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Everything is connected: Inference and attractors in delusions. Schizophr Res 2022; 245:5-22. [PMID: 34384664 PMCID: PMC9241990 DOI: 10.1016/j.schres.2021.07.032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2021] [Revised: 07/21/2021] [Accepted: 07/23/2021] [Indexed: 02/06/2023]
Abstract
Delusions are, by popular definition, false beliefs that are held with certainty and resistant to contradictory evidence. They seem at odds with the notion that the brain at least approximates Bayesian inference. This is especially the case in schizophrenia, a disorder thought to relate to decreased - rather than increased - certainty in the brain's model of the world. We use an active inference Markov decision process model (a Bayes-optimal decision-making agent) to perform a simple task involving social and non-social inferences. We show that even moderate changes in some model parameters - decreasing confidence in sensory input and increasing confidence in states implied by its own (especially habitual) actions - can lead to delusions as defined above. Incorporating affect in the model increases delusions, specifically in the social domain. The model also reproduces some classic psychological effects, including choice-induced preference change, and an optimism bias in inferences about oneself. A key observation is that no change in a single parameter is both necessary and sufficient for delusions; rather, delusions arise due to conditional dependencies that create 'basins of attraction' which trap Bayesian beliefs. Simulating the effects of antidopaminergic antipsychotics - by reducing the model's confidence in its actions - demonstrates that the model can escape from these attractors, through this synthetic pharmacotherapy.
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Gorlin EI, Békés V. Agency via Awareness: A Unifying Meta-Process in Psychotherapy. Front Psychol 2021; 12:698655. [PMID: 34335416 PMCID: PMC8316855 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.698655] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/21/2021] [Accepted: 06/04/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
To address the need for conceptual and clinical consensus within the field, psychotherapy research has increasingly focused on identifying common principles of change. While the field contends that this approach is atheoretical, we argue that principles of change cannot be fully understood or applied without the context of some theoretical framework. This article develops such a framework by identifying and explicating two theoretical assumptions that are implicitly shared by multiple therapeutic approaches: (1) that increasing agency is a fundamental aim of psychotherapy, and (2) that therapists enhance clients' agency by increasing their awareness. Building on the largely disparate empirical literatures demonstrating the importance of client agency and awareness to successful therapeutic outcomes, we provide a theoretical account of the highly iterative and synergistic meta-process by which these two factors jointly produce change. Explicit identification and empirical investigation of this Agency via Awareness psychotherapy meta-process, we argue, could facilitate scientific and clinical progress within the field. The hypothesized meta-process is discussed in relation to existing integrative models of therapeutic change, and its manifestations in the theory and practice of major therapeutic orientations are reviewed and illustrated. We discuss how this framework can facilitate psychotherapy research by providing a common language and conceptual foundation for wide-ranging therapeutic approaches, constructs, and findings. Finally, by raising clinicians' awareness of the implicit assumptions underlying their therapeutic work, we suggest that the Agency via Awareness framework can increase their agency over when and how they apply these assumptions in therapy to maximize client improvement.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eugenia I Gorlin
- Ferkauf Graduate School of Psychology, Yeshiva University, New York, NY, United States
| | - Vera Békés
- Ferkauf Graduate School of Psychology, Yeshiva University, New York, NY, United States
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Nave O, Trautwein FM, Ataria Y, Dor-Ziderman Y, Schweitzer Y, Fulder S, Berkovich-Ohana A. Self-Boundary Dissolution in Meditation: A Phenomenological Investigation. Brain Sci 2021; 11:819. [PMID: 34205621 PMCID: PMC8235013 DOI: 10.3390/brainsci11060819] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/14/2021] [Revised: 06/15/2021] [Accepted: 06/18/2021] [Indexed: 01/08/2023] Open
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of the sense of self is its pre-reflective dimension specifying the self as a bounded and embodied knower and agent. Being a constant and tacit feature structuring consciousness, it eludes robust empirical exploration. Recently, deep meditative states involving global dissolution of the sense of self have been suggested as a promising path for advancing such an investigation. To that end, we conducted a comprehensive phenomenological inquiry into meditative self-boundary alteration. The induced states were systematically characterized by changes in six experiential features including the sense of location, agency, first-person perspective, attention, body sensations, and affective valence, as well as their interaction with meditative technique and overall degree of dissolution. Quantitative analyses of the relationships between these phenomenological categories highlighted a unitary dimension of boundary dissolution. Notably, passive meditative gestures of "letting go", which reduce attentional engagement and sense of agency, emerged as driving the depth of dissolution. These findings are aligned with an enactive approach to the pre-reflective sense of self, linking its generation to sensorimotor activity and attention-demanding processes. Moreover, they set the stage for future phenomenologically informed analyses of neurophysiological data and highlight the utility of combining phenomenology and intense contemplative training for a scientific characterization of processes giving rise to the basic sense of being a bounded self.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ohad Nave
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel
| | - Fynn-Mathis Trautwein
- Edmond Safra Brain Research Center, Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel; (F.-M.T.); (Y.D.-Z.); (Y.S.)
- Department of Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy, Faculty of Medicine, University of Freiburg, 79085 Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
- Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health, 79098 Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
| | - Yochai Ataria
- Psychology Department, Tel-Hai Academic College, Qiryat Shemona 1220800, Israel;
| | - Yair Dor-Ziderman
- Edmond Safra Brain Research Center, Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel; (F.-M.T.); (Y.D.-Z.); (Y.S.)
- The Integrated Brain and Behavior Research Center (IBBRC), University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel
| | - Yoav Schweitzer
- Edmond Safra Brain Research Center, Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel; (F.-M.T.); (Y.D.-Z.); (Y.S.)
- The Integrated Brain and Behavior Research Center (IBBRC), University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel
- Department of Learning, Instruction and Teacher Education, Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel
| | - Stephen Fulder
- The Israel Insight Society (Tovana), Kibbutz Ein-Dor, R.D. Izrael 1933500, Israel;
| | - Aviva Berkovich-Ohana
- Edmond Safra Brain Research Center, Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel; (F.-M.T.); (Y.D.-Z.); (Y.S.)
- The Integrated Brain and Behavior Research Center (IBBRC), University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel
- Department of Learning, Instruction and Teacher Education, Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel
- Department of Counseling and Human Development, Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel
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Deane G, Miller M, Wilkinson S. Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation. Front Psychol 2020; 11:539726. [PMID: 33250804 PMCID: PMC7673417 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.539726] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/06/2020] [Accepted: 10/02/2020] [Indexed: 12/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Disruptions in the ordinary sense of selfhood underpin both pathological and "enlightened" states of consciousness. People suffering from depersonalization can experience the loss of a sense of self as devastating, often accompanied by intense feelings of alienation, fear, and hopelessness. However, for meditative contemplatives from various traditions, "selfless" experiences are highly sought after, being associated with enduring peace and joy. Little is understood about how these contrasting dysphoric and euphoric experiences should be conceptualized. In this paper, we propose a unified account of these selfless experiences within the active inference framework. Building on our recent active inference research, we propose an account of the experiences of selfhood as emerging from a temporally deep generative model. We go on to develop a view of the self as playing a central role in structuring ordinary experience by "tuning" agents to the counterfactually rich possibilities for action. Finally, we explore how depersonalization may result from an inferred loss of allostatic control and contrast this phenomenology with selfless experiences reported by meditation practitioners. We will show how, by beginning with a conception of self-modeling within an active inference framework, we have available to us a new way of conceptualizing the striking experiential similarities and important differences between these selfless experiences within a unifying theoretical framework. We will explore the implications for understanding and treating dissociative disorders, as well as elucidate both the therapeutic potential, and possible dangers, of meditation.
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Affiliation(s)
- George Deane
- Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom
| | - Mark Miller
- Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom
| | - Sam Wilkinson
- Department of Sociology, Philosophy and Anthropology, University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom
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