Mechanisms of self-other representations and vicarious experiences of touch in mirror-touch synesthesia

Atypical emotion sharing in individuals with mirror sensory synaesthesia

Being able to empathise with others is a crucial ability in everyday life. However, this does not usually entail feeling the pain of others in our own bodies. For individuals with mirror-sensory synaesthesia (MSS), however, this form of empathic embodiment is a common feature. Our study investigates the empathic ability of adults who experience MSS using a video-based empathy task. We found that MSS participants did not differ from controls on emotion identification and affective empathy; however, they showed higher affect sharing (degree to which their affect matches what they attribute to others) than controls. This finding indicates difficulties with self-other distinction, which our data shows results in fewer signs of prosocial behaviour. Our findings are in line with the self-other control theory of MSS and highlight how the use of appropriate empathy measures can contribute to our understanding of this important socio-affective ability, both in typical and atypical populations.

An evolutionary account of impairment of self in cognitive disorders

Recent research has proposed that certain aspects of psychosis, as experienced in, e.g., schizophrenia (SCZ), but also aspects of other cognitive conditions, such as autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and synesthesia, can be related to a shattered sense of the notion of self. In this paper, our goal is to show that altered processing of self can be attributed to an abnormal functioning of cortico-striatal brain networks supporting, among other, one key human distinctive cognitive ability, namely cross-modality, which plays multiple roles in human cognition and language. Specifically, our hypothesis is that this cognitive mechanism sheds light both on some basic aspects of the minimal self and on some aspects related to higher forms of self, such as the narrative self. We further link the atypical functioning in these conditions to some recent evolutionary changes in our species, specifically, an atypical presentation of human self-domestication (HSD) features. In doing so, we also lean on previous work concerning the link between cognitive disorders and language evolution under the effects of HSD. We further show that this approach can unify both linguistic and non-linguistic symptoms of these conditions through deficits in the notion of self. Our considerations provide further support for the hypothesis that SCZ and ASD are diametrically opposed cognitive conditions, as well for the hypothesis that their etiology is associated with recent human evolution, leading to a deeper understanding of the causes and symptoms of these disorders, and providing new cues, which can be used for an earlier and more accurate diagnostics.

Do synaesthesia and mental imagery tap into similar cross-modal processes?

Synaesthesia has previously been linked with imagery abilities, although an understanding of a causal role for mental imagery in broader synaesthetic experiences remains elusive. This can be partly attributed to our relatively poor understanding of imagery in sensory domains beyond vision. Investigations into the neural and behavioural underpinnings of mental imagery have nevertheless identified an important role for imagery in perception, particularly in mediating cross-modal interactions. However, the phenomenology of synaesthesia gives rise to the assumption that associated cross-modal interactions may be encapsulated and specific to synaesthesia. As such, evidence for a link between imagery and perception may not generalize to synaesthesia. Here, we present results that challenge this idea: first, we found enhanced somatosensory imagery evoked by visual stimuli of body parts in mirror-touch synaesthetes, relative to other synaesthetes or controls. Moreover, this enhanced imagery generalized to tactile object properties not directly linked to their synaesthetic associations. Second, we report evidence that concurrent experience evoked in grapheme-colour synaesthesia was sufficient to trigger visual-to-tactile correspondences that are common to all. Together, these findings show that enhanced mental imagery is a consistent hallmark of synaesthesia, and suggest the intriguing possibility that imagery may facilitate the cross-modal interactions that underpin synaesthesic experiences. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Bridging senses: novel insights from synaesthesia'.

Atypical bodily self-awareness in vicarious pain responders

Vicarious perception refers to the ability to co-represent the experiences of others. Prior research has shown considerable inter-individual variability in vicarious perception of pain, with some experiencing conscious sensations of pain on their own body when viewing another person in pain (conscious vicarious perception/mirror-pain synaesthesia). Self-Other Theory proposes that this conscious vicarious perception may result from impairments in self-other distinction and maintaining a coherent sense of bodily self. In support of this, individuals who experience conscious vicarious perception are more susceptible to illusions of body ownership and agency. However, little work has assessed whether trait differences in bodily self-awareness are associated with conscious vicarious pain. Here we addressed this gap by examining individual difference factors related to awareness of the body, in conscious vicarious pain responders. Increased self-reported depersonalization and interoceptive sensibility was found for conscious vicarious pain responders compared with non-responders, in addition to more internally oriented thinking (associated with lower alexithymia). There were no significant differences in trait anxiety. Results indicate that maintaining a stable sense of the bodily self may be important for vicarious perception of pain, and that vicarious perception might also be enhanced by attention towards internal bodily states. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Bridging senses: novel insights from synaesthesia'.

Enhanced self-reported affect and prosocial behaviour without differential physiological responses in mirror-sensory synaesthesia

Mirror-sensory synaesthetes mirror the pain or touch that they observe in other people on their own bodies. This type of synaesthesia has been associated with enhanced empathy. We investigated whether the enhanced empathy of people with mirror-sensory synesthesia influences the experience of situations involving touch or pain and whether it affects their prosocial decision making. Mirror-sensory synaesthetes (N = 18, all female), verified with a touch-interference paradigm, were compared with a similar number of age-matched control individuals (all female). Participants viewed arousing images depicting pain or touch; we recorded subjective valence and arousal ratings, and physiological responses, hypothesizing more extreme reactions in synaesthetes. The subjective impact of positive and negative images was stronger in synaesthetes than in control participants; the stronger the reported synaesthesia, the more extreme the picture ratings. However, there was no evidence for differential physiological or hormonal responses to arousing pictures. Prosocial decision making was assessed with an economic game assessing altruism, in which participants had to divide money between themselves and a second player. Mirror-sensory synaesthetes donated more money than non-synaesthetes, showing enhanced prosocial behaviour, and also scored higher on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index as a measure of empathy. Our study demonstrates the subjective impact of mirror-sensory synaesthesia and its stimulating influence on prosocial behaviour. This article is part of the discussion meeting issue 'Bridging senses: novel insights from synaesthesia'.

Inter-Individual Differences in Vicarious Tactile Perception: a View Across the Lifespan in Typical and Atypical Populations

Touch is our most interpersonal sense, and so it stands to reason that we represent not only our own bodily experiences, but also those felt by others. This review will summarise brain and behavioural research on vicarious tactile perception (mirror touch). Specifically, we will focus on vicarious touch across the lifespan in typical and atypical groups, and will identify the knowledge gaps that are in urgent need of filling by examining what is known about how individuals differ within and between typical and atypical groups.

Self-other control processes in social cognition: from imitation to empathy

We review the evidence that an ability to achieve a precise balance between representing the self and representing other people is crucial in social interaction. This ability is required for imitation, perspective-taking, theory of mind and empathy; and disruption to this ability may contribute to the symptoms of clinical and sub-clinical conditions, including autism spectrum disorder and mirror-touch synaesthesia. Moving beyond correlational approaches, a recent intervention study demonstrated that training participants to control representations of the self and others improves their ability to control imitative behaviour, and to take another's visual perspective. However, it is unclear whether these effects apply to other areas of social interaction, such as the ability to empathize with others. We report original data showing that participants trained to increase self-other control in the motor domain demonstrated increased empathic corticospinal responses (Experiment 1) and self-reported empathy (Experiment 2), as well as an increased ability to control imitation. These results suggest that the ability to control self and other representations contributes to empathy as well as to other types of social interaction.

Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia Is Not Associated with Heightened Empathy, and Can Occur with Autism

Research has linked Mirror-Touch (MT) synaesthesia with enhanced empathy. We test the largest sample of MT synaesthetes to date to examine two claims that have been previously made: that MT synaesthetes (1) have superior empathy; and (2) only ever experience their MT synaesthesia in response to viewing a person being touched. Given that autism has been suggested to involve deficits in cognitive empathy, we also test two predictions: that MT synaesthetes should (3) be less likely than general population individuals without MT synaesthesia to have an autism spectrum condition (ASC), if MT is characterized by superior empathy; and (4) have fewer autistic traits. We selected three groups: a pure MT synaesthesia group (N = 46), a pure grapheme-colour (GC) synaesthesia group (N = 36), and a typical control group without synaesthesia (N = 46). Participants took three measures of empathy and one measure of autistic traits. MT synaesthetes did not show enhanced empathy. In addition, 30% of all MT synaesthetes recruited into this study (N = 135) reported also having ASC, and MT synaesthetes showed higher autistic trait scores than controls. Finally, some MT experiences were reported in response to viewing objects being touched. Our findings dispute the views that MT synaesthesia is linked with enhanced empathy, is less likely to occur with ASC or elevated autistic traits, and is specific to seeing a person being touched.

Is that me in the mirror? Depersonalisation modulates tactile mirroring mechanisms

Our sense of self is thought to develop through sensory-motor contingencies provided, not only by observing one's own body, but also by mirroring interactions with others. This suggests that there is a strong link between mirroring mechanisms and the bodily self. The present study tested whether this link is expressed at early, implicit stages of the mirroring process or at later, more cognitive stages. We also provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first demonstration of how inter-individual differences in our sense of bodily self may affect mirroring mechanisms. We used somatosensory event-related potentials (SEPs) to investigate the temporal dynamics of mirroring highly self-related information (viewed touch on one's own face) compared to other-related information (viewed touch on a stranger's face), in individuals with low and high levels of depersonalisation, a mental condition characterised by feeling detached or estranged from one's self and body. For the low-depersonalisation group, mirroring for self-related events (P45) preceded mirroring for other-related events (N80). At later stages (P200), mirroring was stronger for other-related than self-related events. This shows that early, implicit and later, more cognitive processes play different relative roles in mirroring self- and other-related bodily events. Critically, mirroring differed in the high-depersonalisation group, specifically for self-related events. An absence of early, implicit mirroring for self-related events over P45 suggests that the associated processes may be the neural correlates of the disembodiment experienced in depersonalisation. A lack of differential mirroring for self- and other-related events over P200 may reflect compensatory mechanisms that redress deficiencies in mirroring at earlier stages, which may break down to give rise to symptoms of depersonalisation. Alternatively, or in addition, they may represent an attenuation of processes related to self-other distinction. Our study thus shows that mirroring, especially for events on one's own face, can be strongly affected by how connected the observer feels to their own bodily self.

To bet or not to bet? The coding of bets modulates brain potentials in outcome evaluations

Decisions made on the basis of risk often require rapid evaluation of feedback before follow-up actions and feedback-related negativity in brain potential is sensitive to the poor outcome. The current study investigated the effects of feedback from one's own decision (Experiment 1) and feedback from observing others' decisions (Experiment 2) on electroencephalograph responses to winning and losing money with and without betting. Irrespective of whether the betting is self-generated or simply observed, the cognitive evaluation of the outcome evoked feedback-related negativity, indicating that one's own experience and vicarious experience give rise to the same neural response. These results indicate that participants were more sensitive to loss when it was personally relevant, irrespective of whether that loss was associated with betting. However, when observing others' losses, participants showed stronger negative responses when the losses were associated with betting.

Mirror-touch synaesthesia: Difficulties inhibiting the other

Individuals with mirror touch synaesthesia (MTS) experience touch on their own body when observing others being touched. A recent account proposes that such rare experiences could be linked to impairment in self-other representations. Here we tested participants with MTS on a battery of social cognition tests and found that compared to non-synaesthete controls, the MTS group showed impairment in imitation-inhibition but not in visual perspective taking or theory of mind. Although all of these socio-cognitive abilities rely on the control of self-other representations, they differ as to whether the self, or the other, should be preferentially represented. For imitation-inhibition, representations of the other should be inhibited and self-representations should be enhanced, whereas the opposite is true for visual perspective taking and theory of mind. These findings suggest that MTS is associated with a specific deficit in inhibiting representation of other individuals and shed light on the fractionability of processes underlying typical social cognition.

Common coding and dynamic interactions between observed, imagined, and experienced motor and somatosensory activity

Motor imagery and perception - considered generally as forms of motor simulation - share overlapping neural representations with motor production. While much research has focused on the extent of this "common coding," less attention has been paid to how these overlapping representations interact. How do imagined, observed, or produced actions influence one another, and how do we maintain control over our perception and behavior? In the first part of this review we describe interactions between motor production and motor simulation, and explore apparent regulatory mechanisms that balance these processes. Next, we consider the somatosensory system. Numerous studies now support a "sensory mirror system" comprised of neural representations activated by either afferent sensation or vicarious sensation. In the second part of this review we summarize evidence for shared representations of sensation and sensory simulation (including imagery and observed sensation), and suggest that similar interactions and regulation of simulation occur in the somatosensory domain as in the motor domain. We suggest that both motor and somatosensory simulations are flexibly regulated to support simulations congruent with our sensorimotor experience and goals and suppress or separate the influence of those that are not. These regulatory mechanisms are frequently revealed by cases of brain injury but can also be employed to facilitate sensorimotor rehabilitation.

Body ownership causes illusory self-attribution of speaking and influences subsequent real speaking

When we carry out an act, we typically attribute the action to ourselves, the sense of agency. Explanations for agency include conscious prior intention to act, followed by observation of the sensory consequences; brain activity that involves the feed-forward prediction of the consequences combined with rapid inverse motor prediction to fine-tune the action in real time; priming where there is, e.g., a prior command to perform the act; a cause (the intention to act) preceding the effect (the results of the action); and common-sense rules of attribution of physical causality satisfied. We describe an experiment where participants falsely attributed an act to themselves under conditions that apparently cannot be explained by these theories. A life-sized virtual body (VB) seen from the first-person perspective in 3D stereo, as if substituting the real body, was used to induce the illusion of ownership over the VB. Half of the 44 experimental participants experienced VB movements that were synchronous with their own movements (sync), and the other half asynchronous (async). The VB, seen in a mirror, spoke with corresponding lip movements, and for half of the participants this was accompanied by synchronous vibrotactile stimulation on the thyroid cartilage (Von) but this was not so for the other half. Participants experiencing sync misattributed the speaking to themselves and also shifted the fundamental frequency of their later utterances toward the stimulus voice. Von also contributed to these results. We show that these findings can be explained by current theories of agency, provided that the critical role of ownership over the VB is taken into account.

Semantic mechanisms may be responsible for developing synesthesia

Currently, little is known about how synesthesia develops and which aspects of synesthesia can be acquired through a learning process. We review the increasing evidence for the role of semantic representations in the induction of synesthesia, and argue for the thesis that synesthetic abilities are developed and modified by semantic mechanisms. That is, in certain people semantic mechanisms associate concepts with perception-like experiences-and this association occurs in an extraordinary way. This phenomenon can be referred to as "higher" synesthesia or ideasthesia. The present analysis suggests that synesthesia develops during childhood and is being enriched further throughout the synesthetes' lifetime; for example, the already existing concurrents may be adopted by novel inducers or new concurrents may be formed. For a deeper understanding of the origin and nature of synesthesia we propose to focus future research on two aspects: (i) the similarities between synesthesia and ordinary phenomenal experiences based on concepts; and (ii) the tight entanglement of perception, cognition and the conceptualization of the world. Importantly, an explanation of how biological systems get to generate experiences, synesthetic or not, may have to involve an explanation of how semantic networks are formed in general and what their role is in the ability to be aware of the surrounding world.

Mirror-touch and ticker tape experiences in synesthesia

A fundamental question in the field of synesthesia is whether it is associated with other cognitive phenomena. The current study examined synesthesia's connections with phenomenal traits of mirror-touch and ticker tape experiences, as well as the representation of the three phenomena in the population, across gender and domain of work/study. Mirror-touch is the automatic, involuntary experience of tactile sensation on one's own body when others are being touched. For example, seeing another person's arm being stroked can evoke physical touch sensation on one's own arm. Ticker tape is the automatic visualization of spoken words or thoughts, such as a teleprompter. For example, when spoken to, a ticker taper might see mentally the spoken words displayed in front of his face or as coming out of the speaker's mouth. To explore synesthesia's associations with these phenomena, a diverse group (n = 3743) was systematically recruited from eight universities and one public museum in France to complete an online screening. Of the 1017 eligible respondents, synesthetes (across all subtypes) reported higher rates of mirror-touch and ticker tape than non-synesthetes, suggesting that synesthesia is associated with these phenomenal traits. However, effect sizes were small and we could not rule out that response bias influenced these associations. Mirror-touch and ticker tape were independent. No differences were found across gender or domain of work and study in prevalence of synesthesia, mirror-touch or ticker tape. The prevalence of ticker tape, unknown so far, was estimated at about 7%, an intermediate rate between estimates of grapheme-color (2-4%) and sequence-space synesthesia (9-14%). Within synesthesia, grapheme-personification, also called ordinal-linguistic personification (OLP) was the most common subtype and was estimated around 12%. Co-occurences of the different types of synesthesia were higher than chance, though at the level of small effect sizes.