Proto-tool use for food processing in wild Arabian babblers: matching processing methods, substrates and prey types

Cognition is a powerful adaptation, enabling animals to utilise resources that are unavailable without manipulation. Tool use and food processing are examples of using cognition to overcome the protective mechanisms of food resources. Here, we describe and examine the flexibility of proto-tool use (defined as the alteration of an object through object-substrate manipulation) for food processing in a cooperatively breeding bird, the Arabian babbler (Argya squamiceps). Field observations demonstrate that the birds transport different caterpillar species to different substrate types depending on the processing method needed to prepare the caterpillar for eating. Species with toxic setae (e.g. Casama innotata) are transported to be rubbed on rough substrates (e.g. sand) before consumption, while other species (e.g. Hyles livornica) are transported to be pounded against hard substrates until their inner organs are removed and only their external body part is consumed. These results are among the few to describe flexible proto-tool use for food processing in wild animals. They thereby contribute to the taxonomic mapping of proto-tool use and food processing in non-human species, which is a fundamental step to advance comparative studies on the evolution of these behaviours and their underlying cognitive mechanisms.

Bodies at play: the role of intercorporeality and bodily affordances in coordinating social play in chimpanzees in the wild

The comparative approach is a crucial method to gain a better understanding of the behavior of living human and nonhuman animals to then draw informed inferences about the behavior of extinct ancestors. One focus has been on disentangling the puzzle of language evolution. Traditionally, studies have predominantly focused on intentionally produced signals in communicative interactions. However, in collaborative and highly dynamic interactions such as play, underlying intentionality is difficult to assess and often interactions are negotiated via body movements rather than signals. This "lack" of signals has led to this dynamic context being widely ignored in comparative studies. The aim of this paper is threefold: First, we will show how comparative research into communication can benefit from taking the intentionality-agnostic standpoint used in conversation analysis. Second, we will introduce the concepts of 'intercorporeality' and 'bodily affordance', and show how they can be applied to the analysis of communicative interactions of nonhuman animals. Third, we will use these concepts to investigate how chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) initiate, end, and maintain 'contact social play'. Our results showed that bodily affordances are able to capture elements of interactions that more traditional approaches failed to describe. Participants made use of bodily affordances to achieve coordinated engagement in contact social play. Additionally, these interactions could display a sequential organization by which one 'move' by a chimpanzee was responded to with an aligning 'move', which allowed for the co-construction of the activity underway. Overall, the present approach innovates on three fronts: First, it allows for the analysis of interactions that are often ignored because they do not fulfil criteria of intentionality, and/or consist of purely body movements. Second, adopting concepts from research on human interaction enables a better comparison of communicative interactions in other animal species without a too narrow focus on intentional signaling only. Third, adopting a stance from interaction research that highlights how practical action can also be communicative, our results show that chimpanzees can communicate through their embodied actions as well as through signaling. With this first step, we hope to inspire new research into dynamic day-to-day interactions involving both "traditional" signals and embodied actions, which, in turn, can provide insights into evolutionary precursors of human language.

Coordinating social action: a primer for the cross-species investigation of communicative repair

Human joint action is inherently cooperative, manifested in the collaborative efforts of participants to minimize communicative trouble through interactive repair. Although interactive repair requires sophisticated cognitive abilities, it can be dissected into basic building blocks shared with non-human animal species. A review of the primate literature shows that interactionally contingent signal sequences are at least common among species of non-human great apes, suggesting a gradual evolution of repair. To pioneer a cross-species assessment of repair this paper aims at (i) identifying necessary precursors of human interactive repair; (ii) proposing a coding framework for its comparative study in humans and non-human species; and (iii) using this framework to analyse examples of interactions of humans (adults/children) and non-human great apes. We hope this paper will serve as a primer for cross-species comparisons of communicative breakdowns and how they are repaired. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

Intentional communication: solving methodological issues to assigning first-order intentional signalling

Intentional signalling plays a fundamental role in human communication. Mapping the taxonomic distribution of comparable capacities may thus shed light on the selective pressures that enabled the evolution of human communication. Nonetheless, severe methodological issues undermine comparisons among studies, species and communicative modalities. Here, we discuss three main obstacles that hinder comparative research of 'first-order' intentional signalling (i.e. voluntary signalling in pursuit of a cognitively represented goal): (i) inconsistency in how behavioural hallmarks are defined and operationalised, (ii) testing of behavioural hallmarks without statistical comparison to control conditions, and (iii) bias against the publication of negative results. To address these obstacles, we present a four-step scheme with 20 statistical operational criteria to distinguish between non-intentional and first-order intentional signalling. Our unified scheme applies to visual and audible signals, thereby validating comparison across communicative modalities and species. This, in turn, promotes the generation and testing of hypotheses about the evolution of intentional communication.

Why do human and non-human species conceal mating? The cooperation maintenance hypothesis

Despite considerable cultural differences, a striking uniformity is argued to exist in human preferences for concealing sexual intercourse from the sensory perception of conspecifics. However, no systematic accounts support this claim, with only limited attempts to understand the selective pressures acting on the evolution of this preference. Here, I combine cross-cultural and cross-species comparative approaches to investigate these topics. First, an analysis of more than 4572 ethnographies from 249 cultures presents systematic evidence that the preference to conceal mating is widespread across cultures. Second, I argue that current anthropological hypotheses do not sufficiently explain why habitual concealment of mating evolved in humans but is only seldom exhibited by other social species. Third, I introduce the cooperation maintenance hypothesis, which postulates that humans, and a specific category of non-human species, conceal matings to prevent sexual arousal in witnesses (proximate explanation). This allows them to simultaneously maintain mating control over their partner(s) and cooperation with group members who are prevented from mating (ultimate explanations). I conclude by presenting a comparative framework and predictions to be tested across species and human cultures.

Marmoset prosociality is intentional

Marmoset monkeys show high levels of proactive prosociality, a trait shared with humans, presumably because both species rely on allomaternal care. However, it is not clear whether the proximate regulation of this convergent trait is also similar, in particular with regard to intentionality, which is a defining characteristic of prosocial behavior in the human literature. The aim of this paper was to investigate whether marmoset monkeys' prosociality fulfils the criteria of intentionality developed in primate communication research. The results show that marmoset prosocial behavior (i) has some degree of flexibility, since individuals can use multiple means to reach their goal and adjust them to specific conditions, (ii) depends on the presence of an audience, i.e. potential recipients (social use), and (iii) is goal-directed, because (a) it continues exactly until the putative goal is reached, and (b) individuals check back and look at/for their partner when their prosocial actions do not achieve the putative goal (i.e. if their actions don't lead to the expected outcome, this elicits distinct reactions in the actor). These results suggest that marmoset prosociality is under some degree of voluntary, intentional control. They are in line with other findings that marmosets perceive each other as intentional agents, and only learn socially from actions that are perceived as intentional. The most parsimonious conclusion is, therefore, that prosocial behavior is fundamentally under voluntary control in marmosets, just as it is in humans, even though our more sophisticated cognitive abilities allow for a far more complex integration of prosociality into a broader variety of contexts and of behavioral goals.