Will I Regret It? Anticipated Negative Emotions Modulate Choices in Moral Dilemmas

Does Embodying a Divine Avatar Influence Moral Decisions? An Immersive Virtual Reality Study

The term Proteus effect refers to the changes in attitudes and behavior induced by the characteristics of an embodied virtual agent. Whether the effect can extend to the moral sphere is currently unknown. To deal with this issue, we investigated if embodying virtual agents (i.e., avatars) with different characteristics modulate people's moral standards differentially. Participants were requested to embody an avatar resembling the Christian God in His anthropomorphic appearance or a control human avatar and to perform a text-based version of incidental and instrumental dilemmas in a virtual environment. For each participant, we recorded (1) chosen options (deontological vs. utilitarian), (2) decision times, (3) postdecision feelings, and (4) physiological reactions (skin conductance response and heart rate). We found that embodying God vs. a control avatar did not change the performance in the moral dilemma task, indicating that no strong Proteus effect was at play in our experimental conditions. We interpreted this result by examining the constraints and limitations of our task, reasoning about the necessary conditions for eliciting the Proteus effect, and discussing future developments and advances in the field. Moreover, we presented compelling effects concerning dilemma type, chosen option, personality traits, and religion affiliation, thus supporting and extending literature on decision making in moral dilemmas.

Fear facilitates utilitarian moral judgments: Evidence from a moral judgment task

Previous research on moral judgment (MJ) has focused on understanding the cognitive processes and emotional factors that influence different types of moral judgment tasks, such as personal and impersonal dilemmas. However, few studies have distinguished between the emotions related to cognition and the complex emotions specifically caused by MJ tasks. This gap in knowledge is important to address to have a better understanding of how emotions influence moral judgment. The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of fear and the role of moral emotions on MJ. Data were collected from 145 participants through jsPsych and analyzed using mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) and correlation analysis. The study found that individuals who were triggered by the fear increased the number of utilitarian moral judgments in personal moral scenarios and lengthened the cognitive process, but not in impersonal moral dilemmas. Hence, we speculate that fear may play a cognitive role in personal moral dilemmas and an emotional role in impersonal moral dilemmas. Another finding is that the complex moral emotions arising from the moral decision-making process may affect the effectiveness of fear and potentially influence moral judgments. However, this study adopts a cautious attitude toward these discoveries, and further verification of this hypothesis should be conducted in the future.

How does the moral self-concept relate to prosocial behaviour? Investigating the role of emotions and consistency preference

The moral self-concept has been proposed as a central predictor of prosocial behaviour. In two experiments (one preregistered), we explored the nature of the relation between the moral self-concept (explicit and implicit) and prosocial behaviour. Specifically, we investigated the role of emotions associated with prosocial behaviour (consequential or anticipated) and preference for consistency. The results revealed a relation between the explicit moral self-concept and sharing behaviour. The explicit moral self-concept was linked to anticipated and consequential emotions regarding not-sharing. Importantly, anticipated and consequential emotions about not-sharing mediated the relation between self-concept and behaviour. Yet, the relation was independent of preference for consistency. The implicit moral self-concept was neither related to prosocial behaviour nor to emotions associated with behaviour. Overall, our study demonstrates the interplay between cognitive and emotional processes in explaining prosocial behaviour. More specific, it underlines the link between the moral self-concept and prosocial behaviour and highlights the role of emotions about the omission of prosocial behaviour.

Own Pain Distress Mediates the Link Between the Lifestyle Facet of Psychopathy and Estimates of Pain Distress in Others

Psychopathy is a multifaceted personality construct entailing interpersonal-affective disturbances, antisocial traits, and a tendency to lead an erratic lifestyle. Elevated levels of psychopathic traits have been linked to having an altered experience of pain, reduced responsivity to distress in others, and making poor moral choices that bring harm to others. In the context of moral decision-making, it is possible that the capacity to estimate the distress felt by others is linked to a limitation in the first-hand experience of distress, as the presence of psychopathic traits increases. We employed a model-based approach in a non-offender sample (n = 174) to investigate whether pain-related distress mediated the links between facets of psychopathy and estimates of the pain distress potentially experienced by others. Participants judged the permissibility of moral dilemmas and rated how much pain distress they would experience while making such judgements, as well as how much pain distress they believed the “victims” would feel as a result of the moral choice made by the participant. We found that ratings of own pain distress predicted beliefs about the distress others may experience, and elevated scores on the lifestyle facet of psychopathy uniquely predicted lower estimates of own pain distress. Furthermore, own pain distress mediated the relationship between the lifestyle facet and beliefs about others’ distress. Finally, exploratory zero-order correlation analyses revealed that ratings of own pain distress decreased as the scores on multiple psychopathic traits increased. Only the lifestyle facet correlated in the negative direction with beliefs about others’ distress. Taken together, our findings suggest that beliefs about how much pain distress others may experience is indeed mediated by own pain distress, and that the tendency to lead an erratic lifestyle is linked to alterations in this mechanism.

Moral judgment, decision times and emotional salience of a new developed set of sacrificial manual driving dilemmas

The growing interest in the subject of moral judgment in driver and autonomous vehicle behavior highlights the importance of investigating the suitability of sacrificial dilemmas as experimental tools in the context of traffic psychology. To this aim a set of validated sacrificial trolley problems and a new set of trolley-like driving dilemmas were compared through an online survey experiment, providing normative values for rates of participants' choices; decision times; evaluation of emotional valence and arousal experienced during the decision process; and ratings of the moral acceptability. Results showed that while both sets of dilemmas led to a more frequent selection of utilitarian outcomes, the driving-type dilemmas seemed to enhance faster decisions mainly based on the utilitarian moral code. No further differences were observed between the two sets, confirming the reliability of the moral dilemma tool in the investigation of moral driving behaviors. We suggest that as moral judgments and behaviors become more lifelike, the individual's moral inclination emerge more automatically and effectively. This new driving-type dilemma set may help researchers who work in traffic psychology and moral decision-making to approach the complex task of developing realistic moral scenarios more easily in the context of autonomous and nonautonomous transportation.

Sleeping over moral dilemmas modulates utilitarian decision-making

Moral decision-making depends on the interaction between emotional and cognitive control processes, which are also affected by sleep. Here we aimed to assess the potential role of sleep in the modulation of moral decisions over time by testing the change in behavioral responses to moral dilemmas over time (1 week). Thirty-five young adults were tested twice, with one week between the sessions. In each session, participants were presented with 24 sacrificial (12 Footbridge- and 12 Trolley-type) and 6 everyday-type moral dilemmas. In sacrificial dilemmas, participants had to choose whether or not to kill one person to save more people (utilitarian choice), to judge how morally acceptable the proposed solution was, and how they felt in terms of valence and arousal during the decision. In everyday-type dilemmas, they had to decide whether to pursuit moral violations involving dishonest behavior. Between the sessions, the participants’ sleep pattern was assessed via actigraphy. We observed that participants reduced the utilitarian choices in the second session, and this effect was more pronounced for the Trolley-type dilemmas. We also showed that after a week participants judged the utilitarian choices as less morally acceptable, but there was no change in self-reported emotional reactivity (i.e., valence, and arousal). Moreover, sleep efficiency was mildly negatively associated with the changes in decision choices and moral acceptability for the Footbridge-type dilemmas. Taken together, our data suggest that dealing with a moral situation engages several interacting factors that seem to go beyond the competing roles of cognitive and emotional processes.

Future-Oriented Happiness: Its Nature and Role in Consumer Decision-Making for New Products

Cognitive evaluations only partially explain the consumer purchasing patterns, especially when consumers approach a product for the first time. In such an encounter, consumers anticipate the emotions they might experience as a result of their decision, as they cannot realistically evaluate product performances. The work investigates the nature and the influence of these future-oriented emotions, namely anticipated and anticipatory happiness, in the first encounter with new products. Through a first laboratory study, adopting both physiological (micro-facial expressions analysis) and self-reported measures, we confirm the distinction between anticipated and anticipatory happiness. We further show the differential impact of these two emotional constructs on the consumer decision-making process by grounding on the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). Through a second study, based on a questionnaire, we further investigate the role of anticipated happiness within the TPB. We show that anticipated happiness is a pervasive emotional construct that influences all stages of the intention formation process. We discuss how these findings enrich existing knowledge on the interplay between cognitive and affective components of the decision-making process for new products. Moreover, we offer a methodological contribution to the use of physiological methods to assess emotions.

Anticipated nostalgia: Looking forward to looking back

Anticipated nostalgia is a new construct that has received limited empirical attention. It concerns the anticipation of having nostalgic feelings for one's present and future experiences. In three studies, we assessed its prevalence, content, emotional profile, and implications for self-regulation and psychological functioning. Study 1 revealed that anticipated nostalgia most typically concerns interpersonal relationships, and also concerns goals, plans, current life, and culture. Further, it is affectively laden with happiness, sadness, bittersweetness, and sociality. Studies 2 and 3 assessed the implications of anticipated nostalgia for self-regulation and psychological functioning. In both studies, positive evaluation of a personal experience was linked to stronger anticipated nostalgia, and anticipated nostalgia was linked to savouring of the experience. In Study 3, anticipated nostalgia measured prior to an important life transition predicted nostalgia a few months after the transition, and post-transition nostalgia predicted heightened self-esteem, social connectedness, and meaning in life.

Interindividual neural differences in moral decision-making are mediated by alpha power and delta/theta phase coherence

As technology in Artificial Intelligence has developed, the question of how to program driverless cars to respond to an emergency has arisen. It was recently shown that approval of the consequential behavior of driverless cars varied with the number of lives saved and showed interindividual differences, with approval increasing alongside the number of lives saved. In the present study, interindividual differences in individualized moral decision-making at both the behavioral and neural level were investigated using EEG. It was found that alpha event-related spectral perturbation (ERSP) and delta/theta phase-locking - intertrial coherence (ITC) and phase-locking value (PLV) - play a central role in mediating interindividual differences in Moral decision-making. In addition, very late alpha activity differences between individualized and shared stimuli, and delta/theta ITC, where shown to be closely related to reaction time and subjectively perceived emotional distress. This demonstrates that interindividual differences in Moral decision-making are mediated neuronally by various markers - late alpha ERSP, and delta/theta ITC - as well as psychologically by reaction time and perceived emotional distress. Our data show, for the first time, how and according to which neuronal and behavioral measures interindividual differences in Moral dilemmas can be measured.

Do affective episodes modulate moral judgment in individuals with bipolar disorder?

BACKGROUND

Bipolar disorder (BD) patients experience altered emotional states and deficits in social adaptation that may also be involved in deontological moral judgments in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number.

METHODS

In the present study we compared the utilitarian responses of BD patients in their different states (euthymia, mania, depression) and healthy controls to moral dilemmas with low (impersonal dilemma) and high (personal dilemma) emotional saliency.

RESULTS

Our findings revealed an increased tendency to utilitarian judgments in the three groups of BD patients in impersonal dilemmas relative to healthy individuals. In addition, utilitarian responses were increased during manic and depressive episodes in personal moral dilemmas relative to control group. Furthermore, we found no differences in social adaptation between utilitarian and deontological BD responders, though the depressive BD had a lower adaptation than the euthymic individuals.

LIMITATIONS

The recording of response times, the exhaustive control of medication effect, or the inclusion of a non-moral condition in the battery of moral dilemmas would provide a better characterization of moral judgment in BD.

CONCLUSIONS

For impersonal dilemmas, BD patients exhibited more utilitarian reasoning, which is also affected by emotional engagement for personal dilemmas during acute episodes of mania and depression. Social adaptation is not associated to utilitarian reasoning, but is rather influenced by mood state.

Moral Judgment and Empathic/Deontological Guilt

BACKGROUND

People often make complicated decisions to help or to punish perfect strangers. Harming someone or breaking some moral imperative is usually linked to feeling guilt, and several researches suggested the existence of two different kinds of guilt: altruistic/empathic and deontological.

AIM

Our study aimed to investigate the decision-making processes in moral and nonmoral judgments and assess how specific situations in which the subject is close to the victim or flanked by an authority can influence his decisions.

METHODS

We used three different moral conditions: Empathic Moral (the decision has made while physically close to the potential victims), Deontological Moral (the decision has made while flanked by an "authority"), and Standard Moral (without any influence); a fourth condition is represented by Nonmoral dilemmas (the subject must make a choice between two different things and this does not cause any harm or victims). Previously, a pilot study was carried out for validating the experimental stories to be used in the main study.

RESULTS

We observed a higher number of utilitarian/positive responses when individuals had to respond to Empathic Moral condition, with respect to Deontological Moral and Nonmoral dilemmas. Moreover, looking at the time needed to read the dilemma, under empathic guilt condition, people tended to be slower in reading the dilemmas than in other conditions and this both in case of positive and negative responses. No significant differences in time needed to effectively respond emerged.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings suggested that be physically close to potential victims or be flanked by an "authority" differentially influence the decision-making processes in moral judgment, inducing slower decisions and more utilitarian answers, particularly in the scenario of physical proximity.