Consciousness in Jawless Fishes

Gross anatomy of the Pacific hagfish, Eptatretus burgeri, with special reference to the coelomic viscera

Hagfish (Myxinoidea) are a deep-sea taxon of cyclostomes, the extant jawless vertebrates. Many researchers have examined the anatomy and embryology of hagfish to shed light on the early evolution of vertebrates; however, the diversity within hagfish is often overlooked. Hagfish have three lineages, Myxininae, Eptatretinae, and Rubicundinae. Usually, textbook illustrations of hagfish anatomy reflect the morphology of the Myxininae lineage, especially Myxine glutinosa, with its single pair of external branchial pores. Here, we instead report the gross anatomy of an Eptatretinae, Eptatretus burgeri, which has six pairs of branchial pores, especially focusing on the coelomic organs. Dissections were performed on fixed and unfixed specimens to provide a guide for those doing organ- or tissue-specific molecular experiments. Our dissections revealed that the ventral aorta is Y-branched in E. burgeri, which differs from the unbranched morphology of Myxine. Otherwise, there were no differences in the morphology of the lingual apparatus or heart in the pharyngeal domain. The thyroid follicles were scattered around the ventral aorta, as has been reported for adult lampreys. The hepatobiliary system more closely resembled those of jawed vertebrates than those of adult lampreys, with the liver having two lobes and a bile duct connecting the gallbladder to each lobe. Overall, the visceral morphology of E. burgeri does not differ significantly from that of the known Myxine at the level of gross anatomy, although the branchial morphology is phylogenetically ancestral compared to Myxine.

The evolutionary origins of the Global Neuronal Workspace in vertebrates

The Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness offers an explicit functional architecture that relates consciousness to cognitive abilities such as perception, attention, memory, and evaluation. We show that the functional architecture of the Global Neuronal Workspace, which is based mainly on human studies, corresponds to the cognitive-affective architecture proposed by the Unlimited Associative Learning theory that describes minimal consciousness. However, we suggest that when applied to basal vertebrates, both models require important modifications to accommodate what has been learned about the evolution of the vertebrate brain. Most importantly, comparative studies suggest that in basal vertebrates, the Global Neuronal Workspace is instantiated by the event memory system found in the hippocampal homolog. This proposal has testable predictions and implications for understanding hippocampal and cortical functions, the evolutionary relations between memory and consciousness, and the evolution of unified perception.

Neurophysiological Mechanisms of Implicit and Explicit Memory in the Process of Consciousness

Neurophysiological mechanisms are increasingly understood to constitute the foundations of human conscious experience. These include the capacity for ongoing memory, achieved through a hierarchy of reentrant cross-laminar connections across limbic, heteromodal, unimodal, and primary cortices. The neurophysiological mechanisms of consciousness also include the capacity for volitional direction of attention to the ongoing cognitive process, through a reentrant fronto-thalamo-cortical network regulation of the inhibitory thalamic reticular nucleus. More elusive is the way that discrete objects of subjective experience, such as the color of deep blue or the sound of middle C, could be generated by neural mechanisms. Explaining such ineffable qualities of subjective experience is what Chalmers has called “the hard problem of consciousness,” which has divided modern neuroscientists and philosophers alike. We propose that insight into the appearance of the hard problem can be gained through integrating classical phenomenological studies of experience with recent progress in the differential neurophysiology of consolidating explicit versus implicit memory. Although the achievement of consciousness, once it is reflected upon, becomes explicit, the underlying process of generating consciousness, through neurophysiological mechanisms, is largely implicit. Studying the neurophysiological mechanisms of adaptive implicit memory, including brain stem, limbic, and thalamic regulation of neocortical representations, may lead to a more extended phenomenological understanding of both the neurophysiological process and the subjective experience of consciousness.

NEW & NOTEWORTHY The process of consciousness, generating the qualia that may appear to be irreducible qualities of experience, can be understood to arise from neurophysiological mechanisms of memory. Implicit memory, organized by the lemnothalamic brain stem projections and dorsal limbic consolidation in REM sleep, supports the unconscious field and the quasi-conscious fringe of current awareness. Explicit memory, organized by the collothalamic midbrain projections and ventral limbic consolidation of NREM sleep, supports the focal objects of consciousness.