Impaired Communication Between the Dorsal and Ventral Stream: Indications from Apraxia

Trainability of affordance judgments in right and left hemisphere stroke patients

Whenever we are confronted with action opportunities in everyday life, e.g., when passing an opening, we rely on our ability to precisely estimate our own bodily capabilities in relation to the environmental conditions. So-called affordance judgments can be affected after brain damage. Previous studies with healthy adults showed that such judgments appeared to be trainable within one session. In the current study, we examined whether stroke patients with either right brain damage (n = 30) or left brain damage (n = 30) may similarly profit from training in an aperture task. Further, the role of neuropsychological deficits in trainability was investigated. In the administered task, stroke patients decided whether their hand would fit into a presented opening with varying horizontal width (Aperture Task). During one training session, patients were asked to try to fit their hand into the opening and received feedback on their decisions. We analyzed accuracy and the detection theory parameters perceptual sensitivity and judgment tendency. Both patients with right brain damage and patients with left brain damage showed improved performance during training as well as post training. High variability with differential profiles of trainability was revealed in these patients. Patients with impaired performance in a visuo-spatial or motor-cognitive task appeared to profit considerably from the target-driven action phase with feedback, but the performance increase in judgments did not last when the action was withdrawn. Future studies applying lesion analysis with a larger sample may shed further light on the dissociation in the trainability of affordance judgments observed in patients with versus without visuo-spatial or motor-cognitive deficits.

A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception

In this paper, I offer a discussion concerning the conceptual connection between the notion of vision-for-action and the one of affordance perception. I first analyze the notion of vision-for-action. I then analyze a notion usually coupled with it: the notion of affordance perception, the main insights behind which are guiding several current neuroscientific enterprises and the related philosophical speculations. Then, I argue that we should not couple these two notions with a light heart: though these two processes can be, from a theoretical point of view, related, we should be careful in inferring the actual and effective occurrence of the latter in the presence of the former. This will be done by carrying out a conceptual analysis of the experimental evidence coming from the 'Two Visual Systems Model', which is the main reference in the literature on affordance perception and vision-for-action. My point has strong philosophical implications for our view concerning the best interpretation of how vision-for-action really works, and the specific relation it actually entertains with affordance perception.