Processing of Self versus Non-Self in Alzheimer's Disease

The use of virtual reality as a perspective-taking manipulation to improve self-awareness in Alzheimer's disease

Lack of awareness of symptoms or having a condition referred to as anosognosia is a common feature of individuals with Alzheimer's Disease (AD). Previous literature on AD reported difficulties in evaluating self-abilities, often showing underestimation of limitations. There is increasing evidence that the perspective through which information is presented may moderate the performance appraisal and that anosognosia in AD might be a consequence of a deficit in assuming a third-person perspective. In this context, some studies showed that subjects may better recognize self-and other-difficulties when exposed to a third-person perspective. Considering the variety of approaches aiming to investigate the lack of awareness, there is still a scarcity of methods that provide great ecological validity and consider more than one facet of awareness, thus failing to offer more accurate evaluations of daily experiences. The present paper primarily addresses the theme of the multidimensional character of awareness of abilities in AD and the effect of perspective-taking on its trajectories. The focus turns to virtual reality as a promising tool for a greater evaluation of perspective-taking and self-awareness. Particularly, these systems offer the possibility to involve users in cognitive and sensorimotor tasks that simulate daily life conditions within immersive and realistic environments, and a great sense of embodiment. We propose that virtual reality might allow a great level of complexity, veracity, and safety that is needed for individuals with AD to behave according to their actual abilities and enable to explore the liaison between the subject's viewpoint, performance, and self-evaluation. In addition, we suggest promising clinical implications of virtual reality-based methods for individualized assessments, investigating specific impacts on subjects' life and possible improvements in their awareness.

Disentangling empathy impairment along Alzheimer's disease continuum: From subjective cognitive decline to Alzheimer's dementia

Little is known about empathy changes from the early stages of Alzheimer's Disease (AD) continuum. The aim of this study is to investigate empathy across AD spectrum from Subjective Cognitive Decline (SCD) to Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) and AD dementia (AD-d). Forty-five SCD, 83 MCI and 80 AD-d patients were included. Empathy was assessed by Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Perspective Taking - PT, Fantasy - FT, Empathic Concern - EC, and Personal Distress - PD), rated by caregivers before (T0) and after (T1) cognitive symptoms' onset. IRI was also administered to SCD patients to have a self-reported empathy evaluation. Facial emotion recognition was assessed by Ekman-60 Faces Test. Twenty-two SCD, 54 MCI and 62 AD-d patients underwent CSF biomarkers analysis and were classified as carriers of AD pathology (AP+) when they were A+/T+ (regardless of N), or non-carriers (AP-) when they were A- (regardless of T and N), or A+/T-/N-, or A+/T-/N+ according to the A/T(N) system. Cerebral FDG-PET SPM analysis was used to explore neural correlates underlying empathy deficits. PD scores significantly increased from T0 to T1 in SCD, MCI and AD-d (p < .001), while PT scores decreased in MCI and in AD-d (p < .001). SCD AP+ showed a greater increase in PD scores over time (ΔPD T0 - T1) than SCD AP- (p < .001). SCD self-reported PT scores were lower than those of general Italian population (14.94 ± 3.94, 95% C.I. [13.68-16.20] vs 17.70 ± 4.36, 95% C.I. [17.30-18.10]). In AD continuum (SCD AP+, MCI AP+, AD-d), a positive correlation was detected between PT-T1 and brain metabolism in left posterior cingulate gyrus, precuneus and right frontal gyri; a negative correlation was found between ΔPT and brain metabolism in bilateral posterior cingulate gyri. PT may be subtly involved since the preclinical phase of AD. Changes over time of PD are influenced by the underlying Alzheimer's pathology and could potentially serve as an early AD neuropsychological marker.

Change in the psychological self in people living with dementia: A scoping review

Alterations in one's sense of self are often considered a significant psychological symptom of dementia. However, the self is not a unified construct; it consists of a set of closely connected, yet substantive, manifestations which might not be equally impacted by dementia. Recognising the multidimensional nature of the self, the current scoping review aimed to explore the nature and scope of the evidence demonstrating change in the psychological self in people living with dementia. Adopting a cognitive psychological framework, a hundred and five (105) quantitative and qualitative studies were reviewed, and findings were organised into three main types of self-manifestations: high-order manifestations, functional aspects of the self, and foundational manifestations. Overall, the results show that although there are alterations in some of these different manifestations of the self, these do not imply a global loss of selfhood. Despite notable cognitive changes during dementia, it seems that preserved aspects of self may be enough to compensate for potential weakening of some self-processes such as autobiographical recall. Better understanding alterations in selfhood is key to addressing psychological symptoms of people living with dementia, such as feelings of disconnection and reduced agency, and may inform new pathways for dementia care interventions.

Differences and Similarities in Empathy Deficit and Its Neural Basis between Logopenic and Amnesic Alzheimer's Disease

The aims of the study were to assess empathy deficit and neuronal correlates in logopenic primary progressive aphasia (lv-PPA) and compare these data with those deriving from amnesic Alzheimer's disease (AD). Eighteen lv-PPA and thirty-eight amnesic AD patients were included. Empathy in both cognitive and affective domains was assessed by Informer-rated Interpersonal Reactivity Index (perspective taking, PT, and fantasy, FT, for cognitive empathy; empathic concern, EC, and personal distress, PD, for affective empathy) before (T0) and after (T1) cognitive symptoms' onset. Emotion recognition was explored through the Ekman 60 Faces Test. Cerebral FDG-PET was used to explore neural correlates underlying empathy deficits. From T0 to T1, PT scores decreased, and PD scores increased in both lv-PPA (PT z = -3.43, p = 0.001; PD z = -3.62, p < 0.001) and in amnesic AD (PT z = -4.57, p < 0.001; PD z = -5.20, p < 0.001). Delta PT (T0-T1) negatively correlated with metabolic disfunction of the right superior temporal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, and middle frontal gyrus (MFG) in amnesic AD and of the left inferior parietal lobule (IPL), insula, MFG, and bilateral superior frontal gyrus (SFG) in lv-PPA (p < 0.005). Delta PD (T0-T1) positively correlated with metabolic disfunction of the right inferior frontal gyrus in amnesic AD (p < 0.001) and of the left IPL, insula, and bilateral SFG in lv-PPA (p < 0.005). Lv-PPA and amnesic AD share the same empathic changes, with a damage of cognitive empathy and a heightening of personal distress over time. The differences in metabolic disfunctions correlated with empathy deficits might be due to a different vulnerability of specific brain regions in the two AD clinical presentations.

Moral Emotions and Their Brain Structural Correlates Across Neurodegenerative Disorders

BACKGROUND

Although social cognition is compromised in patients with neurodegenerative disorders such as behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) and Alzheimer's disease (AD), research on moral emotions and their neural correlates in these populations is scarce. No previous study has explored the utility of moral emotions, compared to and in combination with classical general cognitive state tools, to discriminate bvFTD from AD patients.

OBJECTIVE

To examine self-conscious (guilt and embarrassment) and other-oriented (pity and indignation) moral emotions, their subjective experience, and their structural brain underpinnings in bvFTD (n = 31) and AD (n = 30) patients, compared to healthy controls (n = 37). We also explored the potential utility of moral emotions measures to discriminate bvFTD from AD.

METHODS

We used a modified version of the Moral Sentiment Task measuring the participants' accuracy scores and their emotional subjective experiences.

RESULTS

bvFTD patients exhibited greater impairments in self-conscious and other-oriented moral emotions as compared with AD patients and healthy controls. Moral emotions combined with general cognitive state tools emerged as useful measures to discriminate bvFTD from AD patients. In bvFTD patients, lower moral emotions scores were associated with lower gray matter volumes in caudate nucleus and inferior and middle temporal gyri. In AD, these scores were associated with lower gray matter volumes in superior and middle frontal gyri, middle temporal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule and supramarginal gyrus.

CONCLUSION

These findings contribute to a better understanding of moral emotion deficits across neurodegenerative disorders, highlighting the potential benefits of integrating this domain into the clinical assessment.

Understanding Alzheimer's disease as a disorder of consciousness

People with Alzheimer's disease (AD) demonstrate a range of alterations in consciousness. Changes in awareness of cognitive deficit, self-awareness, and introspection are seen early in AD, and dysfunction of awareness and arousal progresses with increasing disease severity. However, heterogeneity of deficits between individuals and a lack of empirical studies in people with severe dementia highlight the importance of identifying and applying biomarkers of awareness in AD. Impairments of awareness in AD are associated with neuropathology in regions that overlap with proposed neural correlates of consciousness. Recent developments in consciousness science provide theoretical frameworks and experimental approaches to help further understand the conscious experience of people with AD. Recognition of AD as a disorder of consciousness is overdue, and important to both understand the lived experience of people with AD and to improve care.

Toward a Molecular Profile of Self-Representation

Feeling embodiment over our body or body part has a major role in the understanding of the self and control of self-actions. Even though it is crucial in our daily life, embodiment is not an homogenous phenotype across population, as quantified by implicit and explicit measures (i.e., neuroimaging or self-reports). Studies have shown differences in neuropathological conditions compared to healthy controls, but also across healthy individuals. We discuss examples of self-perception differences, and the molecular origin of embodiment, focusing on clinical cases, during the first and second section. We then discuss two important questions in this molecular-to-embodiment relationship: (i) which are the molecular levels (and their associated techniques) that can be relevant to embodiment, and (ii) which are the most adequate experiments to correlate molecular profiles and embodiment quantification across individuals. Potential answers for both questions will be outlined during the third and fourth sections, respectively, in order to design a framework to study the molecular profile of body embodiment.

Metacognition and Perspective-Taking in Alzheimer's Disease: A Mini-Review

Metacognition refers to the monitoring and regulation of cognitive processes and its impairment can lead to a lack of self-awareness of deficits, or anosognosia. In the context of different neurological and psychiatric disorders (e.g., traumatic brain injury, dementia, and schizophrenia), studies have shown that patients who present impairments in metacognitive abilities may be able to recognize such difficulties in others and in themselves when exposed to material in a third-person perspective. Considering that metacognitive impairments are an important characteristic of dementia, especially in Alzheimer's Disease (AD), studies of the relationship between metacognition and perspective-taking may be relevant to improve the quality of life of people with dementia. The current paper first briefly addresses the theme of metacognition and the impact of metacognitive deficits in people with AD. The focus then turns to the relationship between metacognition and perspective-taking in different neurological and psychiatric disorders, particularly AD. This relationship is also discussed based on theoretical models, particularly the Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM). Specifically, the CAM suggests the existence of distinct memory systems for self- and other-information, an idea which is supported by neuroimaging findings. We suggest that the Default Mode Network, as it has been shown to be implicated in self vs. other processing and is affected early in AD, could explain the impact of perspective-taking on awareness of deficits in AD. Finally, we present possible clinical implications of the relationship between metacognition and perspective-taking in AD. Indeed, we considered the possibility of improving patient's awareness through the use of a third-person perspective, which, consequently, may decrease the negative impacts of anosognosia in AD.