Social Transmission of Experience of Agency: An Experimental Study

Agency and social affordance shape visual perception

Research on the sense of agency has shown that being the author of an action changes the way we estimate the timing and the intensity of the action-effect. Yet, there is a dearth of attempts to assess the influence of agency on perception per se. The present study used the Representational Momentum paradigm to measure participants' visual anticipation of movement while manipulating their agency. In line with previous literature emphasizing the impact of social factors on visual anticipation and on the sense of agency, we additionally investigated the modulating power of social affordances on the relationship between agency and visual anticipation. We conducted two experiments where participants viewed a virtual agent directing a handshake gesture toward a second virtual agent. In a first experiment, we addressed the role of agency on visual anticipation by comparing a condition in which participants triggered the virtual agent's gesture with a condition where the computer triggered the gesture. Results showed greater forward movement anticipation when participants triggered the gesture. The second experiment investigated how altering social interaction parameters (interindividual distance and body posture) modulated the relationship between agency and visual anticipation. The outcome contrasted with the first experiment, with participants anticipating a backward movement of the hand when the computer triggered the gesture and displaying a null anticipation when participants triggered the gesture. Those two experiments highlighted how active involvement and environmental affordance interact to shape perception and allowed us to propose an updated model of agency processing.

Human-likeness and attribution of intentionality predict vicarious sense of agency over humanoid robot actions

Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of being in control of one's actions and their outcomes. In a social context, people can experience a "vicarious" SoA over another human's actions; however, it is still controversial whether the same occurs in Human-Robot Interaction (HRI). The present study aimed at understanding whether humanoid robots may elicit vicarious SoA in humans, and whether the emergence of this phenomenon depends on the attribution of intentionality towards robots. We asked adult participants to perform an Intentional Binding (IB) task alone and with the humanoid iCub robot, reporting the time of occurrence of both self- and iCub-generated actions. Before the experiment, participants' degree of attribution of intentionality towards robots was assessed. Results showed that participants experienced vicarious SoA over iCub-generated actions. Moreover, intentionality attribution positively predicted the magnitude of vicarious SoA. In conclusion, our results highlight the importance of factors such as human-likeness and attribution of intentionality for the emergence of vicarious SoA towards robots.

Intentions with actions: The role of intentionality attribution on the vicarious sense of agency in Human-Robot interaction

Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of control over one's actions and their consequences. In social contexts, people experience a "vicarious" SoA over other humans' actions; however, the phenomenon disappears when the other agent is a computer. This study aimed to investigate the factors that determine when humans experience vicarious SoA in Human-Robot Interaction (HRI). To this end, in two experiments, we disentangled two potential contributing factors: (1) the possibility of representing the robot's actions and (2) the adoption of Intentional Stance towards robots. Participants performed an Intentional Binding (IB) task reporting the time of occurrence for self- or robot-generated actions or sensory outcomes. To assess the role of action representation, the robot either performed a physical keypress (Experiment 1) or "acted" by sending a command via Bluetooth (Experiment 2). Before the experiment, attribution of intentionality to the robot was assessed. Results showed that when participants judged the occurrence of the action, vicarious SoA was predicted by the degree of attributed intentionality, but only when the robot's action was physical. Conversely, digital actions elicited the reversed effect of vicarious IB, suggesting that disembodied actions of robots are perceived as non-intentional. When participants judged the occurrence of the sensory outcome, vicarious SoA emerged only when the causing action was physical. Notably, intentionality attribution predicted vicarious SoA for sensory outcomes independently of the nature of the causing event, physical or digital. In conclusion, both intentionality attribution and action representation play a crucial role for vicarious SoA in HRI.