A Simplified Model of Choice Behavior under Uncertainty

Cognitive chicken or the emotional egg? How reconceptualizing decision-making by integrating cognition and emotion can improve task psychometrics and clinical utility

Decision-making is an executive function, tapping into cognitive, emotional, and personality-based components. This complexity, and the varying operational definitions of the construct, is reflected in the rich array of behavioral decision-making tasks available for use in research and clinical settings. In many cases, these tasks are "subfield-specific," with tasks developed by cognitive psychologists focusing on cognitive aspects of decision-making and tasks developed by clinical psychologists focusing on interactions between emotional and cognitive aspects. Critically, performance across different tasks does not consistently correlate, obfuscating the ability to compare scores between measures and detect changes over time. Differing theories as to what cognitive and/or emotional aspects affect decision-making likely contribute to this lack of consistency across measures. The low criterion-related validity among decision-making tasks and lack of consistent measurement of the construct presents challenges for emotion and decision-making scholars. In this perspective, we provide several recommendations for the field: (a) assess decision-making as a specific cognitive ability versus a taxonomy of cognitive abilities; (b) a renewed focus on convergent validity across tasks; (c) further assessment of test-retest reliability versus practice effects on tasks; and (d) reimagine future decision-making research to consider the research versus clinical implications. We discuss one example of decision-making research applied to clinical settings, acquired brain injury recovery, to demonstrate how some of these concerns and recommendations can affect the ability to track changes in decision-making across time.

The Prominent Deck B Phenomenon in Schizophrenia: An Empirical Study on Iowa Gambling Task

Background: The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was established to evaluate emotion-based decision-making ability under uncertain circumstances in clinical populations, including schizophrenia (Sz). However, there remains a lack of stable behavioral measures regarding discrimination for decision-making performance in IGT between schizophrenic cases and healthy participants. None of the Sz-IGT studies has specifically verified the prominent deck B (PDB) phenomenon gradually revealed in other populations. Here, we provided a global review and empirical study to verify these Sz-IGT issues. Methods: Seeking reliable and valid behavioral measures, we reviewed 38 studies using IGT to investigate decision-making behavior in Sz groups. The IGT, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), and clinical symptoms evaluations were administered to 61 schizophrenia or schizoaffective cases diagnosed by psychiatrists and 62 demographically matched healthy participants. Results: There were no valid behavioral measures in IGT that could significantly identify the decision-making dysfunction of Sz. However, Sz cases, on average, made more choices from disadvantageous deck B relative to other decks, particularly in the later learning process (block 3-5). Compared to the control group, the Sz group was more impaired on the WCST. The high-gain frequency decks B and D showed significant correlations with WCST but no correlation between clinical symptoms and IGT/WCST. Conclusions: Gain-loss frequency (GLF) has a dominant and stable impact on the decision-making process in both Sz and control groups. PDB phenomenon is essentially challenging to be observed on the ground of the expected value (EV) viewpoint approach on the IGT in both populations. Consequently, caution should be exercised when launching the IGT to assess the decision-making ability of Sz under a clinical scenario.

Recollecting Cross-Cultural Evidences: Are Decision Makers Really Foresighted in Iowa Gambling Task?

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has become a remarkable experimental paradigm of dynamic emotion decision making. In recent years, research has emphasized the "prominent deck B (PDB) phenomenon" among normal (control group) participants, in which they favor "bad" deck B with its high-frequency gain structure-a finding that is incongruent with the original IGT hypothesis concerning foresightedness. Some studies have attributed such performance inconsistencies to cultural differences. In the present review, 86 studies featuring data on individual deck selections were drawn from an initial sample of 958 IGT-related studies published from 1994 to 2017 for further investigation. The PDB phenomenon was found in 67.44% of the studies (58 of 86), and most participants were recorded as having adopted the "gain-stay loss-randomize" strategy to cope with uncertainty. Notably, participants in our sample of studies originated from 16 areas across North America, South America, Europe, Oceania, and Asia, and the findings suggest that the PDB phenomenon may be cross-cultural.

Uncertainty Modulates the Effect of Transcranial Stimulation Over the Right Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex on Decision-Making Under Threat

Threat is a strategy that can be used to impact decision-making processes in bargaining. Abundant evidence suggests that credible threat and incredible threat both influence the obeisance of others. However, it is not clear whether the decision-making processes under credible threat and incredible threat during bargaining involve differential neurocognitive mechanisms. Here, we employed cathodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to deactivate the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) to address this question while subjects allocated and reported the subjective probability of future rejection under incredible threat and credible threat. We found that application of cathodal tDCS over the rDLPFC decreased the proposer's subjective inference of probability of rejection and the offer to the responder under incredible threat. Conversely, the same stimulation did not lead to a significant difference compared to the sham group in subjective probability and offer under credible threat. These results suggested that decision-making processes under the two types of threat during bargaining were associated with different neurocognitive substrates, because the punishment for non-compliance was uncertain under incredible threat, whereas it was certain under credible threat. We decreased activity in the rDLPFC, which is involved in decision-making processes related to bargaining under incredible threats, and observed significantly impacted behavior. The differential neurocognitive bases of subjective probability of rejection under incredible threat and credible threat resulted in different tDCS effects.