Working Memory and Consciousness: The Current State of Play

A Slip Between the Brain and the Lip: Working Memory and Cognitive-Communication Disorders

The relationship between working memory and speech has been a topic of intense research interest and investigation for many years. Memory studies have found that the active processing of working memory is required for language comprehension and speech production. Though there are studies that discuss the capacity of working memory, the processing of verbal stimuli into verbal memory remains unclear. Therefore, it is essential to understand the functioning of the working memory and how it processes verbal information. As working memory is intricately linked with communication, any deficits in working memory could cause communication disorders. Also, the disruption in the storage and retrieval of verbal memory could cause a disturbance in the speech pattern. To this point, this review elaborates on the active processing of working memory and its role in communication. Further, by studying the deficits in working memory that could cause cognitive-communication disorders such as apraxia of speech, dementia, and dysarthria, this article highlights the importance of verbal memory in speech.

Revealing robust neural correlates of conscious and unconscious visual processing: activation likelihood estimation meta-analyses

Our ability to consciously perceive information from the visual scene relies on a myriad of intrinsic neural mechanisms. Functional neuroimaging studies have sought to identify the neural correlates of conscious visual processing and to further dissociate from those pertaining to preconscious and unconscious visual processing. However, delineating what core brain regions are involved in eliciting a conscious percept remains a challenge, particularly regarding the role of prefrontal-parietal regions. We performed a systematic search of the literature that yielded a total of 54 functional neuroimaging studies. We conducted two quantitative meta-analyses using activation likelihood estimation to identify reliable patterns of activation engaged by i. conscious (n = 45 studies, comprising 704 participants) and ii. unconscious (n = 16 studies, comprising 262 participants) visual processing during various task performances. Results of the meta-analysis specific to conscious percepts quantitatively revealed reliable activations across a constellation of regions comprising the bilateral inferior frontal junction, intraparietal sulcus, dorsal anterior cingulate, angular gyrus, temporo-occipital cortex and anterior insula. Neurosynth reverse inference revealed conscious visual processing to be intertwined with cognitive terms related to attention, cognitive control and working memory. Results of the meta-analysis on unconscious percepts revealed consistent activations in the lateral occipital complex, intraparietal sulcus and precuneus. These findings highlight the notion that conscious visual processing readily engages higher-level regions including the inferior frontal junction and unconscious processing reliably recruits posterior regions, mainly the lateral occipital complex.

Episodic Events as Spatiotemporal Memory: The Sequence of Information in the Episodic Buffer of Working Memory for Language Comprehension

Memory and language are the two higher-order cognitive abilities intertwined for communication and other cognitive skills. Memory is the storage capacity of all the information we perceive. Where the sensory memory perceives the stimuli, the working memory actively stores the information and passes it to the long-term memory. However, there is a question that how is the continuous perception of stimuli transformed into meaningful information and organized for proper execution and retrieval from the memory? This paper focuses on the episodic memory that perceives information that is spatial and temporal based on our everyday experiences. Though the spatiotemporal information we receive is continuous; the episodic memory arranges the information as to episodes in the working memory before the information is stored for a longer period. The episodic buffer is one of the components of the working memory model which holds the episodic memory that is organized concerning time. To this point, the paper tries to understand the working of the episodic buffer in maintaining the episodic memory and also about the process of episodic events into meaningful units. Further, the paper also concentrates on the hippocampus which is considered to be the location of the episodic buffer.

Nonconscious information can be identified as task-relevant but not prioritized in working memory

Two critical features of working memory are the identification and appropriate use of task-relevant information while avoiding distraction. Here, in 3 experiments, we explored if these features can be achieved also for nonconscious stimuli. Participants performed a delayed match-to-sample task in which task relevance of 2 competing stimuli was indicated by a cue, and continuous flash suppression was used to manipulate the conscious/nonconscious visual experience. Experiment 1 revealed better-than-chance performance with nonconscious stimuli, demonstrating goal-directed use of nonconscious task-relevant information. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the cue that defined task relevance must be conscious to allow such goal-directed use. In Experiment 3, multi-voxel pattern analyses of brain activity revealed that only the target was prioritized and maintained during conscious trials. Conversely, during nonconscious trials, both target and distractor were maintained. However, decoding of task relevance during the probe/test phase demonstrated identification of both target and distractor information. These results show that identification of task-relevant information can operate also on nonconscious material. However, they do not support the prioritization of nonconscious task-relevant information, thus suggesting a mismatch in the attentional mechanisms involved during conscious and nonconscious working memory.

Brain Mechanisms of Conscious Awareness: Detect, Pulse, Switch, and Wave

Consciousness is a fascinating field of neuroscience research where questions often outnumber the answers. We advocate an open and optimistic approach where converging mechanisms in neuroscience may eventually provide a satisfactory understanding of consciousness. We first review several characteristics of conscious neural activity, including the involvement of dedicated systems for content and levels of consciousness, the distinction and overlap of mechanisms contributing to conscious states and conscious awareness of transient events, nonlinear transitions and involvement of large-scale networks, and finally the temporal nexus where conscious awareness of discrete events occurs when mechanisms of attention and memory meet. These considerations and recent new experimental findings lead us to propose an inclusive hypothesis involving four phases initiated shortly after an external sensory stimulus: (1) Detect-primary and higher cortical and subcortical circuits detect the stimulus and select it for conscious perception. (2) Pulse-a transient and massive neuromodulatory surge in subcortical-cortical arousal and salience networks amplifies signals enabling conscious perception to proceed. (3) Switch-networks that may interfere with conscious processing are switched off. (4) Wave-sequential processing through hierarchical lower to higher cortical regions produces a fully formed percept, encoded in frontoparietal working memory and medial temporal episodic memory systems for subsequent report of experience. The framework hypothesized here is intended to be nonexclusive and encourages the addition of other mechanisms with further progress. Ultimately, just as many mechanisms in biology together distinguish living from nonliving things, many mechanisms in neuroscience synergistically may separate conscious from nonconscious neural activity.

In search for consciousness in animals: Using working memory and voluntary attention as behavioral indicators

Whether animals have subjective experiences about the content of their sensory input, i.e., whether they are aware of stimuli, is a notoriously difficult question to answer. If consciousness is present in animals, it must share fundamental characteristics with human awareness. Working memory and voluntary/endogenous attention are suggested as diagnostic features of conscious awareness. Behavioral evidence shows clear signatures of both working memory and voluntary attention as minimal criterium for sensory consciousness in mammals and birds. In contrast, reptiles and amphibians show no sign of either working memory or volitional attention. Surprisingly, some species of teleost fishes exhibit elementary working memory and voluntary attention effects suggestive of possibly rudimentary forms of subjective experience. With the potential exception of honeybees, evidence for conscious processing is lacking in invertebrates. These findings suggest that consciousness is not ubiquitous in the animal kingdom but also not exclusive to humans. The phylogenetic gap between animal taxa argues that evolution does not rely on specific neural substrates to endow distantly related species with basic forms of consciousness.

Neuroscientific Evidence for Processing Without Awareness

The extent to which we are affected by perceptual input of which we are unaware is widely debated. By measuring neural responses to sensory stimulation, neuroscientific data could complement behavioral results with valuable evidence. Here we review neuroscientific findings of processing of high-level information, as well as interactions with attention and memory. Although the results are mixed, we find initial support for processing object categories and words, possibly to the semantic level, as well as emotional expressions. Robust neural evidence for face individuation and integration of sentences or scenes is lacking. Attention affects the processing of stimuli that are not consciously perceived, and such stimuli may exogenously but not endogenously capture attention when relevant, and be maintained in memory over time. Sources of inconsistency in the literature include variability in control for awareness as well as individual differences, calling for future studies that adopt stricter measures of awareness and probe multiple processes within subjects.

What triggers explicit awareness in implicit sequence learning? Implications from theories of consciousness

This article aims to continue the debate on how explicit, conscious knowledge can arise in an implicit learning situation. We review hitherto existing theoretical views and evaluate their compatibility with two current, successful scientific concepts of consciousness: The Global Workspace Theory and Higher-Order Thought Theories. In this context, we introduce the Unexpected Event Hypothesis (Frensch et al., Attention and implicit learning, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003) in an elaborated form and discuss its advantage in explaining the emergence of conscious knowledge in an implicit learning situation.

The Essential Role of Executive Attention in Unconscious Visuomotor Priming

Many reports have emphasized that unconscious processing demands attention. However, some studies were unable to observe a modulation of attentional load in subliminal visual processing. We proposed that the paradoxical phenomena could be explained based on whether the mental workload task was involved in central executive processes. In two experiments, by combining a masked shape discrimination task with an N-back task, executive attention availability for masked visuomotor processing decreased as the N-back task demand increased. We observed that unconscious visuomotor priming diminished with increasing executive attention load in Experiment 2; however, this pattern did not occur in Experiment 1. Further analysis verified that in Experiment 1, the role of the central executive in unconscious visuomotor priming was eliminated by the accuracy-speed trade-off since the higher load spatial N-back tasks with larger memory set sizes, compared with higher load verbal N-bask tasks, were quite difficult for the subjects to manage. Therefore, our results demonstrated that central executive load modulates unconscious visuomotor priming and that this modulation can be weakened by task difficulty. Collectively, by emphasizing the essential role of executive attention in subliminal visuomotor priming, the present work provides a powerful interpretation of prior debates and develops extant attention capacity limitations from the realm of consciousness to that of unconsciousness.

Unconscious Visual Working Memory: A critical review and Bayesian meta-analysis

The relationship between consciousness and working memory (WM) has been recently debated both at the theoretical and methodological levels (Persuh et al., 2018; Velichkovsky, 2017). While there is behavioral and neural evidence that argues for the existence of unconscious WM, several methodological concerns have been raised, rendering this issue highly controversial. To address the robustness of the previous findings, here we adopt a meta-analytic approach to estimate the effect size and heterogeneity of the previously reported unconscious WM results, also including unpublished results. We used meta-regression to isolate relevant experimental variables, in particular, consciousness manipulation and the WM paradigm to identify the source of the heterogeneity in the reported effect size of the unconscious WM. Our meta-analysis supports the existence of the unconscious WM effect and critically reveals several experimental variables that contribute to relevant heterogeneity. Our analysis clarifies several theoretical and methodological issues. We recommend that future studies explicitly operationalize the definition of consciousness, standardize the methodology and systematically explore the role of critical variables for the unconscious WM effect.

What Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience

Debates around fishes' ability to feel pain concern sentience: do reactions to tissue damage indicate evaluative consciousness (conscious affect), or mere nociception? Thanks to Braithwaite's discovery of trout nociceptors, and concerns that current practices could compromise welfare in countless fish, this issue's importance is beyond dispute. However, nociceptors are merely necessary, not sufficient, for true pain, and many measures held to indicate sentience have the same problem. The question of whether fish feel pain - or indeed anything at all - therefore stimulates sometimes polarized debate. Here, we try to bridge the divide. After reviewing key consciousness concepts, we identify "red herring" measures that should not be used to infer sentience because also present in non-sentient organisms, notably those lacking nervous systems, like plants and protozoa (P); spines disconnected from brains (S); decerebrate mammals and birds (D); and humans in unaware states (U). These "S.P.U.D. subjects" can show approach/withdrawal; react with apparent emotion; change their reactivity with food deprivation or analgesia; discriminate between stimuli; display Pavlovian learning, including some forms of trace conditioning; and even learn simple instrumental responses. Consequently, none of these responses are good indicators of sentience. Potentially more valid are aspects of working memory, operant conditioning, the self-report of state, and forms of higher order cognition. We suggest new experiments on humans to test these hypotheses, as well as modifications to tests for "mental time travel" and self-awareness (e.g., mirror self-recognition) that could allow these to now probe sentience (since currently they reflect perceptual rather than evaluative, affective aspects of consciousness). Because "bullet-proof" neurological and behavioral indicators of sentience are thus still lacking, agnosticism about fish sentience remains widespread. To end, we address how to balance such doubts with welfare protection, discussing concerns raised by key skeptics in this debate. Overall, we celebrate the rigorous evidential standards required by those unconvinced that fish are sentient; laud the compassion and ethical rigor shown by those advocating for welfare protections; and seek to show how precautionary principles still support protecting fish from physical harm.

The Functional Interactions between Cortical Regions through Theta-Gamma Coupling during Resting-State and a Visual Working Memory Task

Theta phase-gamma amplitude coupling (TGC) plays an important role in several different cognitive processes. Although spontaneous brain activity at the resting state is crucial in preparing for cognitive performance, the functional role of resting-state TGC remains unclear. To investigate the role of resting-state TGC, electroencephalogram recordings were obtained for 56 healthy volunteers while they were in the resting state, with their eyes closed, and then when they were engaged in a retention interval period in the visual memory task. The TGCs of the two different conditions were calculated and compared. The results indicated that the modulation index of TGC during the retention interval of the visual working memory (VWM) task was not higher than that during the resting state; however, the topographical distribution of TGC during the resting state was negatively correlated with TGC during VWM task at the local level. The topographical distribution of TGC during the resting state was negatively correlated with TGC coordinates’ engagement of brain areas in local and large-scale networks and during task performance at the local level. These findings support the view that TGC reflects information-processing and signal interaction across distant brain areas. These results demonstrate that TGC could explain the efficiency of competing brain networks.

Working Memory and Cross-Frequency Coupling of Neuronal Oscillations

Working memory (WM) is the active retention and processing of information over a few seconds and is considered an essential component of cognitive function. The reduced WM capacity is a common feature in many diseases, such as schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), mild cognitive impairment (MCI), and Alzheimer's disease (AD). The theta-gamma neural code is an essential component of memory representations in the multi-item WM. A large body of studies have examined the association between cross-frequency coupling (CFC) across the cerebral cortices and WM performance; electrophysiological data together with the behavioral results showed the associations between CFC and WM performance. The oscillatory entrainment (sensory, non-invasive electrical/magnetic, and invasive electrical) remains the key method to investigate the causal relationship between CFC and WM. The frequency-tuned non-invasive brain stimulation is a promising way to improve WM performance in healthy and non-healthy patients with cognitive impairment. The WM performance is sensitive to the phase and rhythm of externally applied stimulations. CFC-transcranial-alternating current stimulation (CFC-tACS) is a recent approach in neuroscience that could alter cognitive outcomes. The studies that investigated (1) the association between CFC and WM and (2) the brain stimulation protocols that enhanced WM through modulating CFC by the means of the non-invasive brain stimulation techniques have been included in this review. In principle, this review can guide the researchers to identify the most prominent form of CFC associated with WM processing (e.g., theta/gamma phase-amplitude coupling), and to define the previously published studies that manipulate endogenous CFC externally to improve WM. This in turn will pave the path for future studies aimed at investigating the CFC-tACS effect on WM. The CFC-tACS protocols need to be thoroughly studied before they can be considered as therapeutic tools in patients with WM deficits.

The Neural Correlates of Access Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness Seem to Coincide and Would Correspond to a Memory Center, an Activation Center and Eight Parallel Convergence Centers

An increasing number of authors suggest that the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) have no selective, executive, or metacognitive function. It is believed that attention unconsciously selects the contents that will become conscious. Consciousness would have only the fundamental function of transforming the selected contents into a format easily used by high-level processors, such as working memory, language, or autobiographical memory. According to Dehaene, the neural correlates (NC) of access consciousness (AC; cognitive consciousness) constitute a widespread network in the frontal, parietal, and temporal cortices. While Tononi localized the correlates of phenomenal consciousness (PC; subjective consciousness) to a posterior “hot zone” in the temporo-parietal cortex. A careful examination of the works of these two groups leads to the conclusion that the correlates of access and PC coincide. The two consciousnesses are therefore two faces of the same single consciousness with both its cognitive and subjective contents. A review of the literature of the pathology called “neglect” confirms that the common correlates include 10: a memory center, an activation center, and eight parallel centers. From study of the “imagery” it can be deduced that these eight parallel centers would operate as points of convergence in the third person linking the respective eight sensory-motor-emotional areas activated by external perceptions and the corresponding memories of these perceptions deposited in the memory center. The first four centers of convergence appear in the most evolved fish and gradually reach eight in humans.

Strongly masked content retained in memory made accessible through repetition

A growing body of evidence indicates that information can be stored even in the absence of conscious awareness. Despite these findings, unconscious memory is still poorly understood with limited evidence for unconscious iconic memory storage. Here we show that strongly masked visual data can be stored and accumulate to elicit clear perception. We used a repetition method across a wide range of conditions (Experiment 1) and a more focused follow-up experiment with enhanced masking conditions (Experiment 2). Information was stored despite being masked, demonstrating that masking did not erase or overwrite memory traces but limited perception. We examined the temporal properties and found that stored information followed a gradual but rapid decay. Extraction of meaningful information was severely impaired after 300 ms, and most data was lost after 700 ms. Our findings are congruent with theories of consciousness that are based on an integration of subliminal information and support theoretical predictions based on the global workspace theory of consciousness, especially the existence of an implicit iconic memory buffer store.

How does the non-conscious become conscious?

In this My Word, Joseph LeDoux describes how his work as a graduate student got him interested in human consciousness. Although he has not studied this topic since 1970s, he never stopped thinking and writing about it during his four-decade career exploring how non-conscious processes involving the amygdala detect and respond to danger. Here, he tells us what is on his mind about consciousness these days.

The attentional blink unveils the interplay between conscious perception, spatial attention and working memory encoding

Our ability to perceive two events in close temporal succession is severely limited, a phenomenon known as the attentional blink. While the blink has served as a popular tool to prevent conscious perception, there is less research on its causes, and in particular on the role of conscious perception of the first event in triggering it. In three experiments, we disentangled the roles of spatial attention, conscious perception and working memory (WM) in causing the blink. We show that while allocating spatial attention to T1 is neither necessary nor sufficient for eliciting a blink, consciously perceiving it is necessary but not sufficient. When T1 was task irrelevant, consciously perceiving it triggered a blink only when it matched the attentional set for T2. We conclude that consciously perceiving a task-relevant event causes the blink, possibly because it triggers encoding of this event into WM. We discuss the implications of these findings for the relationship between spatial attention, conscious perception and WM, as well as for the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness.

Perceptual Representations and the Vividness of Stimulus-Triggered and Stimulus-Independent Experiences

In recent years, researchers from independent subfields have begun to engage with the idea that the same cortical regions that contribute to on-line perception are recruited during and underlie off-line activities such as information maintenance in working memory, mental imagery, hallucinations, dreaming, and mind wandering. Accumulating evidence suggests that in all of these cases the activity of posterior brain regions provides the contents of experiences. This article is intended to move one step further by exploring specific links between the vividness of experiences, which is a characteristic feature of consciousness regardless of its actual content, and certain properties of the content-specific neural-activity patterns. Investigating the mechanisms that underlie mental imagery and its relation to working memory and the processes responsible for mind wandering and its similarities to dreaming form two clusters of research that are in the forefront of the recent scientific study of mental phenomena, yet communication between these two clusters has been surprisingly sparse. Here our aim is to foster such information exchange by articulating a hypothesis about the fine-grained phenomenological structure determining subjective vividness and its possible neural basis that allows us to shed new light on these mental phenomena by bringing them under a common framework.

The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model

This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, potentially after a temporal delay and adapted to current purposes. I will argue that information generation should not be regarded as a sufficient condition for consciousness, but could serve as what I will call a “minimal unifying model of consciousness.” A minimal unifying model (MUM) specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and shows that it is entailed by (many) existing theories of consciousness. Information generation fulfills these requirements. A MUM of consciousness is useful, because it unifies existing theories of consciousness by highlighting their common assumptions, while enabling further developments from which empirical predictions can be derived. Unlike existing theories (which probably contain at least some false assumptions), a MUM is thus likely to be an adequate model of consciousness, albeit at a relatively general level. Assumptions embodied in such a model are less informative than assumptions made by more specific theories and hence function more in the way of guiding principles. Still, they enable further refinements, in line with new empirical results and broader theoretical and evolutionary considerations. This also allows developing the model in ways that facilitate more specific claims and predictions.

The persistent problem of targetless thought

Targetless thought raises a persistent problem for higher-order theories of consciousness. In cases of targetless thought, a subject represents herself as being in a mental state that she in fact lacks. One popular response among proponents of the higher-order theory is to say that it can appear to a subject that she is in a conscious mental state, even though that mental state doesn't exist (Picciuto, 2017; Rosenthal 1997, 2011; Weisberg, 2010). Recently Brown and Lau (2019) and Lau and Rosenthal (2011) have shifted the debate to empirical ground, and offered evidence for real-world cases of targetless thought. In this paper, I give an alternate explanation of the evidence which avoids the need to posit targetless thoughts. As I argue, this challenges the empirical argument for the higher-order view because it shows that the evidence on offer does not discriminate between the first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness.

The Common Basis of Memory and Consciousness: Understanding the Brain as a Write-Read Head Interacting With an Omnipresent Background Field

The main goal of this article consists in addressing two fundamental issues of consciousness research and cognitive science, namely, the question of why declarative memory functions are inextricably linked with phenomenal awareness and the question of the physical basis of memory traces. The presented approach proposes that high-level cognitive processes involving consciousness employ a universal mechanism by means of which they access and modulate an omnipresent background field that is identified with the zero-point field (ZPF) specified by stochastic electrodynamics (SED), a branch of physics that deals with the universal principles underlying quantum systems. In addition to its known physical properties and memory capacities, the ZPF is hypothesized to be an immanently sentient medium. It is propounded that linking up to a particular field mode of the ZPF activates a particular phenomenal nuance, implying that the phase-locked coupling of a set of field modes, i.e., the formation of a so-called ZPF information state, constitutes an appropriate mechanism for the amalgamation of elementary shades of consciousness into a complex state of consciousness. Since quantum systems rest exactly on this mechanism, conscious memory processes in the brain are expected to differ from unconscious processes by the presence of the typical features of many-body quantum systems, particularly long-range coherence and attractor formation, which is supported by a huge body of empirical evidence. On this basis, the conceptual framework set out in this article paves the way for a new understanding of the brain as a write-read head interacting with the ZPF, leading to self-consistent interpretations of the neural correlates of memory formation and memory retrieval and explaining why these memory processes are closely intertwined with phenomenal awareness. In particular, the neural correlates suggest that the brain produces consciously perceived memory traces by writing sequences of information states into the ZPF and retrieves consciously experienced memory traces by reading sequences of information states from the ZPF. Using these theoretical foundations, altered states of consciousness and memory disorders can be traced back to impairments of the ZPF write-read mechanism. The mechanism should reveal itself through characteristic photon emissions, resulting in testable predictions.

Towards a comparative science of emotion: Affect and consciousness in humans and animals

The componential view of human emotion recognises that affective states comprise conscious, behavioural, physiological, neural and cognitive elements. Although many animals display bodily and behavioural changes consistent with the occurrence of affective states similar to those seen in humans, the question of whether and in which species these are accompanied by conscious experiences remains controversial. Finding scientifically valid methods for investigating markers for the subjective component of affect in both humans and animals is central to developing a comparative understanding of the processes and mechanisms of affect and its evolution and distribution across taxonomic groups, to our understanding of animal welfare, and to the development of animal models of affective disorders. Here, contemporary evidence indicating potential markers of conscious processing in animals is reviewed, with a view to extending this search to include markers of conscious affective processing. We do this by combining animal-focused approaches with investigations of the components of conscious and non-conscious emotional processing in humans, and neuropsychological research into the structure and functions of conscious emotions.

Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness

The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness has often been misunderstood by critics. Here, we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views, such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models (e.g., first-order local recurrency theories). For example, HOT has been criticized for overintellectualizing consciousness. We show that, while higher-order states are cognitively assembled, the requirements are in fact considerably less than often presumed. In this sense, HOT may be viewed as an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views. We also clarify that most proponents of HOT do not stipulate consciousness as equivalent to metacognition or confidence. Furthermore, compared with other existing theories, HOT can arguably account better for complex everyday experiences, such as emotions and episodic memories. This makes HOT particularly useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states.