic signatures, in particular those of "zero-knowledge" and "invisibility." This means more than mere signature hiding, but relies on a knowledge-based proof and differentiation of a secret (here, as assigned to specific clones) which can be realized without explicit demonstration of that secret. A re-conceptualization of these principles can be used in form of a combined (digital and physical) method to establish confidentiality and prevent un-impersonation of the manufacturer. As a result, this helps mitigate the circulation of possibly hazardous GMO counterfeits and also addresses the situation whereby attackers try to blame producers for deliberately implanting illicit adulterations hidden within authorized GMOs.