1
|
Hyde J, Feenaughty L, van Mersbergen M. Does Vocalization Increase the Positive Valence of Emotion? J Voice 2024:S0892-1997(24)00233-9. [PMID: 39107212 DOI: 10.1016/j.jvoice.2024.07.022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/03/2024] [Revised: 07/15/2024] [Accepted: 07/18/2024] [Indexed: 08/09/2024]
Abstract
PURPOSE This study aims to determine if the act of voicing can have an effect on mood. DESIGN A within-participant reversal paradigm, where each participant served as their own control. METHODS Following a baseline condition, 40 participants (8 male, 32 female, none disclosed as other) underwent three experimental conditions: breathing, articulating, and voicing. After each condition, participants underwent a picture-viewing emotion-induction paradigm using the International Affective Picture System followed by rating their current mood and arousal. RESULTS Immediately following the articulating condition, aversive pictures were rated as less unpleasant compared with the other conditions. Additionally, arousal levels were rated lower immediately following the articulating and voicing conditions in response to the positive pictures. CONCLUSIONS The findings showed that the act of making speech sounds, not simply voicing by itself, may influence the way we process emotions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Joshua Hyde
- School of Communication Sciences and Disorders, University of Memphis, Memphis, Tennessee; Voice Center, Department of Otorhinolaryngology, Ochsner Health, New Orleans, Louisiana
| | - Lynda Feenaughty
- School of Communication Sciences and Disorders, University of Memphis, Memphis, Tennessee
| | - Miriam van Mersbergen
- School of Communication Sciences and Disorders, University of Memphis, Memphis, Tennessee.
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Vincini S. Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1068404. [PMID: 37063586 PMCID: PMC10098213 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1068404] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/12/2022] [Accepted: 03/06/2023] [Indexed: 04/18/2023] Open
Abstract
Ordinary language in Western and non-Western cultures individuates shared mental states or experiences as unitary interpersonal events that belong to more than one individual. However, a default assumption in modern Western thought is that, in this regard, ordinary language is either illusory or merely metaphorical: a mental state or experience can belong to only one person. This assumption is called Cartesian eliminativism and is often taken to be foundational in psychology. It follows that any view that contradicts Cartesian eliminativism is a priori suspected of being "mysterious," i.e., of not meeting scientific standards. This paper suggests that the very opposite may be the case. The straightforward view explains how individuals assemble and experience a shared mental state as a unitary whole whose components are distributed among the participants. The naturalistic advantages of such a view are brought to light by focusing on developmental science. Since it explains early shared emotions, goals, and attention merely by relying on domain-general, associative processes, the straightforward view is more parsimonious than current psychological theories. Indeed, it abandons the cumbersome postulates of (i) multi-level recursive mindreading and (ii) a special, conceptually elusive phenomenal quality. I outline the distinctive developmental predictions of the view and discuss how it accounts for the functions of shared mental states. As a reductionist, non-eliminativist approach, the straightforward view promises to be viable also for cognitive scientists who have so far worked within the Cartesian framework due to a lack of a rigorous and sufficiently developed alternative.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Stefano Vincini
- Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Bonn, Germany
- Department of Philosophy and Political Science, TU Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany
- *Correspondence: Stefano Vincini,
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
A New Perspective on Assessing Cognition in Children through Estimating Shared Intentionality. J Intell 2022; 10:jintelligence10020021. [PMID: 35466234 PMCID: PMC9036231 DOI: 10.3390/jintelligence10020021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/10/2022] [Revised: 03/20/2022] [Accepted: 03/26/2022] [Indexed: 02/06/2023] Open
Abstract
This theoretical article aims to create a conceptual framework for future research on digital methods for assessing cognition in children through estimating shared intentionality, different from assessing through behavioral markers. It shows the new assessing paradigm based directly on the evaluation of parent-child interaction exchanges (protoconversation), allowing early monitoring of children’s developmental trajectories. This literature analysis attempts to understand how cognition is related to emotions in interpersonal dynamics and whether assessing these dynamics shows cognitive abilities in children. The first part discusses infants’ unexpected achievements, observing the literature about children’s development. The analysis supposes that due to the caregiver’s help under emotional arousal, newborns’ intentionality could appear even before it is possible for children’s intention to occur. The emotional bond evokes intentionality in neonates. Therefore, they can manifest unexpected achievements while performing them with caregivers. This outcome shows an appearance of protoconversation in adult-children dyads through shared intentionality. The article presents experimental data of other studies that extend our knowledge about human cognition by showing an increase of coordinated neuronal activities and the acquisition of new knowledge by subjects in the absence of sensory cues. This highlights the contribution of interpersonal interaction to gain cognition, discussed already by Vygotsky. The current theoretical study hypothesizes that if shared intentionality promotes cognition from the onset, this interaction modality can also facilitate cognition in older children. Therefore in the second step, the current article analyzes empirical data of recent studies that reported meaningful interaction in mother-infant dyads without sensory cues. It discusses whether an unbiased digital assessment of the interaction ability of children is possible before the age when the typical developmental trajectory implies verbal communication. The article develops knowledge for a digital assessment that can measure the extent of children’s ability to acquire knowledge through protoconversation. This specific assessment can signalize the lack of communication ability in children even when the typical trajectory of peers’ development does not imply verbal communication.
Collapse
|
4
|
Davis J, Redshaw J, Suddendorf T, Nielsen M, Kennedy-Costantini S, Oostenbroek J, Slaughter V. Does Neonatal Imitation Exist? Insights From a Meta-Analysis of 336 Effect Sizes. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2021; 16:1373-1397. [PMID: 33577426 DOI: 10.1177/1745691620959834] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/17/2024]
Abstract
Neonatal imitation is a cornerstone in many theoretical accounts of human development and social behavior, yet its existence has been debated for the past 40 years. To examine possible explanations for the inconsistent findings in this body of research, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis synthesizing 336 effect sizes from 33 independent samples of human newborns, reported in 26 articles. The meta-analysis found significant evidence for neonatal imitation (d = 0.68, 95% CI = [0.39, 0.96], p < .001) but substantial heterogeneity between study estimates. This heterogeneity was not explained by any of 13 methodological moderators identified by previous reviews, but it was associated with researcher affiliation, test of moderators (QM) (15) = 57.09, p < .001. There are at least two possible explanations for these results: (a) Neonatal imitation exists and its detection varies as a function of uncaptured methodological factors common to a limited set of studies, and (2) neonatal imitation does not exist and the overall positive result is an artifact of high researcher degrees of freedom.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jacqueline Davis
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge
- School of Psychology, University of Queensland
| | | | | | - Mark Nielsen
- School of Psychology, University of Queensland
- Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg
| | | | | | | |
Collapse
|
5
|
Morgan G, Curtin M, Botting N. The interplay between early social interaction, language and executive function development in deaf and hearing infants. Infant Behav Dev 2021; 64:101591. [PMID: 34090007 DOI: 10.1016/j.infbeh.2021.101591] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/14/2020] [Revised: 05/17/2021] [Accepted: 05/26/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
In this article, we review the influence of early social interaction on the development of executive function and language in infants. We first define social interaction, executive function and language and show how they are related in infant development. Studies of children born deaf are used to illustrate this connection because they represent cases where there has been a disruption to early social interaction and the development of intersubjectivity. Unlike other groups, the disturbance to development is known to be largely environmental rather than neuro-biological. This enables us to more accurately tease apart those impacts on EF that are associated with social interaction and language, since the potential confounds of disordered cognitive development are largely controlled for. The review offers a unifying model for how social, cognitive and linguistic development work together in early human development.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Gary Morgan
- Dept. Language and Communication Science, City University of London, UK.
| | - Martina Curtin
- Dept. Language and Communication Science, City University of London, UK
| | - Nicola Botting
- Dept. Language and Communication Science, City University of London, UK
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Quintero AM, De Jaegher H. Pregnant Agencies: Movement and Participation in Maternal-Fetal Interactions. Front Psychol 2020; 11:1977. [PMID: 32922337 PMCID: PMC7456916 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01977] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2019] [Accepted: 07/16/2020] [Indexed: 01/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Pregnancy presents some interesting challenges for the philosophy of embodied cognition. Mother and fetus are generally considered to be passive during pregnancy, both individually and in their relation. In this paper, we use the enactive operational concepts of autonomy, agency, individuation, and participation to examine the relation between mother and fetus in utero. Based on biological, physiological, and phenomenological research, we explore the emergence of agentive capacities in embryo and fetus, as well as how maternal agency changes as pregnancy advances. We show that qualitatively different kinds of agency have their beginnings already in utero, and to what extent fetal and maternal movement modulate affectivity and individuation in pregnancy. We thus propose that mother and fetus are both agents who participate in pregnancy. Pregnancy then emerges as a relational developmental organization that anchors and holds its developing participants. We end the paper with reflections on ethical implications of this proposal, and suggestions for future research.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Alejandra Martínez Quintero
- IAS-Research Centre for Life, Mind and Society, Department of Philosophy, University of the Basque Country, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Hanne De Jaegher
- IAS-Research Centre for Life, Mind and Society, Department of Philosophy, University of the Basque Country, Bilbao, Spain.,ChatLab, School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Pepperberg IM. The Comparative Psychology of Intelligence: Some Thirty Years Later. Front Psychol 2020; 11:973. [PMID: 32508723 PMCID: PMC7248277 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00973] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/31/2020] [Accepted: 04/20/2020] [Indexed: 01/02/2023] Open
Abstract
After re-reading Macphail's (1987) essay "The Comparative Psychology of Intelligence" with all the associated commentaries, I was struck by how contemporary many of the arguments and counter-arguments still appear. Of course, we now know much more about the abilities of many more species (including their neurobiology) and fewer researchers currently favor explanations of behavior based solely on associative processes; however, the role of contextual variables in comparative psychology still remains cloudy. I discuss these issues briefly. Given my research interests involving the cognitive and communicative abilities of Grey parrots, the one aspect of the original article upon which I feel I can comment in depth involves Macphail's claims about the importance of language-and specifically syntax-in problem-solving and thus in placing humans above all other creatures. Granted, no other species has (or in my opinion is likely ever to acquire) everything that goes into what is considered "human language." Nevertheless, several other species have acquired symbolic representation, and considerable information now exists upon which to base an argument that such acquisition by itself enables more complex and "human-like" cognitive processes. Such processes may form the basis of the kind of intelligence that is measured-not surprisingly-with human-based tasks, including the use of such representations as a means to directly query non-human subjects in ways not unlike those used with young children.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Irene M Pepperberg
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Heimann M, Tjus T. Neonatal imitation: Temporal characteristics in imitative response patterns. INFANCY 2019; 24:674-692. [DOI: 10.1111/infa.12304] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/13/2018] [Revised: 03/17/2019] [Accepted: 05/18/2019] [Indexed: 01/16/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Mikael Heimann
- The Infant and Child Lab Division of Psychology Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning Linköping University Linköping Sweden
| | - Tomas Tjus
- Department of Psychology University of Gothenburg Gothenburg Sweden
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Oostenbroek J, Redshaw J, Davis J, Kennedy-Costantini S, Nielsen M, Slaughter V, Suddendorf T. Re-evaluating the neonatal imitation hypothesis. Dev Sci 2018; 22:e12720. [PMID: 30123972 DOI: 10.1111/desc.12720] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/13/2017] [Accepted: 07/10/2018] [Indexed: 01/28/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Janine Oostenbroek
- Department of Psychology, The University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, USA
| | - Jonathan Redshaw
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| | | | | | - Mark Nielsen
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.,Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | | | - Thomas Suddendorf
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Abstract
AbstractDebates about neonatal imitation remain more open than Keven & Akins (K&A) imply. K&A do not recognize the primacy of the question concerning differential imitation and the links between experimental designs and more or less plausible theoretical assumptions. Moreover, they do not acknowledge previous theorizing on spontaneous behavior, the explanatory power of entrainment, and subtle connections with social cognition.
Collapse
|
11
|
Gallagher S. Self-defense: Deflecting Deflationary and Eliminativist Critiques of the Sense of Ownership. Front Psychol 2017; 8:1612. [PMID: 28970813 PMCID: PMC5609435 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01612] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/26/2017] [Accepted: 09/01/2017] [Indexed: 12/18/2022] Open
Abstract
I defend a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self from those critics who propose either a deflationary or eliminativist critique. Specifically, I block the deflationary critique by showing that in fact the phenomenological account is itself a deflationary account insofar as it takes the sense of ownership to be implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. I address the eliminativist view by considering empirical evidence that supports the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness, which underpins the sense of ownership. Finally, I respond to claims that phenomenology does not offer a positive account of the sense of ownership by showing the role it plays in an enactivist (action-oriented) view of embodied cognition.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Shaun Gallagher
- Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, MemphisTN, United States.,Philosophy, Faculty of Law, Arts and Humanities, University of Wollongong, WollongongNSW, Australia.,Center for Mind, Brain and Cognitive Evolution, Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr University BochumBochum, Germany
| |
Collapse
|