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Kuhn RL. A landscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications. PROGRESS IN BIOPHYSICS AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 2024; 190:28-169. [PMID: 38281544 DOI: 10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2023.12.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/04/2023] [Revised: 09/12/2023] [Accepted: 12/25/2023] [Indexed: 01/30/2024]
Abstract
Diverse explanations or theories of consciousness are arrayed on a roughly physicalist-to-nonphysicalist landscape of essences and mechanisms. Categories: Materialism Theories (philosophical, neurobiological, electromagnetic field, computational and informational, homeostatic and affective, embodied and enactive, relational, representational, language, phylogenetic evolution); Non-Reductive Physicalism; Quantum Theories; Integrated Information Theory; Panpsychisms; Monisms; Dualisms; Idealisms; Anomalous and Altered States Theories; Challenge Theories. There are many subcategories, especially for Materialism Theories. Each explanation is self-described by its adherents, critique is minimal and only for clarification, and there is no attempt to adjudicate among theories. The implications of consciousness explanations or theories are assessed with respect to four questions: meaning/purpose/value (if any); AI consciousness; virtual immortality; and survival beyond death. A Landscape of Consciousness, I suggest, offers perspective.
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Havlík M, Hlinka J, Klírová M, Adámek P, Horáček J. Towards causal mechanisms of consciousness through focused transcranial brain stimulation. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad008. [PMID: 37089451 PMCID: PMC10120840 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/01/2022] [Revised: 01/10/2023] [Accepted: 03/30/2023] [Indexed: 04/25/2023] Open
Abstract
Conscious experience represents one of the most elusive problems of empirical science, namely neuroscience. The main objective of empirical studies of consciousness has been to describe the minimal sets of neural events necessary for a specific neuronal state to become consciously experienced. The current state of the art still does not meet this objective but rather consists of highly speculative theories based on correlates of consciousness and an ever-growing list of knowledge gaps. The current state of the art is defined by the limitations of past stimulation techniques and the emphasis on the observational approach. However, looking at the current stimulation technologies that are becoming more accurate, it is time to consider an alternative approach to studying consciousness, which builds on the methodology of causal explanations via causal alterations. The aim of this methodology is to move beyond the correlates of consciousness and focus directly on the mechanisms of consciousness with the help of the currently focused brain stimulation techniques, such as geodesic transcranial electric neuromodulation. This approach not only overcomes the limitations of the correlational methodology but will also become another firm step in the following science of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marek Havlík
- Center for Advanced Studies of Brain and Consciousness, National Institute of Mental Health, Topolová 748, Klecany 250 67, Czech Republic
| | - Jaroslav Hlinka
- Center for Advanced Studies of Brain and Consciousness, National Institute of Mental Health, Topolová 748, Klecany 250 67, Czech Republic
- Department of Complex Systems, Institute of Computer Science of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Pod Vodárenskou věží 271/2, Prague 182 07, Czech Republic
| | - Monika Klírová
- Center for Advanced Studies of Brain and Consciousness, National Institute of Mental Health, Topolová 748, Klecany 250 67, Czech Republic
- Third Faculty of Medicine, Charles University, Ruská 87, Prague 10 100 00, Czech Republic
| | - Petr Adámek
- Center for Advanced Studies of Brain and Consciousness, National Institute of Mental Health, Topolová 748, Klecany 250 67, Czech Republic
- Third Faculty of Medicine, Charles University, Ruská 87, Prague 10 100 00, Czech Republic
| | - Jiří Horáček
- Center for Advanced Studies of Brain and Consciousness, National Institute of Mental Health, Topolová 748, Klecany 250 67, Czech Republic
- Third Faculty of Medicine, Charles University, Ruská 87, Prague 10 100 00, Czech Republic
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Dalbey B, Saad B. Internal constraints for phenomenal externalists: a structure matching theory. SYNTHESE 2022; 200:348. [PMID: 35993008 PMCID: PMC9385773 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03829-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/22/2021] [Accepted: 07/25/2022] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
We motivate five constraints on theorizing about sensory experience. We then propose a novel form of naturalistic intentionalism that succeeds where other theories fail by satisfying all of these constraints. On the proposed theory, which we call structure matching tracking intentionalism, brains states track determinables. Internal structural features of those states select determinates of those determinables for presentation in experience. We argue that this theory is distinctively well-positioned to both explain internal-phenomenal structural correlations and accord external features a role in fixing phenomenology. In addition, we use the theory to shed light on how one comes to experience "missing shades".
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Bradford Saad
- Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands
- Sentience Institute, New York, USA
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Sattin D, Magnani FG, Bartesaghi L, Caputo M, Fittipaldo AV, Cacciatore M, Picozzi M, Leonardi M. Theoretical Models of Consciousness: A Scoping Review. Brain Sci 2021; 11:535. [PMID: 33923218 PMCID: PMC8146510 DOI: 10.3390/brainsci11050535] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2021] [Revised: 04/20/2021] [Accepted: 04/21/2021] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
The amount of knowledge on human consciousness has created a multitude of viewpoints and it is difficult to compare and synthesize all the recent scientific perspectives. Indeed, there are many definitions of consciousness and multiple approaches to study the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Therefore, the main aim of this article is to collect data on the various theories of consciousness published between 2007-2017 and to synthesize them to provide a general overview of this topic. To describe each theory, we developed a thematic grid called the dimensional model, which qualitatively and quantitatively analyzes how each article, related to one specific theory, debates/analyzes a specific issue. Among the 1130 articles assessed, 85 full texts were included in the prefinal step. Finally, this scoping review analyzed 68 articles that described 29 theories of consciousness. We found heterogeneous perspectives in the theories analyzed. Those with the highest grade of variability are as follows: subjectivity, NCC, and the consciousness/cognitive function. Among sub-cortical structures, thalamus, basal ganglia, and the hippocampus were the most indicated, whereas the cingulate, prefrontal, and temporal areas were the most reported for cortical ones also including the thalamo-cortical system. Moreover, we found several definitions of consciousness and 21 new sub-classifications.
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Affiliation(s)
- Davide Sattin
- Neurology, Public Health, Disability Unit—Scientific Department, Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta, 20133 Milan, Italy; (F.G.M.); (L.B.); (M.C.); (M.C.); (M.L.)
- Experimental Medicine and Medical Humanities-PhD Program, Biotechnology and Life Sciences Department and Center for Clinical Ethics, Insubria University, 21100 Varese, Italy
| | - Francesca Giulia Magnani
- Neurology, Public Health, Disability Unit—Scientific Department, Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta, 20133 Milan, Italy; (F.G.M.); (L.B.); (M.C.); (M.C.); (M.L.)
| | - Laura Bartesaghi
- Neurology, Public Health, Disability Unit—Scientific Department, Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta, 20133 Milan, Italy; (F.G.M.); (L.B.); (M.C.); (M.C.); (M.L.)
| | - Milena Caputo
- Neurology, Public Health, Disability Unit—Scientific Department, Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta, 20133 Milan, Italy; (F.G.M.); (L.B.); (M.C.); (M.C.); (M.L.)
| | | | - Martina Cacciatore
- Neurology, Public Health, Disability Unit—Scientific Department, Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta, 20133 Milan, Italy; (F.G.M.); (L.B.); (M.C.); (M.C.); (M.L.)
| | - Mario Picozzi
- Center for Clinical Ethics, Biotechnology and Life Sciences Department, Insubria University, 21100 Varese, Italy;
| | - Matilde Leonardi
- Neurology, Public Health, Disability Unit—Scientific Department, Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta, 20133 Milan, Italy; (F.G.M.); (L.B.); (M.C.); (M.C.); (M.L.)
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Davidson MJ, Mithen W, Hogendoorn H, van Boxtel JJA, Tsuchiya N. The SSVEP tracks attention, not consciousness, during perceptual filling-in. eLife 2020; 9:e60031. [PMID: 33170121 PMCID: PMC7682990 DOI: 10.7554/elife.60031] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/15/2020] [Accepted: 11/10/2020] [Indexed: 12/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Research on the neural basis of conscious perception has almost exclusively shown that becoming aware of a stimulus leads to increased neural responses. By designing a novel form of perceptual filling-in (PFI) overlaid with a dynamic texture display, we frequency-tagged multiple disappearing targets as well as their surroundings. We show that in a PFI paradigm, the disappearance of a stimulus and subjective invisibility is associated with increases in neural activity, as measured with steady-state visually evoked potentials (SSVEPs), in electroencephalography (EEG). We also find that this increase correlates with alpha-band activity, a well-established neural measure of attention. These findings cast doubt on the direct relationship previously reported between the strength of neural activity and conscious perception, at least when measured with current tools, such as the SSVEP. Instead, we conclude that SSVEP strength more closely measures changes in attention.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthew J Davidson
- School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Science, Monash UniversityMelbourneAustralia
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Medicine, University of OxfordOxfordUnited Kingdom
| | - Will Mithen
- School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Science, Monash UniversityMelbourneAustralia
| | - Hinze Hogendoorn
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of MelbourneMelbourneAustralia
| | - Jeroen JA van Boxtel
- Discipline of Psychology, Faculty of Health, University of CanberraCanberraAustralia
| | - Naotsugu Tsuchiya
- School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Science, Monash UniversityMelbourneAustralia
- Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Science, Monash UniversityMelbourneAustralia
- Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT)SuitaJapan
- Advanced Telecommunications Research Computational Neuroscience Laboratories, 2-2-2 Hikaridai, Seika-cho, Soraku-gunKyotoJapan
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Havlík M, Kozáková E, Horáček J. Intrinsic Rivalry. Can White Bears Help Us With the Other Side of Consciousness? Front Psychol 2019; 10:1087. [PMID: 31133953 PMCID: PMC6524470 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01087] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/21/2019] [Accepted: 04/25/2019] [Indexed: 01/24/2023] Open
Abstract
Studies of consciousness have traditionally been based mainly upon the perceptual domains of consciousness. However, there is another side of consciousness, represented by various types of intrinsic conscious experiences. Even though intrinsic experiences can represent up to 50% of our conscious experiences, they are still largely neglected in conscious studies. We assume there are two reasons for this. First, the field of intrinsic conscious experiences is methodologically far more problematic than any other. Second, specific paradigms for capturing the correlates of intrinsic conscious experiences are almost nonexistent. Nevertheless, we expect the intrinsic side of consciousness to soon take its place in conscious studies, but first new experimental paradigms will have to be devised, which would be of a similar design to the paradigms used in studies of perceptual consciousness. In this hypothesis and theory article, we propose such a hypothetical paradigm, presenting the exploratory data of our proof-of-concept study, discussing its use, and addressing its shortcomings and their possible remediation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marek Havlík
- National Institute of Mental Health, Klecany, Czechia
| | - Eva Kozáková
- National Institute of Mental Health, Klecany, Czechia
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague, Czechia
| | - Jiří Horáček
- National Institute of Mental Health, Klecany, Czechia
- Third Faculty of Medicine, Charles University, Prague, Czechia
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Towards a cognitive neuroscience of self-awareness. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2017; 83:765-773. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.04.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 51] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/23/2016] [Revised: 03/19/2016] [Accepted: 04/07/2016] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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Dijker AJM. Consciousness: a neural capacity for objectivity, especially pronounced in humans. Front Psychol 2014; 5:223. [PMID: 24672506 PMCID: PMC3955983 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00223] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2013] [Accepted: 02/26/2014] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Consciousness tends to be viewed either as subjective experience of sensations and feelings, or as perception and internal representation of objects. This paper argues that neither view sufficiently acknowledges that consciousness may refer to the brain’s most adaptive property: its capacity to produce states of objectivity. It is proposed that this capacity relies on multiple sensorimotor networks for internally representing objects and their properties in terms of expectancies, as well as on motivational and motor mechanisms involved in exploration, play, and care for vulnerable living and non-living objects. States of objectivity are associated with a very special phenomenal aspect; the experience that subjective aspects are absent and one is “just looking” at the world as it really is and can be. However, these states are normally closely preceded and followed by (and tend to be combined or fused with) sensations and feelings which are caused by activation of sensory and motivational mechanisms. A capacity for objectivity may have evolved in different species and can be conceived as a common basis for other elusive psychological properties such as intelligence, conscience, and esthetic experience; all three linked to crucial behaviors in human evolution such as tool making, cooperation, and art. The brain’s pervasive tendency to objectify may be responsible for wrongly equating consciousness with feelings and wrongly opposing it to well-learned or habitual (“unconscious”) patterns of perception and behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anton J M Dijker
- Faculty of Health, Medicine and Life Sciences, Maastricht University Maastricht, Netherlands
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