Perceived Duration Increases with Contrast, but Only a Little

Compression of time in double-step saccades

Temporal intervals appear compressed at the time of saccades. Here, I asked if saccadic compression of time is related to motor planning or to saccade execution. To dissociate saccade motor planning from its execution, I used the double-step paradigm, in which subjects have to perform two horizontal saccades successively. At various times around the saccade sequence, I presented two large horizontal bars, which marked an interval lasting 100 ms. After 700 ms, a second temporal interval was presented, varying in duration across trials. Subjects were required to judge which interval appeared shorter. I found that during the first saccades in the double-step paradigm, temporal intervals were compressed. Maximum temporal compression coincided with saccade onset. Around the time of the second saccade, I found temporal compression as well, however, the time of maximum compression preceded saccade onset by about 70 ms. I compared the magnitude and time of temporal compression between double-step saccades and amplitude-matched single saccades, which I measured separately. Although I found no difference in time compression magnitude, the time when maximum compression occurred differed significantly. I conclude that the temporal shift of time compression in double-step saccades demonstrates the influence of saccade motor planning on time perception.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Visually defined temporal intervals appear compressed at the time of saccades. Here, I tested time perception during double-step saccades dissociating saccade planning from execution. Although around the time of the first saccade, peak compression was found at saccade onset, compression around the time of the second saccade peaked 70 ms before saccade onset. The results suggest that saccade motor planning influences time perception.

Neural correlates of aftereffects induced by adaptations to single and average durations

Duration perception can be heavily distorted owing to repetitive exposure to a relatively long or short sensory event, often causing a duration aftereffect. Here, we used a novel procedure to show that adaptations to both single and average durations produced the duration aftereffect. Participants completed a duration reproduction task (Experiment 1) or a duration category rating task (Experiment 2) after long-term adaptations to a stimulus of medium duration and to stimuli of averagely medium duration. We found that adaptations to both single and average durations resulted in duration aftereffects. The simultaneously recorded functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data revealed that the reduction in neural activity due to long-term adaptation to single duration was observed in the right supramarginal gyrus (SMG) of the parietal lobe, while adaptation to average duration resulted in fMRI adaptations in the left postcentral gyrus (PCG) and middle cingulate gyrus (MCG). At the individual level, the magnitude of the behavioral aftereffect was positively correlated with the magnitude of fMRI adaptation in the right SMG after adaptation to single duration, while there were no significantly positive correlations between the behavioral aftereffect and fMRI adaptations in the left PCG and MCG. These results suggest that there are different neural mechanisms for aftereffects caused by adaptations to single and average durations.

Changes in face category induce stronger duration distortion in the temporal oddball paradigm

A novel stimulus embedded in a sequence of repeated stimuli is often perceived to be longer in duration. Studies have indicated the involvement of repetition suppression in this duration distortion, but it remains unclear which processing stages are important. The present study examined whether high-level visual category processing contributes to the oddball's duration distortion. In Experiment 1, we presented a novel face image in either human, monkey, or cat category after a repetition of an identical human face image in the temporal oddball paradigm. We found that the duration distortion of the last stimulus increased when the face changed across different categories, than when it changed within the same category. However, the effect of category change disappeared when globally scrambled and locally scrambled face images were used in Experiments 2 and 3, respectively, suggesting that the difference in duration distortion cannot be attributed to low-level visual properties of the images. Furthermore, in Experiment 4, we again used intact face images and found that category changes can influence the duration distortion even when a series of different human faces was presented before the last stimulus. These findings indicate that high-level visual category processing plays an important role in the duration distortion of oddballs. This study supports the idea that visual processing at higher visual stages is involved in duration perception. (219 words).

Effect of glare illusion-induced perceptual brightness on temporal perception

Temporal perception and the ability to precisely ascertain time duration are central to essentially all behaviors. Since stimulus magnitude is assumed to be positively related to the perceived duration from the early days of experimental psychology, most studies so far have assessed this effect by presenting stimuli with relatively different intensities in physical quantity. However, it remains unclear how perceptual magnitude itself directly affects temporal perception. In this study (n = 21, n = 20), we conducted a two‐interval duration‐discrimination task adapting a glare illusion (a visual illusion that enhances perceived brightness without changing physical luminance) to investigate whether the temporal perception is also influenced by perceptual magnitude. Based on the mean difference in the point of subjective equality derived from a psychometric function and pupil diameter, we found that temporal perception is influenced by the illusory brightness of glare stimuli. Interestingly, the perceived duration of the apparently brighter stimuli (glare stimuli; larger pupillary light reflex) was shorter than that of control stimuli (halo stimuli; smaller pupillary light reflex) despite the stimuli remaining physically equiluminant, in contrast with the well‐known "magnitude effect." Furthermore, this temporal modulation did not occur when the physical luminance of the stimuli was manipulated to match the illusory‐induced magnitude. These results indicate that temporal processing depends on the confluence of both external and perceived subjective magnitude and even illusory brightness is sufficient to affect the sense of duration; which may be explained by the internal magnitude decrease of the glare stimuli due to pupillary constriction decreasing the light entering the eye.

Our findings suggest a new viewpoint on the positive relationship between temporal perception and stimulus magnitude, in demonstrating that temporal processing depends on the confluence of both external and perceived internal magnitude. We provide evidence that illusory brightness induced by the glare‐illusion also influences the perceived duration which may be explained by the size of the pupil.

Further Evidence That the Effects of Repetition on Subjective Time Depend on Repetition Probability

Repeated stimuli typically have shorter apparent duration than novel stimuli. Most explanations for this effect have attributed it to the repeated stimuli being more expected or predictable than the novel items, but an emerging body of work suggests that repetition and expectation exert distinct effects on time perception. The present experiment replicated a recent study in which the probability of repetition was varied between blocks of trials. As in the previous work, the repetition effect was smaller when repeats were common (and therefore more expected) than when they were rare. These results add to growing evidence that, contrary to traditional accounts, expectation increases apparent duration whereas repetition compresses subjective time, perhaps via a low-level process like adaptation. These opposing processes can be seen as instances of a more general “processing principle,” according to which subjective time is a function of the perceptual strength of the stimulus representation, and therefore depends on a confluence of “bottom-up” and “top-down” variables.