Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

Why it hurts: with freedom comes the biological need for pain

We argue that pain is not needed to protect the body from damage unless the organism is able to make free choices in action selection. Then pain (including its affective and evaluative aspects) provides a necessary prioritising motivation to select actions expected to avoid it, whilst leaving the possibility of alternative actions to serve potentially higher priorities. Thus, on adaptive grounds, only organisms having free choice over action selection should experience pain. Free choice implies actions must be selected following appraisal of their effects, requiring a predictive model generating estimates of action outcomes. These features give organisms anticipatory behavioural autonomy (ABA), for which we propose a plausible system using an internal predictive model, integrated into a system able to produce the qualitative and affective aspects of pain. Our hypothesis can be tested using behavioural experiments designed to elicit trade-off responses to novel experiences for which algorithmic (automaton) responses might be inappropriate. We discuss the empirical evidence for our hypothesis among taxonomic groups, showing how testing for ABA guides thinking on which groups might experience pain. It is likely that all vertebrates do and plausible that some invertebrates do (decapods, cephalopods and at least some insects).

What Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience

Debates around fishes' ability to feel pain concern sentience: do reactions to tissue damage indicate evaluative consciousness (conscious affect), or mere nociception? Thanks to Braithwaite's discovery of trout nociceptors, and concerns that current practices could compromise welfare in countless fish, this issue's importance is beyond dispute. However, nociceptors are merely necessary, not sufficient, for true pain, and many measures held to indicate sentience have the same problem. The question of whether fish feel pain - or indeed anything at all - therefore stimulates sometimes polarized debate. Here, we try to bridge the divide. After reviewing key consciousness concepts, we identify "red herring" measures that should not be used to infer sentience because also present in non-sentient organisms, notably those lacking nervous systems, like plants and protozoa (P); spines disconnected from brains (S); decerebrate mammals and birds (D); and humans in unaware states (U). These "S.P.U.D. subjects" can show approach/withdrawal; react with apparent emotion; change their reactivity with food deprivation or analgesia; discriminate between stimuli; display Pavlovian learning, including some forms of trace conditioning; and even learn simple instrumental responses. Consequently, none of these responses are good indicators of sentience. Potentially more valid are aspects of working memory, operant conditioning, the self-report of state, and forms of higher order cognition. We suggest new experiments on humans to test these hypotheses, as well as modifications to tests for "mental time travel" and self-awareness (e.g., mirror self-recognition) that could allow these to now probe sentience (since currently they reflect perceptual rather than evaluative, affective aspects of consciousness). Because "bullet-proof" neurological and behavioral indicators of sentience are thus still lacking, agnosticism about fish sentience remains widespread. To end, we address how to balance such doubts with welfare protection, discussing concerns raised by key skeptics in this debate. Overall, we celebrate the rigorous evidential standards required by those unconvinced that fish are sentient; laud the compassion and ethical rigor shown by those advocating for welfare protections; and seek to show how precautionary principles still support protecting fish from physical harm.

A First Principles Approach to Subjective Experience

Understanding the neural bases of subjective experience remains one of the great challenges of the natural sciences. Higher-order theories of consciousness are typically defended by assessments of neural activity in higher cortical regions during perception, often with disregard to the nature of the neural computations that these regions execute. We have sought to refocus the problem toward identification of those neural computations that are necessary for subjective experience with the goal of defining the sorts of neural architectures that can perform these operations. This approach removes reliance on behaviour and brain homologies for appraising whether non-human animals have the potential to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. Using two basic principles—first, subjective experience is dependent on complex processing executing specific neural functions and second, the structure-determines-function principle—we have reasoned that subjective experience requires a neural architecture consisting of stacked forward models that predict the output of neural processing from inputs. Given that forward models are dependent on appropriately connected processing modules that generate prediction, error detection and feedback control, we define a minimal neural architecture that is necessary (but not sufficient) for subjective experience. We refer to this framework as the hierarchical forward models algorithm. Accordingly, we postulate that any animal lacking this neural architecture will be incapable of subjective experience.

A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness

This paper assesses two different theories for explaining consciousness, a phenomenon that is widely considered amenable to scientific investigation despite its puzzling subjective aspects. I focus on Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which says that consciousness is integrated information (as ϕMax) and says even simple systems with interacting parts possess some consciousness. First, I evaluate IIT on its own merits. Second, I compare it to a more traditionally derived theory called Neurobiological Naturalism (NN), which says consciousness is an evolved, emergent feature of complex brains. Comparing these theories is informative because it reveals strengths and weaknesses of each, thereby suggesting better ways to study consciousness in the future. IIT's strengths are the reasonable axioms at its core; its strong logic and mathematical formalism; its creative "experience-first" approach to studying consciousness; the way it avoids the mind-body ("hard") problem; its consistency with evolutionary theory; and its many scientifically testable predictions. The potential weakness of IIT is that it contains stretches of logic-based reasoning that were not checked against hard evidence when the theory was being constructed, whereas scientific arguments require such supporting evidence to keep the reasoning on course. This is less of a concern for the other theory, NN, because it incorporated evidence much earlier in its construction process. NN is a less mature theory than IIT, less formalized and quantitative, and less well tested. However, it has identified its own neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and offers a roadmap through which these NNCs may answer the questions of consciousness using the hypothesize-test-hypothesize-test steps of the scientific method.

Neural Design Principles for Subjective Experience: Implications for Insects

How subjective experience is realized in nervous systems remains one of the great challenges in the natural sciences. An answer to this question should resolve debate about which animals are capable of subjective experience. We contend that subjective experience of sensory stimuli is dependent on the brain's awareness of its internal neural processing of these stimuli. This premise is supported by empirical evidence demonstrating that disruption to either processing streams or awareness states perturb subjective experience. Given that the brain must predict the nature of sensory stimuli, we reason that conscious awareness is itself dependent on predictions generated by hierarchically organized forward models of the organism's internal sensory processing. The operation of these forward models requires a specialized neural architecture and hence any nervous system lacking this architecture is unable to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. This approach removes difficulties associated with extrapolations from behavioral and brain homologies typically employed in addressing whether an animal can feel. Using nociception as a model sensation, we show here that the Drosophila brain lacks the required internal neural connectivity to implement the computations required of hierarchical forward models. Consequently, we conclude that Drosophila, and those insects with similar neuroanatomy, do not subjectively experience noxious stimuli and therefore cannot feel pain.

Behavioral and neurophysiological evidence suggests affective pain experience in octopus

Pain is a negative affective state arising from tissue damage or inflammation. Because pain is aversive and its relief is innately rewarding, animals may learn to avoid a context in which pain is experienced and prefer one where pain relief occurs. It is generally accepted that vertebrate animals experience pain; however, there is currently inconclusive evidence that the affective component of pain occurs in any invertebrate. Here, we show that octopuses, the most neurologically complex invertebrates, exhibit cognitive and spontaneous behaviors indicative of affective pain experience. In conditioned place preference assays, octopuses avoided contexts in which pain was experienced, preferred a location in which they experienced relief from pain, and showed no conditioned preference in the absence of pain. Injection site grooming occurred in all animals receiving acetic acid injections, but this was abolished by local anesthesia. Thus, octopuses are likely to experience the affective component of pain.

•

Octopuses avoid a location after it is associated with a noxious stimulus

•

Injection of dilute acetic acid induces lasting, location-specific grooming

•

Nerve recordings show central processing of noxious sensory input

•

Octopuses are capable both of discriminative and affective pain experience

Can Cephalopods Vomit? Hypothesis Based on a Review of Circumstantial Evidence and Preliminary Experimental Observations

In representative species of all vertebrate classes, the oral ejection of upper digestive tract contents by vomiting or regurgitation is used to void food contaminated with toxins or containing indigestible material not voidable in the feces. Vomiting or regurgitation has been reported in a number of invertebrate marine species (Exaiptasia diaphana, Cancer productus, and Pleurobranchaea californica), prompting consideration of whether cephalopods have this capability. This "hypothesis and theory" paper reviews four lines of supporting evidence: (1) the mollusk P. californica sharing some digestive tract morphological and innervation similarities with Octopus vulgaris is able to vomit or regurgitate with the mechanisms well characterized, providing an example of motor program switching; (2) a rationale for vomiting or regurgitation in cephalopods based upon the potential requirement to void indigestible material, which may cause damage and ejection of toxin contaminated food; (3) anecdotal reports (including from the literature) of vomiting- or regurgitation-like behavior in several species of cephalopod (Sepia officinalis, Sepioteuthis sepioidea, O. vulgaris, and Enteroctopus dofleini); and (4) anatomical and physiological studies indicating that ejection of gastric/crop contents via the buccal cavity is a theoretical possibility by retroperistalsis in the upper digestive tract (esophagus, crop, and stomach). We have not identified any publications refuting our hypothesis, so a balanced review is not possible. Overall, the evidence presented is circumstantial, so experiments adapting current methodology (e.g., research community survey, in vitro studies of motility, and analysis of indigestible gut contents and feces) are described to obtain additional evidence to either support or refute our hypothesis. We recognize the possibility that further research may not support the hypothesis; therefore, we consider how cephalopods may protect themselves against ingestion of toxic food by external chemodetection prior to ingestion and digestive gland detoxification post-ingestion. Reviewing the evidence for the hypothesis has identified a number of gaps in knowledge of the anatomy (e.g., the presence of sphincters) and physiology (e.g., the fate of indigestible food residues, pH of digestive secretions, sensory innervation, and digestive gland detoxification mechanisms) of the digestive tract as well as a paucity of recent studies on the role of epithelial chemoreceptors in prey identification and food intake.

Physiological endpoints in daphnid acute toxicity tests

Daphnids are freshwater crustaceans used in toxicity tests. Although lethality and immobilisation are the most commonly used endpoints in those tests, more sensitive parameters are required for determination of sublethal acute effects of toxicants. The use of various physiological endpoints in daphnids is considered as a low-cost and simple alternative that meets the 3R's rule (Replacement, Reduction, Refinement) criteria. However, currently there is no review-based evaluation of their applicability in toxicity testing. This paper presents the results on the most commonly determined physiological parameters of Daphnia in ecotoxicological studies and human drug testing, such as feeding activity, thoracic limb movement, heart rate, cardiac area, respiratory activity, compound eye, mandible movements and post-abdominal claw contractions. Furthermore, their applicability as promising endpoints in the assessment of water quality or drug testing is discussed.