Are Humans Too Generous and Too Punitive? Using Psychological Principles to Further Debates about Human Social Evolution

The Effect of Task Difficulty and Self-Contribution on Fairness Consideration: An Event-Related Potential Study

Self-contribution may be an influential factor in fairness consideration and consequent behavioral decisions. Few studies have investigated simultaneous effects of task difficulty and self-contribution on fairness consideration outcomes and associated neurophysiological responses. To elucidate modulation effects of task difficulty and self-contribution on fairness consideration, 30 recruited participants played a modified ultimatum game (UG) while undergoing event-related potential measurements. A 2 (task difficulty: hard vs. easy) × 3 (contribution: other-contribution vs. both-contribution vs. self-contribution) × 2 (fairness type: fair vs. unfair) within-subject design was adopted. A significant interaction between fairness type and contribution was observed in the behavioral data, with unfair offers being more acceptable in the other-contribution condition than in the self-contribution or both-contribution conditions. In the early processing time window, feedback-related negative magnitudes were greater in the hard condition than in the easy condition. P300 responses were more pronounced when participants contributed equally to the proposer than in the self- and other-contribution conditions. These results demonstrated that individuals’ decisions are influenced by their own effort contributions relative to those of others in cooperative contexts.

The evolution of ‘culture’: Juggling a concept

Although the concept of culture was severely criticized in the second half of the twentieth century, its explanatory use has not been abandoned. Evolutionary psychologists and cognitive scientists have more recently used the concept in models and theories of culture. This use renews the hope that the concept of culture can be explanatorily useful within the social sciences, especially since the new definition of culture connects with both the idea of evolution and with the other natural sciences. In this paper, I analyze the models of cultural evolution developed by Cultural Evolutionary Science (CES), more specifically gene-culture coevolution theoretical models and dual-inheritance theories. I argue that even if CES scholars mostly claim that for them, culture is equal to information, some of these models have aspirations to bring back cultures as discrete units that resemble the social anthropological models of culture that have been already abandoned. I discuss evolutionists’ and social anthropologists’ objections to these models. I claim that despite the popularity of cultural evolutionist theories, social scientists (cultural anthropologists and historians, for example) should remain skeptical about the possibility that this approach can assume an explanatory role for a concept of culture.