A Neurocognitive Framework for Human Creative Thought

Creativity and consciousness in motion: The roundtrip of "mindful" and "mindless" processes in embodied creativity

In this opinion paper, we make a journey across different accounts of creativity that emphasize either the mindful, conscious and cognitive expression of creativity, or its mindless, unconscious and sensorimotor expression. We try to go beyond dichotomy, putting creativity in motion and outlining its embodied and enactive features. Based on the assumption that no creative act is purely conscious or purely unconscious, our discussion on creativity relies on the distinction of three types of creativity that complementarily contribute to the creative process through shifts in the activation of their substrates in the brain: the deliberate, spontaneous and flow types of creativity. The latter is a hybrid and embodied type, in which movement and physical activity meet creativity. We then focus on the most fascinating contribution of unconscious processes and mind wandering to spontaneous and flow modes of creativity, exploring what happens when the individual apparently takes a break from a deliberate and effortful search for solutions and the creative process progresses through an incubation phase. This phase and the overall creative process can be facilitated by physical activity which, depending on its features and context, can disengage the cognitive control network and free the mind from filters that constrain cognitive processes or, conversely, can engage attentional control on sensorimotor and cognitive task components in a mindful way. Lastly, we focus on the unique features of the outer natural environment of physical activity and of the inner environment during mindful movements that can restore capacities and boost creativity.

What triggers explicit awareness in implicit sequence learning? Implications from theories of consciousness

This article aims to continue the debate on how explicit, conscious knowledge can arise in an implicit learning situation. We review hitherto existing theoretical views and evaluate their compatibility with two current, successful scientific concepts of consciousness: The Global Workspace Theory and Higher-Order Thought Theories. In this context, we introduce the Unexpected Event Hypothesis (Frensch et al., Attention and implicit learning, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003) in an elaborated form and discuss its advantage in explaining the emergence of conscious knowledge in an implicit learning situation.

From Something Old to Something New: Functionalist Lessons for the Cognitive Science of Scientific Creativity

An intuitive view is that creativity involves bringing together what is already known and familiar in a way that produces something new. In cognitive science, this intuition is typically formalized in terms of computational processes that combine or associate internally represented information. From this computationalist perspective, it is hard to imagine how non-representational approaches in embodied cognitive science could shed light on creativity, especially when it comes to abstract conceptual reasoning of the kind scientists so often engage in. The present article offers an entry point to addressing this challenge. The scientific project of embodied cognitive science is a continuation of work in the functionalist tradition in psychology developed over a century ago by William James and John Dewey, among others. The focus here is on how functionalist views on the nature of mind, thought, and experience offer an alternative starting point for cognitive science in general, and for the cognitive science of scientific creativity in particular. The result may seem paradoxical. On the one hand, the article claims that the functionalist conceptual framework motivates rejecting mainstream cognitive views of creativity as the combination or association of ideas. On the other hand, however, the strategy adopted here—namely, revisiting ideas from functionalist psychology to inform current scientific theorizing—can itself be described as a process of arriving at new, creative ideas from combinations of old ones. As is shown here, a proper understanding of cognition in light of the functionalist tradition resolves the seeming tension between these two claims.

Functional network connectivity during Jazz improvisation

One of the most complex forms of creativity is musical improvisation where new music is produced in real time. Brain behavior during music production has several dimensions depending on the conditions of the performance. The expression of creativity is suspected to be different whether novel ideas must be externalized using a musical instrument or can be imagined internally. This study explores whole brain functional network connectivity from fMRI data during jazz music improvisation compared against a baseline of prelearned score performance. Given that creativity might be affected by external execution, another dimension where musicians imagine or vocalize the music was also tested. We found improvisation was associated with a state of weak connectivity necessary for attenuated executive control network recruitment associated with a feeling of "flow" allowing unhindered musical creation. In addition, elicited connectivity for sensorimotor and executive control networks is not different whether musicians imagine or externalize (through vocalization) musical performance.

Enhancing creativity by altering the frontoparietal control network functioning using transcranial direct current stimulation

The left angular gyrus (AG), part of the frontotemporal network, is implicated in creative thinking, including verbal creativity tasks such as novel metaphor generation. The current study tested the effects of tDCS over the left AG on two metaphor generation tasks. The study was a randomized, double-blind, sham-controlled, crossover study of anodal vs. cathodal stimulation by tDCS. Compared to sham, cathodal stimulation resulted in significantly increased novel metaphor generation, while anodal stimulation increased conventional metaphor generation. Higher motivation (behavioral approach system's "fun-seeking") was associated with greater metaphor creativity in the sham condition, and lower fun seeking was associated with producing a greater quantity of conventional metaphors. Following active stimulation, motivation traits no longer contributed to creative metaphor generation. Thus, the beneficial effect of cathodal tDCS over the left AG in generation of novel metaphors is through restraining the control network. The current study gives a glimpse into the neural basis for creative thinking.

Brain Activations and Functional Connectivity Patterns Associated with Insight-Based and Analytical Anagram Solving

Insight is one of the most mysterious problem-solving phenomena involving the sudden emergence of a solution, often preceded by long unproductive attempts to find it. This seemingly unexplainable generation of the answer, together with the role attributed to insight in the advancement of science, technology and culture, stimulate active research interest in discovering its neuronal underpinnings. The present study employs functional Magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to probe and compare the brain activations occurring in the course of solving anagrams by insight or analytically, as judged by the subjects. A number of regions were activated in both strategies, including the left premotor cortex, left claustrum, and bilateral clusters in the precuneus and middle temporal gyrus. The activated areas span the majority of the clusters reported in a recent meta-analysis of insight-related fMRI studies. At the same time, the activation patterns were very similar between the insight and analytical solutions, with the only difference in the right sensorimotor region probably explainable by subject motion related to the study design. Additionally, we applied resting-state fMRI to study functional connectivity patterns correlated with the individual frequency of insight anagram solutions. Significant correlations were found for the seed-based connectivity of areas in the left premotor cortex, left claustrum, and left frontal eye field. The results stress the need for optimizing insight paradigms with respect to the accuracy and reliability of the subjective insight/analytical solution classification. Furthermore, the short-lived nature of the insight phenomenon makes it difficult to capture the associated neural events with the current experimental techniques and motivates complementing such studies by the investigation of the structural and functional brain features related to the individual differences in the frequency of insight-based decisions.

How Radical Is Embodied Creativity? Implications of 4E Approaches for Creativity Research and Teaching

Modern ideas of embodiment have been influential in cognitive science for the past several decades, yet there is minimal evidence of embodied cognition approaches in creativity research or pedagogical practices for teaching creativity skills. With creativity research in crisis due to conceptual, methodological, and theoretical issues, radical embodied cognitive science (RECS) may offer a framework to move the field forward. This conceptual analysis examines the current state of creativity research from the 4E (embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) cognition and RECS perspectives. Two streams are critiqued for their potential to further knowledge about the development of creative expertise and inform educational practices. Promising directions for future research is discussed, including ways dynamical systems approaches, such as those used in improvisational and musical creativity, might yield new insights about how people develop creative expertise and help address the "higher order thinking" criticisms of RECS.

Types of creativity

Imagine the impact if we were to understand, and thus could reliably enhance, something - anything - about how creativity works in the brain. The fact that this prospect is not anywhere in sight makes it clear that no reliable progress has been made on the mechanisms underlying creativity over the last half century. Indeed, with the divergent thinking paradigm shown to be theoretically incoherent for neuroscience, there currently is no viable experimental approach to tackle the problem. Given that creativity is a complex and multifaceted concept, the obvious way forward is to parse it into subtypes. This paper presents a theoretical framework that divides the concept of creativity into three distinct types: a deliberate mode, a spontaneous mode, and a flow mode. Unlike previous attempts, the three creativity types are explicitly defined and delineated from one another based on established concepts in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Moreover, to maximize the framework's heuristic value, this is done separately at three different levels of description: (A) neuroanatomy, (B) processes, and (C) evolutionary algorithms (EAs), or, more precisely, different parameters of EAs. This new theoretical framework advances the field in two significant ways. First, by defining the subtypes in terms of concepts that exist in mainstream psychology and neuroscience, they are valid subtypes, as they can be theoretically defended. Second, by providing a solid theoretical rationale to investigate a more circumscribed aspect of the larger problem, the framework provides a more targeted, and realistic, line of attack that will eventually lead to more meaningful data about the neural mechanisms of creativity.

Schizophrenia and Bipolar Illness in the Relatives of University Scientists: An Epidemiological Report on the Creativity-Psychopathology Relationship

A potential link between creativity and mental illness has been a longstanding topic for human studies and empirical research. The major problem is defining creativity and establishing its measurable indicators. A few high-quality epidemiological studies have been undertaken and point to a link between creativity and vulnerability to mental illness. Demonstrating such a shared vulnerability could expand our understanding of mental illnesses and open up new avenues of empirical research. In this epidemiological study, we defined scientists (academics) at the universities as individuals assumed to exhibit "more creativity" than the background population. In a register coupling with a population of 588,532 people, we examined successful university academics' first- and second-degree relatives for diagnosed mental disorders and compared those figures with controls from the background population controlling for educational level. The relatives of the academics had significantly increased risk of suffering from schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. For bipolar disorder, it is perhaps temperamental features and high energy levels that contribute to this association. In the case of schizophrenia, the mediating bridge may involve an amplification of human tendency to question the obvious and "taken-for-granted." Creativity and an increased risk for mental disorders seem to be linked by a shared vulnerability that is not manifested by clinical mental disorders in the academics.

A Neuroeconomic Framework for Creative Cognition

Neuroeconomics is the study of the neurobiological bases of subjective preferences and choices. We present a novel framework that synthesizes findings from the literatures on neuroeconomics and creativity to provide a neurobiological description of creative cognition. We propose that value-based decision-making processes and activity in the locus ceruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) neuromodulatory system underlie creative cognition, as well as the large-scale brain network dynamics shown to be associated with creativity. This reconceptualization leads to several falsifiable hypotheses that can further understanding of creativity, decision making, and brain network dynamics.

Imaging the Creative Unconscious: Reflexive Neural Responses to Objects in the Visual and Parahippocampal Region Predicts State and Trait Creativity

What does it take to have a creative mind? Theories of creative cognition assert that the quantity of automatic associations places fundamental constraints on the probability of reaching creative solutions. Due to the difficulties inherent in isolating automated associative responses from cognitive control, the neural basis underlying this faculty remains unknown. Here we acquired fMRI data in an incidental-viewing paradigm in which subjects performed an attention-demanding task whilst viewing task-irrelevant objects. By assigning a standard creativity task on the same objects out of the scanner, as well as a battery of psychometric creativity tests, we could assess whether stimulus-bound neural activity was predictive of state or trait variability in creativity. We found that stimulus-bound responses in superior occipital regions were linearly predictive of trial-by-trial variability in creative performance (state-creativity), and that in more creative individuals (trait-creativity) this response was more strongly expressed in entorhinal cortex. Additionally, the mean response to the onset of objects in parahippocampal gyrus was predictive of trait differences in creativity. This work suggests that, creative individuals are endowed with occipital and medial temporal reflexes that generate a greater fluency in associative representations, making them more accessible for ideation even when no ideation is explicitly called for.