How to go beyond the body: an introduction

The development of dynamic perceptual simulations during sentence comprehension

Based on an embodied account of language comprehension, this study investigated the dynamic characteristics of children and adults’ perceptual simulations during sentence comprehension, using a novel paradigm to assess the perceptual simulation of objects moving up and down a vertical axis. The participants comprised adults (N = 40) and 6-, 8-, and 10-year-old children (N = 116). After listening in experimental trials to sentences implying that objects moved upward or downward, the participants were shown pictures and had to decide as quickly as possible whether the objects depicted had been mentioned in the sentences. The target pictures moved either up or down and then stopped in the middle of the screen. All age groups’ reaction times were found to be shorter when the objects moved in the directions that the sentences implied. Age exerted no developmental effect on reaction times. The findings suggest that dynamic perceptual simulations are fundamental to language comprehension in text recipients aged 6 and older.

Abstract, emotional and concrete concepts and the activation of mouth-hand effectors

According to embodied and grounded theories, concepts are grounded in sensorimotor systems. The majority of evidence supporting these views concerns concepts referring to objects or actions, while evidence on abstract concepts is more scarce. Explaining how abstract concepts such as “freedom” are represented would thus be pivotal for grounded theories. According to some recent proposals, abstract concepts are grounded in both sensorimotor and linguistic experience, thus they activate the mouth motor system more than concrete concepts. Two experiments are reported, aimed at verifying whether abstract, concrete and emotional words activate the mouth and the hand effectors. In both experiments participants performed first a lexical decision, then a recognition task. In Experiment 1 participants responded by pressing a button either with the mouth or with the hand, in Experiment 2 responses were given with the foot, while a button held either in the mouth or in the hand was used to respond to catch-trials. Abstract words were slower to process in both tasks (concreteness effect). Across the tasks and experiments, emotional concepts had instead a fluctuating pattern, different from those of both concrete and abstract concepts, suggesting that they cannot be considered as a subset of abstract concepts. The interaction between type of concept (abstract, concrete and emotional) and effector (mouth, hand) was not significant in the lexical decision task, likely because it emerged only with tasks implying a deeper processing level. It reached significance, instead, in the recognition tasks. In both experiments abstract concepts were facilitated in the mouth condition compared to the hand condition, supporting our main prediction. Emotional concepts instead had a more variable pattern. Overall, our findings indicate that various kinds of concepts differently activate the mouth and hand effectors, but they also suggest that concepts activate effectors in a flexible and task-dependent way.

Embodied cognition and the cerebellum: Perspectives from the Dysmetria of Thought and the Universal Cerebellar Transform theories

In this report, we analyze the relationship between embodied cognition and current theories of the cerebellum, particularly the Dysmetria of Thought theory and the concept of the Universal Cerebellar Transform (UCT). First, we describe the UCT and the Dysmetria of Thought theories, highlight evidence supporting these hypotheses and discuss their mechanisms, functions and relevance. We then propose the following relationships. (i) The UCT strengthens embodied cognition because it provides an example of embodiment where the nature and intensity of the dependence between cognitive, affective and sensorimotor processes are defined. (ii) Conversely, embodied cognition bolsters the UCT theory because it contextualizes a cerebellum-focused theory within a general neurological theory. (iii) Embodied cognition supports the extension to other brain regions of the principles of organization of cerebral cortical connections that underlie the UCT: The notion that cytoarchitectonically determined transforms manifest via connectivity as sensorimotor, cognitive and affective functions resonates with the embodiment thesis that cognitive, affective and sensorimotor systems are interdependent. (iv) Embodied cognition might shape future definitions of the UCT because embodiment redefines the relationship between the neurological systems modulated by the UCT. We conclude by analyzing the relationship between our hypotheses and the concept of syntax and action semantics deficits in motor diseases.

Grounding Abstractness: Abstract Concepts and the Activation of the Mouth

One key issue for theories of cognition is how abstract concepts, such as freedom, are represented. According to the WAT (Words As social Tools) proposal, abstract concepts activate both sensorimotor and linguistic/social information, and their acquisition modality involves the linguistic experience more than the acquisition of concrete concepts. We report an experiment in which participants were presented with abstract and concrete definitions followed by concrete and abstract target-words. When the definition and the word matched, participants were required to press a key, either with the hand or with the mouth. Response times and accuracy were recorded. As predicted, we found that abstract definitions and abstract words yielded slower responses and more errors compared to concrete definitions and concrete words. More crucially, there was an interaction between the target-words and the effector used to respond (hand, mouth). While responses with the mouth were overall slower, the advantage of the hand over the mouth responses was more marked with concrete than with abstract concepts. The results are in keeping with grounded and embodied theories of cognition and support the WAT proposal, according to which abstract concepts evoke linguistic-social information, hence activate the mouth. The mechanisms underlying the mouth activation with abstract concepts (re-enactment of acquisition experience, or re-explanation of the word meaning, possibly through inner talk) are discussed. To our knowledge this is the first behavioral study demonstrating with real words that the advantage of the hand over the mouth is more marked with concrete than with abstract concepts, likely because of the activation of linguistic information with abstract concepts.