Why isn't everyone an evolutionary psychologist?

Penetrabilidad cognitiva en la percepción visual temprana: Evidencia empírica en humanos

Con base en un trasfondo teórico sobre las concepciones modulares de la mente de Fodor (2001) y Pinker (2005), el objetivo del presente texto es analizar cualitativemente la solidez de la evidencia experimental de una muestra de artículos publicados entre 2002 y 2017 que apoyan la tesis de la penetrabilidad cognitiva en la percepción visual temprana. El estudio se justifica por las implicaciones que pueden tener los resultados de estas investigaciones para las diferentes concepciones sobre arquitectura mental en funciones perceptuales, procesamiento de la información intra e intermodular e isomorfismo entre arquitectura mental y cerebral. La metodología que se utilizó para realizar este estudio implicó establecimiento de la tesis y de los criterios de inclusión de los artículos a revisar, selección final de los artículos más representativos sobre las subáreas seleccionadas, análisis de la calidad metodológica y de los resultados de éstos, identificación de aportes específicos de cada estudio a la tesis planteada e interpretación y síntesis de los hallazgos. De 26 artículos revisados sobre el tema, se reportan y analizan 7, que se consideran representativos de 4 subáreas: penetrabilidad de expectativas, de percepción del color, de rasgos faciales y de reconocimiento de objetos. Se concluye que hay amplia y sólida evidencia convergente (perceptual y neurofisiológica) a favor de los fenómenos penetrativos en la visión temprana, lo cual apoyaría indirectamente la hipótesis de permeabilidad de los módulos mentales de Pinker. Se formulan recomendaciones sobre aspectos por investigar y variables a controlar en experimentos sobre este tema.

Psychology: a Giant with Feet of Clay

The aim of the current study has been to highlight the theoretical precariousness of Psychology. The theoretical precariousness has been evidenced through a review of psychological "core-constructs" whose definitions were thoroughly searched in 11 popular introductory textbooks of psychology edited between 2012 and 2019 and in an APA dictionary of Psychology (VandeBos 2015). This analysis has shown unsatisfactory or discordant definitions of psychological "core-constructs". A further epistemological comparison between psychology and three "harder" sciences (i.e., physics, chemistry and biology) seemed to support the "soft" nature of psychology: a minor consensus in its "core" and a minor capacity to accumulate knowledge when compared to the former "harder" sciences (Fanelli in PLoS One, 5, e10068, 2010; Fanelli and Glänzel in PLoS One, 8, e66938, 2013). This comparison also seemed to support the "pre-paradigmatic" condition of psychology, in which conflicts between rival schools of thought hamper the development of a real unified paradigm (Kuhn 1970). To enter a paradigmatic stage, we propose here evolutionary psychology as the most compelling approach, thanks to its empirical support and theoretical consistency. However, since the skepticism about "grand unifying theories" is well disposed (Badcock in Review of General Psychology, 16, 10-23, 2012), we suggest that evolutionary psychology must be intended as a pluralistic approach rather than a monolithic one, and that its main strength is its capacity to resolve the nature-nurture dialectics.

The hierarchically mechanistic mind: an evolutionary systems theory of the human brain, cognition, and behavior

The purpose of this review was to integrate leading paradigms in psychology and neuroscience with a theory of the embodied, situated human brain, called the Hierarchically Mechanistic Mind (HMM). The HMM describes the brain as a complex adaptive system that functions to minimize the entropy of our sensory and physical states via action-perception cycles generated by hierarchical neural dynamics. First, we review the extant literature on the hierarchical structure of the brain. Next, we derive the HMM from a broader evolutionary systems theory that explains neural structure and function in terms of dynamic interactions across four nested levels of biological causation (i.e., adaptation, phylogeny, ontogeny, and mechanism). We then describe how the HMM aligns with a global brain theory in neuroscience called the free-energy principle, leveraging this theory to mathematically formulate neural dynamics across hierarchical spatiotemporal scales. We conclude by exploring the implications of the HMM for psychological inquiry.

Adaptive Memory

A few seconds of survival processing, during which people assess the relevance of information to a survival situation, produces particularly good retention. One interpretation of this benefit is that our memory systems are optimized to process and retain fitness-relevant information. Such a “tuning” may exist, in part, because our memory systems were shaped by natural selection, using a fitness-based criterion. However, recent research suggests that traditional mnemonic processes, such as elaborative processing, may play an important role in producing the empirical benefit. Boundary conditions have been demonstrated as well, leading some to dismiss evolutionary interpretations of the phenomenon. In this article, we discuss the current state of the evolutionary account and provide a general framework for evaluating evolutionary and purportedly nonevolutionary interpretations of mnemonic phenomena. We suggest that survival processing effects are best viewed within the context of a general survival optimization system, designed by nature to help organisms deal with survival challenges. An important component of survival optimization is the ability to simulate activities that help to prevent or escape from future threats which, in turn, depends in an important way on accurate retrospective remembering of survival-relevant information.

Sciences of the brain: The long road to scientific maturity and to present-day reductionism

When examined in a long-term perspective, brain sciences demonstrate certain conceptual consistencies as well as theoretical oppositions that have lasted for centuries, ever since Ancient Greece. The neurosciences have progressed more on the basis of technological than conceptual advances, and the constant recuperation of new techniques from other sciences have led to a continually reductionist view of the brain and its functions. In a different perspective, if not opposite to the reductionism, are the psychological constructs and those that constitute the functional unity of individuals, which are still mysterious. In fact, the gap between these two approaches has never been larger than it is now. This chapter discusses the enduring nature of some of these problems and their recent consequences.