Evolutionary Implications of Self-Assembling Cybernetic Materials with Collective Problem-Solving Intelligence at Multiple Scales

In recent years, the scientific community has increasingly recognized the complex multi-scale competency architecture (MCA) of biology, comprising nested layers of active homeostatic agents, each forming the self-orchestrated substrate for the layer above, and, in turn, relying on the structural and functional plasticity of the layer(s) below. The question of how natural selection could give rise to this MCA has been the focus of intense research. Here, we instead investigate the effects of such decision-making competencies of MCA agential components on the process of evolution itself, using in silico neuroevolution experiments of simulated, minimal developmental biology. We specifically model the process of morphogenesis with neural cellular automata (NCAs) and utilize an evolutionary algorithm to optimize the corresponding model parameters with the objective of collectively self-assembling a two-dimensional spatial target pattern (reliable morphogenesis). Furthermore, we systematically vary the accuracy with which the uni-cellular agents of an NCA can regulate their cell states (simulating stochastic processes and noise during development). This allows us to continuously scale the agents' competency levels from a direct encoding scheme (no competency) to an MCA (with perfect reliability in cell decision executions). We demonstrate that an evolutionary process proceeds much more rapidly when evolving the functional parameters of an MCA compared to evolving the target pattern directly. Moreover, the evolved MCAs generalize well toward system parameter changes and even modified objective functions of the evolutionary process. Thus, the adaptive problem-solving competencies of the agential parts in our NCA-based in silico morphogenesis model strongly affect the evolutionary process, suggesting significant functional implications of the near-ubiquitous competency seen in living matter.

Collective intelligence: A unifying concept for integrating biology across scales and substrates

A defining feature of biology is the use of a multiscale architecture, ranging from molecular networks to cells, tissues, organs, whole bodies, and swarms. Crucially however, biology is not only nested structurally, but also functionally: each level is able to solve problems in distinct problem spaces, such as physiological, morphological, and behavioral state space. Percolating adaptive functionality from one level of competent subunits to a higher functional level of organization requires collective dynamics: multiple components must work together to achieve specific outcomes. Here we overview a number of biological examples at different scales which highlight the ability of cellular material to make decisions that implement cooperation toward specific homeodynamic endpoints, and implement collective intelligence by solving problems at the cell, tissue, and whole-organism levels. We explore the hypothesis that collective intelligence is not only the province of groups of animals, and that an important symmetry exists between the behavioral science of swarms and the competencies of cells and other biological systems at different scales. We then briefly outline the implications of this approach, and the possible impact of tools from the field of diverse intelligence for regenerative medicine and synthetic bioengineering.

Irruption and Absorption: A 'Black-Box' Framework for How Mind and Matter Make a Difference to Each Other

Cognitive science is confronted by several fundamental anomalies deriving from the mind-body problem. Most prominent is the problem of mental causation and the hard problem of consciousness, which can be generalized into the hard problem of agential efficacy and the hard problem of mental content. Here, it is proposed to accept these explanatory gaps at face value and to take them as positive indications of a complex relation: mind and matter are one, but they are not the same. They are related in an efficacious yet non-reducible, non-observable, and even non-intelligible manner. Natural science is well equipped to handle the effects of non-observables, and so the mind is treated as equivalent to a hidden 'black box' coupled to the body. Two concepts are introduced given that there are two directions of coupling influence: (1) irruption denotes the unobservable mind hiddenly making a difference to observable matter, and (2) absorption denotes observable matter hiddenly making a difference to the unobservable mind. The concepts of irruption and absorption are methodologically compatible with existing information-theoretic approaches to neuroscience, such as measuring cognitive activity and subjective qualia in terms of entropy and compression, respectively. By offering novel responses to otherwise intractable theoretical problems from first principles, and by doing so in a way that is closely connected with empirical advances, irruption theory is poised to set the agenda for the future of the mind sciences.

Open-endedness in synthetic biology: A route to continual innovation for biological design

Design in synthetic biology is typically goal oriented, aiming to repurpose or optimize existing biological functions, augmenting biology with new-to-nature capabilities, or creating life-like systems from scratch. While the field has seen many advances, bottlenecks in the complexity of the systems built are emerging and designs that function in the lab often fail when used in real-world contexts. Here, we propose an open-ended approach to biological design, with the novelty of designed biology being at least as important as how well it fulfils its goal. Rather than solely focusing on optimization toward a single best design, designing with novelty in mind may allow us to move beyond the diminishing returns we see in performance for most engineered biology. Research from the artificial life community has demonstrated that embracing novelty can automatically generate innovative and unexpected solutions to challenging problems beyond local optima. Synthetic biology offers the ideal playground to explore more creative approaches to biological design.

From reinforcement learning to agency: Frameworks for understanding basal cognition

Organisms play, explore, and mimic those around them. Is there a purpose to this behavior? Are organisms just behaving, or are they trying to achieve goals? We believe this is a false dichotomy. To that end, to understand organisms, we attempt to unify two approaches for understanding complex agents, whether evolved or engineered. We argue that formalisms describing multiscale competencies and goal-directedness in biology (e.g., TAME), and reinforcement learning (RL), can be combined in a symbiotic framework. While RL has been largely focused on higher-level organisms and robots of high complexity, TAME is naturally capable of describing lower-level organisms and minimal agents as well. We propose several novel questions that come from using RL/TAME to understand biology as well as ones that come from using biology to formulate new theory in AI. We hope that the research programs proposed in this piece shape future efforts to understand biological organisms and also future efforts to build artificial agents.

Agency, Goal-Directed Behavior, and Part-Whole Relationships in Biological Systems

In this essay we aim to present some considerations regarding a minimal but concrete notion of agency and goal-directed behavior that are useful for characterizing biological systems at different scales. These considerations are a particular perspective, bringing together concepts from dynamical systems, combinatorial problem-solving, and connectionist learning with an emphasis on the relationship between parts and wholes. This perspective affords some ways to think about agents that are concrete and quantifiable, and relevant to some important biological issues. Instead of advocating for a strict definition of minimally agential characteristics, we focus on how (even for a modest notion of agency) the agency of a system can be more than the sum of the agency of its parts. We quantify this in terms of the problem-solving competency of a system with respect to resolution of the frustrations between its parts. This requires goal-directed behavior in the sense of delayed gratification, i.e., taking dynamical trajectories that forego short-term gains (or sustain short-term stress or frustration) in favor of long-term gains. In order for this competency to belong to the system (rather than to its parts or given by its construction or design), it can involve distributed systemic knowledge that is acquired through experience, i.e., changes in the organization of the relationships among its parts (without presupposing a system-level reward function for such changes). This conception of agency helps us think about the ways in which cells, organisms, and perhaps other biological scales, can be agential (i.e., more agential than their parts) in a quantifiable sense, without denying that the behavior of the whole depends on the behaviors of the parts in their current organization.

Bioelectric networks: the cognitive glue enabling evolutionary scaling from physiology to mind

Each of us made the remarkable journey from mere matter to mind: starting life as a quiescent oocyte ("just chemistry and physics"), and slowly, gradually, becoming an adult human with complex metacognitive processes, hopes, and dreams. In addition, even though we feel ourselves to be a unified, single Self, distinct from the emergent dynamics of termite mounds and other swarms, the reality is that all intelligence is collective intelligence: each of us consists of a huge number of cells working together to generate a coherent cognitive being with goals, preferences, and memories that belong to the whole and not to its parts. Basal cognition is the quest to understand how Mind scales-how large numbers of competent subunits can work together to become intelligences that expand the scale of their possible goals. Crucially, the remarkable trick of turning homeostatic, cell-level physiological competencies into large-scale behavioral intelligences is not limited to the electrical dynamics of the brain. Evolution was using bioelectric signaling long before neurons and muscles appeared, to solve the problem of creating and repairing complex bodies. In this Perspective, I review the deep symmetry between the intelligence of developmental morphogenesis and that of classical behavior. I describe the highly conserved mechanisms that enable the collective intelligence of cells to implement regulative embryogenesis, regeneration, and cancer suppression. I sketch the story of an evolutionary pivot that repurposed the algorithms and cellular machinery that enable navigation of morphospace into the behavioral navigation of the 3D world which we so readily recognize as intelligence. Understanding the bioelectric dynamics that underlie construction of complex bodies and brains provides an essential path to understanding the natural evolution, and bioengineered design, of diverse intelligences within and beyond the phylogenetic history of Earth.

Darwin's agential materials: evolutionary implications of multiscale competency in developmental biology

A critical aspect of evolution is the layer of developmental physiology that operates between the genotype and the anatomical phenotype. While much work has addressed the evolution of developmental mechanisms and the evolvability of specific genetic architectures with emergent complexity, one aspect has not been sufficiently explored: the implications of morphogenetic problem-solving competencies for the evolutionary process itself. The cells that evolution works with are not passive components: rather, they have numerous capabilities for behavior because they derive from ancestral unicellular organisms with rich repertoires. In multicellular organisms, these capabilities must be tamed, and can be exploited, by the evolutionary process. Specifically, biological structures have a multiscale competency architecture where cells, tissues, and organs exhibit regulative plasticity-the ability to adjust to perturbations such as external injury or internal modifications and still accomplish specific adaptive tasks across metabolic, transcriptional, physiological, and anatomical problem spaces. Here, I review examples illustrating how physiological circuits guiding cellular collective behavior impart computational properties to the agential material that serves as substrate for the evolutionary process. I then explore the ways in which the collective intelligence of cells during morphogenesis affect evolution, providing a new perspective on the evolutionary search process. This key feature of the physiological software of life helps explain the remarkable speed and robustness of biological evolution, and sheds new light on the relationship between genomes and functional anatomical phenotypes.

Irruption Theory: A Novel Conceptualization of the Enactive Account of Motivated Activity

Cognitive science is lacking conceptual tools to describe how an agent's motivations, as such, can play a role in the generation of its behavior. The enactive approach has made progress by developing a relaxed naturalism, and by placing normativity at the core of life and mind; all cognitive activity is a kind of motivated activity. It has rejected representational architectures, especially their reification of the role of normativity into localized "value" functions, in favor of accounts that appeal to system-level properties of the organism. However, these accounts push the problem of reification to a higher level of description, given that the efficacy of agent-level normativity is completely identified with the efficacy of non-normative system-level activity, while assuming operational equivalency. To allow normativity to have its own efficacy, a new kind of nonreductive theory is proposed: irruption theory. The concept of irruption is introduced to indirectly operationalize an agent's motivated involvement in its activity, specifically in terms of a corresponding underdetermination of its states by their material basis. This implies that irruptions are associated with increased unpredictability of (neuro)physiological activity, and they should, hence, be quantifiable in terms of information-theoretic entropy. Accordingly, evidence that action, cognition, and consciousness are linked to higher levels of neural entropy can be interpreted as indicating higher levels of motivated agential involvement. Counterintuitively, irruptions do not stand in contrast to adaptive behavior. Rather, as indicated by artificial life models of complex adaptive systems, bursts of arbitrary changes in neural activity can facilitate the self-organization of adaptivity. Irruption theory therefore, makes it intelligible how an agent's motivations, as such, can make effective differences to their behavior, without requiring the agent to be able to directly control their body's neurophysiological processes.

Cellular Competency during Development Alters Evolutionary Dynamics in an Artificial Embryogeny Model

Biological genotypes do not code directly for phenotypes; developmental physiology is the control layer that separates genomes from capacities ascertained by selection. A key aspect is cellular competency, since cells are not passive materials but descendants of unicellular organisms with complex context-sensitive behavioral capabilities. To probe the effects of different degrees of cellular competency on evolutionary dynamics, we used an evolutionary simulation in the context of minimal artificial embryogeny. Virtual embryos consisted of a single axis of positional information values provided by cells' 'structural genes', operated upon by an evolutionary cycle in which embryos' fitness was proportional to monotonicity of the axial gradient. Evolutionary dynamics were evaluated in two modes: hardwired development (genotype directly encodes phenotype), and a more realistic mode in which cells interact prior to evaluation by the fitness function ("regulative" development). We find that even minimal ability of cells with to improve their position in the embryo results in better performance of the evolutionary search. Crucially, we observed that increasing the behavioral competency masks the raw fitness encoded by structural genes, with selection favoring improvements to its developmental problem-solving capacities over improvements to its structural genome. This suggests the existence of a powerful ratchet mechanism: evolution progressively becomes locked in to improvements in the intelligence of its agential substrate, with reduced pressure on the structural genome. This kind of feedback loop in which evolution increasingly puts more effort into the developmental software than perfecting the hardware explains the very puzzling divergence of genome from anatomy in species like planaria. In addition, it identifies a possible driver for scaling intelligence over evolutionary time, and suggests strategies for engineering novel systems in silico and in bioengineering.