Preschoolers are sensitive to free riding in a public goods game

Children Sustain Cooperation in a Threshold Public-Goods Game Even When Seeing Others' Outcomes

Many societal challenges are threshold dilemmas requiring people to cooperate to reach a threshold before group benefits can be reaped. Yet receiving feedback about others' outcomes relative to one's own (relative feedback) can undermine cooperation by focusing group members' attention on outperforming each other. We investigated the impact of relative feedback compared to individual feedback (only seeing one's own outcome) on cooperation in children from Germany and India (6- to 10-year-olds, N = 240). Using a threshold public-goods game with real water as a resource, we show that, although feedback had an effect, most groups sustained cooperation at high levels in both feedback conditions until the end of the game. Analyses of children's communication (14,374 codable utterances) revealed more references to social comparisons and more verbal efforts to coordinate in the relative-feedback condition. Thresholds can mitigate the most adverse effects of social comparisons by focusing attention on a common goal.

Understanding the paradox between tragedies of the commons and the anticommons: From a cognitive psychology perspective

The tragedy of the commons refers to the overuse of resources which are rival in consumption but lack excludability and it also refers to rent dissipation. While the tragedy of the anticommons is a tragedy closely connected with underuse of resources that are rival in consumption and with too strong excludability. The prior studies proved that the tragedy of the commons and the tragedy of the anticommons are symmetric from the perspective of pure mathematics, especially the game theory, which was later refuted by behavioral economics experiments. According to them, the tragedy of the anticommons is severer than the tragedy of the commons. The asymmetry of the tragedy of the commons and the tragedy of the anticommons is a paradox by these different research methods. This paradox shows that there are imperfections in the completely rational economic man hypothesis set up by neoclassical economics. As a fundamental theory, the tragedy of the commons is quite influential in many disciplines, such as microeconomics, public sector economics, ecological economics, environmental economics, management, sociology, property law, and political science. And the tragedy of the anticommons theory has also opened its door of both theoretical research and practical implications since its acceptance by Nobel laureate Buchanan, the main founder of public choice school. Only when theoretical issues are thoroughly discussed and made clear enough, can people avoid misunderstanding or misusing the commons theory. Thus, it is necessary to elucidate the paradox between them. Based on Simon’s bounded rationality, Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory, value function, Thaler’s mental accounting, endowment effect, and other cognitive psychological tools, this study clearly shows that agents’ decision-making process is not just based on the long-believed marginal benefit and marginal cost analysis advocated by traditional neoclassical economists. Agents’ decision-making is a process in which agents selectively absorb, code the objective marginal revenue and marginal cost, and feed relevant information to their brain. Therefore, what plays a directly decisive role is not the objective marginal revenue and marginal cost per se, but the mentally perceived subjective utility of marginal revenue and marginal cost by the human brain. Followed by this research clue, the paradox between the tragedy of the commons and the tragedy of the anticommons is elucidated from the perspective of cognitive psychology.

Motivating children's cooperation to conserve forests

Forests are essential common-pool resources. Understanding children's and adolescents' motivations for conservation is critical to improving conservation education. In 2 experiments, we investigated 1086 school-aged children and adolescents (6-16 years old) from China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the United States. testING participants in groups, we assessed their motivation for conservation based on collective-risk common-pool goods games in which they are threatened with losing their endowment unless the group donation exceeds a threshold needed to maintain the forest.eExtrinsic motivations, rather than intrinsic , tended to lead to successful cooperation to maintain a forest. Certainty of losing individual payoffs significantly boosted successful cooperative conservation efforts across cultures (success rates were 90.63 % and 74.19% in the 2 risk-extrinsic conditions and 43.75% in the control condition). In U.S. participants, 2 extrinsic incentives, priming discussions of the value of forests and delay of payoffs as punishment , also increased success of cooperative conservation (success rates were 97.22% and 76.92% in the 2 extrinsic-incentive conditions and 29.19% and 30.77% in the 2 control conditions). Conservation simulations, like those we used, may allow educators to encourage forest protection by leading groups to experience successful cooperation and the extrinsic incentives needed to motivate forest conservation. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

In Defense of the Commons: Young Children Negatively Evaluate and Sanction Free Riders

Human flourishing depends on individuals paying costs to contribute to the common good, but such arrangements are vulnerable to free riding, in which individuals benefit from others' contributions without paying costs themselves. Systems of tracking and sanctioning free riders can stabilize cooperation, but the origin of such tendencies is not well understood. Here, we provide evidence that children as young as 4 years old negatively evaluate and sanction free riders. Across six studies, we showed that these tendencies are robust, large in magnitude, tuned to intentional rather than unintentional noncontribution, and generally consistent across third- and first-party cases. Further, these effects cannot be accounted for by factors that frequently co-occur with free riding, such as nonconforming behaviors or the costs that free riding imposes on the group. Our findings demonstrate that from early in life, children both hold and enforce a normative expectation that individuals are intrinsically obligated to contribute to the common good.

Social status and prenatal testosterone exposure assessed via second-to-fourth digit ratio affect 6-9-year-old children's prosocial choices

Prosocial behaviour (i.e., voluntary behaviour intended to benefit another) seems to be fully developed in children by the age of 6 years. However, questions about which factors modify prosocial behaviour at that age remain understudied. Here we used a resource allocation paradigm to test prosocial behaviour in 6-9-year-old school children. They could decide between a "selfish" (i.e., one sticker for themselves) and a "prosocial" option (i.e., one sticker for themselves and one for the receiver) and we tested whether friendship, social status and prenatal androgen exposure (approximated by the 2nd to 4th digit ratio; 2D:4D) influenced children's prosocial choices. We found that children behaved prosocially, and that their prosocial tendencies were negatively correlated with prenatal androgen exposure; i.e., children with high 2D:4D ratios (reflecting low prenatal androgen exposure) acted more prosocially than children with low 2D:4D ratios. Further, their social status in the classroom influenced their choices: children with fewer interaction partners chose the "prosocial" option more often than more 'popular' children. However, they did so irrespectively of whether they were paired with a recipient or not. Our results highlight the importance of considering social, as well as physiological factors when investigating prosocial behaviour in children.

An investigation of children's strategies for overcoming the tragedy of the commons

Common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas are pervasive challenges to overcome. We presented six-year-old children with an experimental CPR paradigm involving a renewable water resource, which children could collect to win individual rewards. To maximize water collection, children had to wait for water to accumulate, without collapsing the resource. We explore the social strategies children used to overcome the dilemma together. Like adults, six-year-old children were challenged by the dilemma: resource sustaining was more successful in a parallel condition in which children worked independently compared with the collective CPR condition. However, children were capable of collectively preventing resource collapse by spontaneously generating inclusive rules, equally distributing the rewards and distracting one another from the delay-of-gratification task. Children also learned to sustain the resource longer in repeated interactions with the same partner. Already by the age of six, children are capable of CPR social strategies resembling those of adults.

The Pizzagame: A virtual public goods game to assess cooperative behavior in children and adolescents

Social dilemmas are characterized by conflicts between immediate self-interest and long-term collective goals. Although such conflicts lie at the heart of various challenging social interactions, we know little about how cooperation in these situations develops. To extend work on social dilemmas to child and adolescent samples, we developed an age-appropriate computer task (the Pizzagame) with the structural features of a public goods game (PGG). We administered the Pizzagame to a sample of 191 children 9 to 16 years of age. Subjects were led to believe they were playing the game over the Internet with three sets of two same-aged, same-sex co-players. In fact, the co-players were computer-generated and programmed to expose children to three consecutive conditions: (1) a cooperative strategy, (2) a selfish strategy, and (3) divergent cooperative-selfish strategies. Supporting the validity of the Pizzagame, our results revealed that children and adolescents displayed conditional cooperation, such that their contributions rose with the increasing cooperativeness of their co-players. Age and gender did not influence children and adolescents' cooperative behavior within each condition. However, older children adapted their behavior more flexibly between conditions to parallel the strategies of their co-players. These results support the utility of the Pizzagame as a feasible, reliable, and valid instrument for assessing and quantifying child and adolescent cooperative behavior. Moreover, these findings extend previous work showing that age influences cooperative behavior in the PGG.

Do sex and age affect strategic behavior and inequity aversion in children?

The ultimatum game is commonly used to explore fairness in adults in bargaining situations. Although the changes in responses that occur during development have been investigated in children, the results have been mixed. Whereas some studies show that proposers offer more when they grow older, others indicate the opposite. Moreover, these studies are outcome-based and leave intentions out of the scene, although intentions play a relevant role in daily life. The mini-ultimatum game offers the opportunity to test both outcomes and intentions, but one major obstacle for accurately pinpointing developmental transitions in strategic behavior and inequity aversion so far has been the multiple confounds that have plagued previous studies, including different methods, small sample sizes, and reduced age differences. We administered an anonymous direct-method one-shot mini-ultimatum game to 478 6- and 10-year-old children. Strategic behavior was present at 10 years of age; older participants matched more accurately what responders would accept than younger participants. However, this was true only for older girls. No sex differences were detected in younger children. No age group seemed to consider the proposer's intentions given that the rejections of the default option were not significant across conditions. Both disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversions were present in 6-year-olds. However, older children exhibited significantly more disadvantageous inequity aversion than younger children. This contrast made the pattern of rejection of 6-year-olds look more similar to the pattern of rejection found in adults. No sex differences were found in responders' behavior.