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Vogel DHV, Jording M, Weiss PH, Vogeley K. Temporal binding and sense of agency in major depression. Front Psychiatry 2024; 15:1288674. [PMID: 38645414 PMCID: PMC11027068 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyt.2024.1288674] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/04/2023] [Accepted: 03/14/2024] [Indexed: 04/23/2024] Open
Abstract
Background Alterations in the experience of controlling oneself and one's environment are of high relevance to understanding the psychopathology of depression. This study investigated the relationship between Temporal Binding for action-event sequences, sense of agency, self-efficacy and symptom severity in Major Depressive Disorder. Method We employed the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS) and the General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE) to assess explicit Sense of Agency and self-efficacy in a group of 42 persons diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) [20 identifying as female, 19 as male; mean age 37.8 years (± 13.3)] and 40 control persons without a psychiatric diagnosis (CG) [22 identifying as female, 20 as male; mean age 38.0 years ( ± 13.3)]. Depressive symptom severity was measured using the BDI-II. We additionally performed a temporal binding paradigm as a potential correlate to Sense of Agency. Participants partook in a time estimation task judging three intervals (250ms, 450ms, 650ms) while either observing or causing stimulus presentations. The underestimation of intervals following intentional actions causing stimulus presentations (compared to merely observing the stimulus presentation) is interpreted as temporal binding. Results SoAS scores demonstrated an inverse correlation with depressive symptoms (CG: p=.032, R2=.113; MDD: p<.001, R2=.260) and a positive correlation with GSE scores (CG: p<.001, R2=.379; MDD: p<.001, R2=.254). We found distinct differences in temporal binding between healthy participants and the Major Depressive Disorder group without significant correlation between temporal binding and the SoAS or GSE scores. The data suggest group differences in time estimation particular pertaining to time intervals involving intentional action and increasingly complex multisensory stimuli. Discussion We investigated parameters of subjective control, namely Sense of Agency and Self Efficacy. Here, we were able to reveal their inverse relationship with depressive symptoms in patients with major depressive disorder, highlighting a profound experience of loss of control with increasing symptom load. Deficits in experiencing control, particularly involving intentional motor actions (and more complex multisensory stimuli), appear to be more pronounced in Major Depressive Disorder, involving not only negative self-efficacy expectations but also an altered Sense of Agency and temporal binding. Temporal binding and SoAS scores did not correlate, adding to the growing evidence that the two measures may not be directly related. We propose that future research be directed at this contiguous relationship between Sense of Agency and Self Efficacy in Major Depressive Disorder.
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Affiliation(s)
- David H. V. Vogel
- Research Center Jülich, Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine, Cognitive Neuroscience (INM-3), Juelich, Germany
- Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital Cologne, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
| | - Mathis Jording
- Research Center Jülich, Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine, Cognitive Neuroscience (INM-3), Juelich, Germany
| | - Peter H. Weiss
- Research Center Jülich, Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine, Cognitive Neuroscience (INM-3), Juelich, Germany
- Department of Neurology, Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital Cologne, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
| | - Kai Vogeley
- Research Center Jülich, Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine, Cognitive Neuroscience (INM-3), Juelich, Germany
- Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital Cologne, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
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Tanaka T. Evaluating the Bayesian causal inference model of intentional binding through computational modeling. Sci Rep 2024; 14:2979. [PMID: 38316822 PMCID: PMC10844324 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-024-53071-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2023] [Accepted: 01/27/2024] [Indexed: 02/07/2024] Open
Abstract
Intentional binding refers to the subjective compression of the time interval between an action and its consequence. While intentional binding has been widely used as a proxy for the sense of agency, its underlying mechanism has been largely veiled. Bayesian causal inference (BCI) has gained attention as a potential explanation, but currently lacks sufficient empirical support. Thus, this study implemented various computational models to describe the possible mechanisms of intentional binding, fitted them to individual observed data, and quantitatively evaluated their performance. The BCI models successfully isolated the parameters that potentially contributed to intentional binding (i.e., causal belief and temporal prediction) and generally better explained an observer's time estimation than traditional models such as maximum likelihood estimation. The estimated parameter values suggested that the time compression resulted from an expectation that the actions would immediately cause sensory outcomes. Furthermore, I investigated the algorithm that realized this BCI and found probability-matching to be a plausible candidate; people might heuristically reconstruct event timing depending on causal uncertainty rather than optimally integrating causal and temporal posteriors. The evidence demonstrated the utility of computational modeling to investigate how humans infer the causal and temporal structures of events and individual differences in that process.
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Affiliation(s)
- Takumi Tanaka
- Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology and Faculty of Letters, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan.
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Donapati RR, Shukla A, Bapi RS. Action-outcome delays modulate the temporal expansion of intended outcomes. Sci Rep 2024; 14:2379. [PMID: 38287123 PMCID: PMC10824756 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-024-52287-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/17/2023] [Accepted: 01/16/2024] [Indexed: 01/31/2024] Open
Abstract
The phenomenon of intentional binding pertains to the perceived connection between a voluntary action and its anticipated result. When an individual intends an outcome, it appears to subjectively extend in time due to a pre-activation of the intended result, particularly evident at shorter action-outcome delays. However, there is a concern that the operationalisation of intention might have led to a mixed interpretation of the outcome expansion attributed to the pre-activation of intention, given the sensitivity of time perception and intentional binding to external cues that could accelerate the realisation of expectations. To investigate the expansion dynamics of an intended outcome, we employed a modified version of the temporal bisection task in two experiments. Experiment 1 considered the action-outcome delay as a within-subject factor, while experiment 2 treated it as a between-subject factor. The results revealed that the temporal expansion of an intended outcome was only evident under the longer action-outcome delay condition. We attribute this observation to working memory demands and attentional allocation due to temporal relevancy and not due to pre-activation. The discrepancy in effects across studies is explained by operationalising different components of the intentional binding effect, guided by the cue integration theory. Moreover, we discussed speculative ideas regarding the involvement of specific intentions based on the proximal intent distal intent (PIDI) theory and whether causality plays a role in temporal binding. Our study contributes to the understanding of how intention influences time perception and sheds light on how various methodological factors, cues, and delays can impact the dynamics of temporal expansion associated with an intended outcome.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rohan R Donapati
- Cognitive Science Lab, Kohli Research Centre On Intelligent Systems, International Institute of Information Technology - Hyderabad, Gachibowli, Hyderabad, 500032, India
| | - Anuj Shukla
- Thapar School of Liberal Arts & Sciences, Thapar Institute of Engineering & Technology, Patiala, Punjab, 147004, India.
| | - Raju S Bapi
- Cognitive Science Lab, Kohli Research Centre On Intelligent Systems, International Institute of Information Technology - Hyderabad, Gachibowli, Hyderabad, 500032, India.
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Rineau AL, Bringoux L, Sarrazin JC, Berberian B. Being active over one's own motion: Considering predictive mechanisms in self-motion perception. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2023; 146:105051. [PMID: 36669748 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105051] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/03/2022] [Revised: 01/16/2023] [Accepted: 01/16/2023] [Indexed: 01/19/2023]
Abstract
Self-motion perception is a key element guiding pilots' behavior. Its importance is mostly revealed when impaired, leading in most cases to spatial disorientation which is still today a major factor of accidents occurrence. Self-motion perception is known as mainly based on visuo-vestibular integration and can be modulated by the physical properties of the environment with which humans interact. For instance, several studies have shown that the respective weight of visual and vestibular information depends on their reliability. More recently, it has been suggested that the internal state of an operator can also modulate multisensory integration. Interestingly, the systems' automation can interfere with this internal state through the loss of the intentional nature of movements (i.e., loss of agency) and the modulation of associated predictive mechanisms. In this context, one of the new challenges is to better understand the relationship between automation and self-motion perception. The present review explains how linking the concepts of agency and self-motion is a first approach to address this issue.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anne-Laure Rineau
- Information Processing and Systems, ONERA, Salon de Provence, Base Aérienne 701, France.
| | | | | | - Bruno Berberian
- Information Processing and Systems, ONERA, Salon de Provence, Base Aérienne 701, France.
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Rineau AL, Berberian B, Sarrazin JC, Bringoux L. Active self-motion control and the role of agency under ambiguity. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1148793. [PMID: 37151332 PMCID: PMC10158821 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1148793] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2023] [Accepted: 03/31/2023] [Indexed: 05/09/2023] Open
Abstract
Purpose Self-motion perception is a key factor in daily behaviours such as driving a car or piloting an aircraft. It is mainly based on visuo-vestibular integration, whose weighting mechanisms are modulated by the reliability properties of sensory inputs. Recently, it has been shown that the internal state of the operator can also modulate multisensory integration and may sharpen the representation of relevant inputs. In line with the concept of agency, it thus appears relevant to evaluate the impact of being in control of our own action on self-motion perception. Methodology Here, we tested two conditions of motion control (active/manual trigger versus passive/ observer condition), asking participants to discriminate between two consecutive longitudinal movements by identifying the larger displacement (displacement of higher intensity). We also tested motion discrimination under two levels of ambiguity by applying acceleration ratios that differed from our two "standard" displacements (i.e., 3 s; 0.012 m.s-2 and 0.030 m.s-2). Results We found an effect of control condition, but not of the level of ambiguity on the way participants perceived the standard displacement, i.e., perceptual bias (Point of Subjective Equality; PSE). Also, we found a significant effect of interaction between the active condition and the level of ambiguity on the ability to discriminate between displacements, i.e., sensitivity (Just Noticeable Difference; JND). Originality Being in control of our own motion through a manual intentional trigger of self-displacement maintains overall motion sensitivity when ambiguity increases.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anne-Laure Rineau
- ONERA, Information Processing and Systems Department (DTIS), Salon-de-Provence, France
- *Correspondence: Anne-Laure Rineau,
| | - Bruno Berberian
- ONERA, Information Processing and Systems Department (DTIS), Salon-de-Provence, France
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Vogel DHV, Jording M, Esser C, Conrad A, Weiss PH, Vogeley K. Temporal binding of social events less pronounced in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Sci Rep 2022; 12:14853. [PMID: 36050371 PMCID: PMC9437002 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-19309-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/25/2022] [Accepted: 08/26/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Differences in predictive processing are considered amongst the prime candidates for mechanisms underlying different symptoms of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). A particularly valuable paradigm to investigate these processes is temporal binding (TB) assessed through time estimation tasks. In this study, we report on two separate experiments using a TB task designed to assess the influence of top-down social information on action event related TB. Both experiments were performed with a group of individuals diagnosed with ASD and a matched group without ASD. The results replicate earlier findings on a pronounced social hyperbinding for social action-event sequences and extend them to persons with ASD. Hyperbinding however, is less pronounced in the group with ASD as compared to the group without ASD. We interpret our results as indicative of a reduced predictive processing during social interaction. This reduction most likely results from differences in the integration of top-down social information into action-event monitoring. We speculate that this corresponds to differences in mentalizing processes in ASD.
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Affiliation(s)
- David H V Vogel
- Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine, Cognitive Neuroscience (INM3), Research Center Juelich, Jülich, Germany. .,Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital Cologne, Department of Psychiatry, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany.
| | - Mathis Jording
- Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine, Cognitive Neuroscience (INM3), Research Center Juelich, Jülich, Germany.,Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital Cologne, Department of Psychiatry, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
| | - Carolin Esser
- Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital Cologne, Department of Psychiatry, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
| | - Amelie Conrad
- Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital Cologne, Department of Psychiatry, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
| | - Peter H Weiss
- Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine, Cognitive Neuroscience (INM3), Research Center Juelich, Jülich, Germany.,Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital Cologne, Department of Neurology, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
| | - Kai Vogeley
- Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine, Cognitive Neuroscience (INM3), Research Center Juelich, Jülich, Germany.,Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital Cologne, Department of Psychiatry, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
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