What's Next: Recruitment of a Grounded Predictive Body Model for Planning a Robot's Actions

Integrative Biomimetics of Autonomous Hexapedal Locomotion

Despite substantial advances in many different fields of neurorobotics in general, and biomimetic robots in particular, a key challenge is the integration of concepts: to collate and combine research on disparate and conceptually disjunct research areas in the neurosciences and engineering sciences. We claim that the development of suitable robotic integration platforms is of particular relevance to make such integration of concepts work in practice. Here, we provide an example for a hexapod robotic integration platform for autonomous locomotion. In a sequence of six focus sections dealing with aspects of intelligent, embodied motor control in insects and multipedal robots—ranging from compliant actuation, distributed proprioception and control of multiple legs, the formation of internal representations to the use of an internal body model—we introduce the walking robot HECTOR as a research platform for integrative biomimetics of hexapedal locomotion. Owing to its 18 highly sensorized, compliant actuators, light-weight exoskeleton, distributed and expandable hardware architecture, and an appropriate dynamic simulation framework, HECTOR offers many opportunities to integrate research effort across biomimetics research on actuation, sensory-motor feedback, inter-leg coordination, and cognitive abilities such as motion planning and learning of its own body size.

Transfer of Spatial Contact Information Among Limbs and the Notion of Peripersonal Space in Insects

Internal representation of far-range space in insects is well established, as it is necessary for navigation behavior. Although it is likely that insects also have an internal representation of near-range space, the behavioral evidence for the latter is much less evident. Here, we estimate the size and shape of the spatial equivalent of a near-range representation that is constituted by somatosensory sampling events. To do so, we use a large set of experimental whole-body motion capture data on unrestrained walking, climbing and searching behavior in stick insects of the species Carausius morosus to delineate ‘action volumes’ and ‘contact volumes’ for both antennae and all six legs. As these volumes are derived from recorded sampling events, they comprise a volume equivalent to a representation of coinciding somatosensory and motor activity. Accordingly, we define this volume as the peripersonal space of an insect. It is of immediate behavioral relevance, because it comprises all potential external object locations within the action range of the body. In a next step, we introduce the notion of an affordance space as that part of peripersonal space within which contact-induced spatial estimates lie within the action ranges of more than one limb. Because the action volumes of limbs overlap in this affordance space, spatial information from one limb can be used to control the movement of another limb. Thus, it gives rise to an affordance as known for contact-induced reaching movements and spatial coordination of footfall patterns in stick insects. Finally, we probe the computational properties of the experimentally derived affordance space for pairs of neighboring legs. This is done by use of artificial neural networks that map the posture of one leg into a target posture of another leg with identical foot position.

ReaCog, a Minimal Cognitive Controller Based on Recruitment of Reactive Systems

It has often been stated that for a neuronal system to become a cognitive one, it has to be large enough. In contrast, we argue that a basic property of a cognitive system, namely the ability to plan ahead, can already be fulfilled by small neuronal systems. As a proof of concept, we propose an artificial neural network, termed reaCog, that, first, is able to deal with a specific domain of behavior (six-legged-walking). Second, we show how a minor expansion of this system enables the system to plan ahead and deploy existing behavioral elements in novel contexts in order to solve current problems. To this end, the system invents new solutions that are not possible for the reactive network. Rather these solutions result from new combinations of given memory elements. This faculty does not rely on a dedicated system being more or less independent of the reactive basis, but results from exploitation of the reactive basis by recruiting the lower-level control structures in a way that motor planning becomes possible as an internal simulation relying on internal representation being grounded in embodied experiences.

Toward a Unified Sub-symbolic Computational Theory of Cognition

This paper proposes how various disciplinary theories of cognition may be combined into a unifying, sub-symbolic, computational theory of cognition. The following theories are considered for integration: psychological theories, including the theory of event coding, event segmentation theory, the theory of anticipatory behavioral control, and concept development; artificial intelligence and machine learning theories, including reinforcement learning and generative artificial neural networks; and theories from theoretical and computational neuroscience, including predictive coding and free energy-based inference. In the light of such a potential unification, it is discussed how abstract cognitive, conceptualized knowledge and understanding may be learned from actively gathered sensorimotor experiences. The unification rests on the free energy-based inference principle, which essentially implies that the brain builds a predictive, generative model of its environment. Neural activity-oriented inference causes the continuous adaptation of the currently active predictive encodings. Neural structure-oriented inference causes the longer term adaptation of the developing generative model as a whole. Finally, active inference strives for maintaining internal homeostasis, causing goal-directed motor behavior. To learn abstract, hierarchical encodings, however, it is proposed that free energy-based inference needs to be enhanced with structural priors, which bias cognitive development toward the formation of particular, behaviorally suitable encoding structures. As a result, it is hypothesized how abstract concepts can develop from, and thus how they are structured by and grounded in, sensorimotor experiences. Moreover, it is sketched-out how symbol-like thought can be generated by a temporarily active set of predictive encodings, which constitute a distributed neural attractor in the form of an interactive free-energy minimum. The activated, interactive network attractor essentially characterizes the semantics of a concept or a concept composition, such as an actual or imagined situation in our environment. Temporal successions of attractors then encode unfolding semantics, which may be generated by a behavioral or mental interaction with an actual or imagined situation in our environment. Implications, further predictions, possible verification, and falsifications, as well as potential enhancements into a fully spelled-out unified theory of cognition are discussed at the end of the paper.

A hexapod walker using a heterarchical architecture for action selection

Moving in a cluttered environment with a six-legged walking machine that has additional body actuators, therefore controlling 22 DoFs, is not a trivial task. Already simple forward walking on a flat plane requires the system to select between different internal states. The orchestration of these states depends on walking velocity and on external disturbances. Such disturbances occur continuously, for example due to irregular up-and-down movements of the body or slipping of the legs, even on flat surfaces, in particular when negotiating tight curves. The number of possible states is further increased when the system is allowed to walk backward or when front legs are used as grippers and cannot contribute to walking. Further states are necessary for expansion that allow for navigation. Here we demonstrate a solution for the selection and sequencing of different (attractor) states required to control different behaviors as are forward walking at different speeds, backward walking, as well as negotiation of tight curves. This selection is made by a recurrent neural network (RNN) of motivation units, controlling a bank of decentralized memory elements in combination with the feedback through the environment. The underlying heterarchical architecture of the network allows to select various combinations of these elements. This modular approach representing an example of neural reuse of a limited number of procedures allows for adaptation to different internal and external conditions. A way is sketched as to how this approach may be expanded to form a cognitive system being able to plan ahead. This architecture is characterized by different types of modules being arranged in layers and columns, but the complete network can also be considered as a holistic system showing emergent properties which cannot be attributed to a specific module.

How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network

An artificial neural network called reaCog is described which is based on a decentralized, reactive and embodied architecture developed to control non-trivial hexapod walking in an unpredictable environment (Walknet) while using insect-like navigation (Navinet). In reaCog, these basic networks are extended in such a way that the complete system, reaCog, adopts the capability of inventing new behaviors and - via internal simulation - of planning ahead. This cognitive expansion enables the reactive system to be enriched with additional procedures. Here, we focus on the question to what extent properties of phenomena to be characterized on a different level of description as for example consciousness can be found in this minimally cognitive system. Adopting a monist view, we argue that the phenomenal aspect of mental phenomena can be neglected when discussing the function of such a system. Under this condition, reaCog is discussed to be equipped with properties as are bottom-up and top-down attention, intentions, volition, and some aspects of Access Consciousness. These properties have not been explicitly implemented but emerge from the cooperation between the elements of the network. The aspects of Access Consciousness found in reaCog concern the above mentioned ability to plan ahead and to invent and guide (new) actions. Furthermore, global accessibility of memory elements, another aspect characterizing Access Consciousness is realized by this network. reaCog allows for both reactive/automatic control and (access-) conscious control of behavior. We discuss examples for interactions between both the reactive domain and the conscious domain. Metacognition or Reflexive Consciousness is not a property of reaCog. Possible expansions are discussed to allow for further properties of Access Consciousness, verbal report on internal states, and for Metacognition. In summary, we argue that already simple networks allow for properties of consciousness if leaving the phenomenal aspect aside.