The Comprehension of Counterfactual Conditionals: Evidence From Eye-Tracking in the Visual World Paradigm

Better I than He: Personal perspective modulates counterfactual processing

First-person narratives are more attentively and emotionally engaging than third-person narratives. This study examined whether and how personal perspective modulates counterfactual processing. Participants read counterfactual and causal conditionals written from the first-person or third-person perspective (e.g., If/Because I/he had read enough literature before, I/he would have finished my/his thesis easily.), followed by factual consequences that contained a critical word either consistent or inconsistent with preceding contexts (e.g., Therefore, when I/he was about to defend the thesis I/he felt panicked/confident). In both perspectives, inconsistent words showed a prolonged N400 vs. consistent words in the counterfactual condition, but a larger P600 in the causal condition. The critical word showed a larger P600 in the first- than the third-person condition in counterfactual scenarios, but not in causal scenarios. These findings suggest that personal perspective exerts different influences on counterfactual processing, presumably by modulating the amount of attentional resources involved.

"Looking at" Negation: Faster Processing for Symbolic Rather Than Iconic Representations

Many studies have shown the double processing of negation, suggesting that negation integration into sentence meaning is delayed. This contrasts with some researches that have found that such integration is rather immediate. The present study contributes to this debate. Affirmative and negative compound sentences (e.g., "because he was not hungry, he did not order a salad") were presented orally in a visual world paradigm while four printed words were on the screen: salad, no salad, soup, and no soup. The eye-tracking data showed two different fixation patterns for negative causal assertions, which are linked to differences in the representation and inferential demands. One indicates that negation is integrated immediately, as people look at the explicit negation (e.g., no salad) very early. The other, in which people look at the alternate (e.g., soup) much later, indicates that what is delayed in time is the representation of the alternate. These results support theories that combine iconic and symbolic representations, such as the model theory.

The Suppression of Inferences From Counterfactual Conditionals

We examine two competing effects of beliefs on conditional inferences. The suppression effect occurs for conditionals, for example, "if she watered the plants they bloomed," when beliefs about additional background conditions, for example, "if the sun shone they bloomed" decrease the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens (from "the plants did not bloom" to "therefore she did not water them"). In contrast, the counterfactual elevation effect occurs for counterfactual conditionals, for example, "if she had watered the plants they would have bloomed," when beliefs about the known or presupposed facts, "she did not water the plants and they did not bloom" increase the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens. We report six experiments that show that beliefs about additional conditions take precedence over beliefs about presupposed facts for counterfactuals. The modus tollens inference is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain additional conditions (Experiments 1a and 1b). The denial of the antecedent inference (from "she did not water the plants" to "therefore they did not bloom") is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain alternatives (Experiments 2a and 2b). We report a new "switched-suppression" effect for conditionals with negated components, for example, "if she had not watered the plants they would not have bloomed": modus tollens is suppressed by alternatives and denial of the antecedent by additional conditions, rather than vice versa (Experiments 3a and 3b). We discuss the implications of the results for alternative theories of conditional reasoning.