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Baron M, Devor M. From molecule to oblivion: dedicated brain circuitry underlies anesthetic loss of consciousness permitting pain-free surgery. Front Mol Neurosci 2023; 16:1197304. [PMID: 37305550 PMCID: PMC10248014 DOI: 10.3389/fnmol.2023.1197304] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/30/2023] [Accepted: 05/04/2023] [Indexed: 06/13/2023] Open
Abstract
The canonical view of how general anesthetics induce loss-of-consciousness (LOC) permitting pain-free surgery posits that anesthetic molecules, distributed throughout the CNS, suppress neural activity globally to levels at which the cerebral cortex can no longer sustain conscious experience. We support an alternative view that LOC, in the context of GABAergic anesthesia at least, results from anesthetic exposure of a small number of neurons in a focal brainstem nucleus, the mesopontine tegmental anesthesia area (MPTA). The various sub-components of anesthesia, in turn, are effected in distant locations, driven by dedicated axonal pathways. This proposal is based on the observations that microinjection of infinitesimal amounts of GABAergic agents into the MPTA, and only there, rapidly induces LOC, and that lesioning the MPTA renders animals relatively insensitive to these agents delivered systemically. Recently, using chemogenetics, we identified a subpopulation of MPTA "effector-neurons" which, when excited (not inhibited), induce anesthesia. These neurons contribute to well-defined ascending and descending axonal pathways each of which accesses a target region associated with a key anesthetic endpoint: atonia, anti-nociception, amnesia and LOC (by electroencephalographic criteria). Interestingly, the effector-neurons do not themselves express GABAA-receptors. Rather, the target receptors reside on a separate sub-population of presumed inhibitory interneurons. These are thought to excite the effectors by disinhibition, thus triggering anesthetic LOC.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mark Baron
- Department of Cell and Developmental Biology, Institute of Life Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
| | - Marshall Devor
- Department of Cell and Developmental Biology, Institute of Life Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
- Center for Research on Pain, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
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2
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Marchetti G. The why of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness: Its main functions and the mechanisms underpinning it. Front Psychol 2022; 13:913309. [PMID: 35967722 PMCID: PMC9368316 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.913309] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/05/2022] [Accepted: 07/01/2022] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
What distinguishes conscious information processing from other kinds of information processing is its phenomenal aspect (PAC), the-what-it-is-like for an agent to experience something. The PAC supplies the agent with a sense of self, and informs the agent on how its self is affected by the agent’s own operations. The PAC originates from the activity that attention performs to detect the state of what I define “the self” (S). S is centered and develops on a hierarchy of innate and acquired values, and is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems; it maps the agent’s body and cognitive capacities, and its interactions with the environment. The detection of the state of S by attention modulates the energy level of the organ of attention (OA), i.e., the neural substrate that underpins attention. This modulation generates the PAC. The PAC can be qualified according to five dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal and spatial. Each dimension can be traced back to a specific feature of the modulation of the energy level of the OA.
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3
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Browning H, Birch J. Animal sentience. PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 2022; 17:e12822. [PMID: 35859762 PMCID: PMC9285591 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12822] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/25/2020] [Revised: 10/01/2021] [Accepted: 02/14/2022] [Indexed: 06/01/2023]
Abstract
'Sentience' sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their sentience. In a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Heather Browning
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social ScienceLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK
| | - Jonathan Birch
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social ScienceLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK
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4
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Kanaev IA. Evolutionary origin and the development of consciousness. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 133:104511. [PMID: 34942266 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.12.034] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/12/2021] [Revised: 12/04/2021] [Accepted: 12/19/2021] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
This review seeks to combine advances in anthropology and neuroscience to investigate the adaptive value of human consciousness. It uses an interdisciplinary perspective on the origin of consciousness to refute the most common fallacies in considering consciousness, particularly, disregarding the evolutionary origin of the subjective reality in looking for the neural correlates of consciousness and divorcing studies in neuroscience and behavioural sciences. Various explanations linked to consciousness in the field of neuroscience, supplemented with the theoretical explanation of an experience as an ongoing process of overlap between intrinsic neural dynamics and stimulation can be summarised as the stochastic dynamics of one's control system experienced by the individual in the form of subjective reality. This framework elaborates on the world-brain research program and lays foundation for the quantitative description of one's qualitative feelings and naturalistic science of consciousness. Furthermore, this study highlights the philosophical perspective of the inseparability between the physical correlates and the subjective reality contributing to the realistic ontology of conscious processes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ilya A Kanaev
- School of Philosophy, Zhengzhou University, 100, Science Avenue, High Tech Zone, Zhengzhou, 450001, People's Republic of China.
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Mallatt J, Feinberg TE. Multiple Routes to Animal Consciousness: Constrained Multiple Realizability Rather Than Modest Identity Theory. Front Psychol 2021; 12:732336. [PMID: 34630245 PMCID: PMC8497802 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.732336] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/28/2021] [Accepted: 08/13/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The multiple realizability thesis (MRT) is an important philosophical and psychological concept. It says any mental state can be constructed by multiple realizability (MR), meaning in many distinct ways from different physical parts. The goal of our study is to find if the MRT applies to the mental state of consciousness among animals. Many things have been written about MRT but the ones most applicable to animal consciousness are by Shapiro in a 2004 book called The Mind Incarnate and by Polger and Shapiro in their 2016 work, The Multiple Realization Book. Standard, classical MRT has been around since 1967 and it says that a mental state can have very many different physical realizations, in a nearly unlimited manner. To the contrary, Shapiro's book reasoned that physical, physiological, and historical constraints force mental traits to evolve in just a few, limited directions, which is seen as convergent evolution of the associated neural traits in different animal lineages. This is his mental constraint thesis (MCT). We examined the evolution of consciousness in animals and found that it arose independently in just three animal clades-vertebrates, arthropods, and cephalopod mollusks-all of which share many consciousness-associated traits: elaborate sensory organs and brains, high capacity for memory, directed mobility, etc. These three constrained, convergently evolved routes to consciousness fit Shapiro's original MCT. More recently, Polger and Shapiro's book presented much the same thesis but changed its name from MCT to a "modest identity thesis." Furthermore, they argued against almost all the classically offered instances of MR in animal evolution, especially against the evidence of neural plasticity and the differently expanded cerebrums of mammals and birds. In contrast, we argue that some of these classical examples of MR are indeed valid and that Shapiro's original MCT correction of MRT is the better account of the evolution of consciousness in animal clades. And we still agree that constraints and convergence refute the standard, nearly unconstrained, MRT.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jon Mallatt
- The University of Washington WWAMI Medical Education Program at The University of Idaho, Moscow, ID, United States
| | - Todd E Feinberg
- Department of Psychiatry and Neurology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, United States
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What Is Consciousness? Integrated Information vs. Inference. ENTROPY 2021; 23:e23081032. [PMID: 34441172 PMCID: PMC8391140 DOI: 10.3390/e23081032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2021] [Revised: 08/03/2021] [Accepted: 08/06/2021] [Indexed: 12/24/2022]
Abstract
Any successful naturalistic account of consciousness must state what consciousness is, in terms that are compatible with the rest of our naturalistic descriptions of the world. Integrated Information Theory represents a pioneering attempt to do just this. This theory accounts for the core features of consciousness by holding that there is an equivalence between the phenomenal experience associated with a system and its intrinsic causal power. The proposal, however, fails to provide insight into the qualitative character of consciousness and, as a result of its proposed equivalence between consciousness and purely internal dynamics, into the intentional character of conscious perception. In recent years, an alternate group of theories has been proposed that claims consciousness to be equivalent to certain forms of inference. One such theory is the Living Mirror theory, which holds consciousness to be a form of inference performed by all living systems. The proposal of consciousness as inference overcomes the shortcomings of Integrated Information Theory, particularly in the case of conscious perception. A synthesis of these two perspectives can be reached by appreciating that conscious living systems are self-organising in nature. This mode of organization requires them to have a high level of integration. From this perspective, we can understand consciousness as being dependent on a system possessing non-trivial amounts of integrated information while holding that the process of inference performed by the system is the fact of consciousness itself.
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Mallatt J. A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2021; 23:650. [PMID: 34067413 PMCID: PMC8224652 DOI: 10.3390/e23060650] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2021] [Revised: 05/14/2021] [Accepted: 05/18/2021] [Indexed: 02/05/2023]
Abstract
This paper assesses two different theories for explaining consciousness, a phenomenon that is widely considered amenable to scientific investigation despite its puzzling subjective aspects. I focus on Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which says that consciousness is integrated information (as ϕMax) and says even simple systems with interacting parts possess some consciousness. First, I evaluate IIT on its own merits. Second, I compare it to a more traditionally derived theory called Neurobiological Naturalism (NN), which says consciousness is an evolved, emergent feature of complex brains. Comparing these theories is informative because it reveals strengths and weaknesses of each, thereby suggesting better ways to study consciousness in the future. IIT's strengths are the reasonable axioms at its core; its strong logic and mathematical formalism; its creative "experience-first" approach to studying consciousness; the way it avoids the mind-body ("hard") problem; its consistency with evolutionary theory; and its many scientifically testable predictions. The potential weakness of IIT is that it contains stretches of logic-based reasoning that were not checked against hard evidence when the theory was being constructed, whereas scientific arguments require such supporting evidence to keep the reasoning on course. This is less of a concern for the other theory, NN, because it incorporated evidence much earlier in its construction process. NN is a less mature theory than IIT, less formalized and quantitative, and less well tested. However, it has identified its own neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and offers a roadmap through which these NNCs may answer the questions of consciousness using the hypothesize-test-hypothesize-test steps of the scientific method.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jon Mallatt
- The University of Washington WWAMI Medical Education Program at The University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83844, USA
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Mallatt J, Blatt MR, Draguhn A, Robinson DG, Taiz L. Debunking a myth: plant consciousness. PROTOPLASMA 2021; 258:459-476. [PMID: 33196907 PMCID: PMC8052213 DOI: 10.1007/s00709-020-01579-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/27/2020] [Accepted: 10/22/2020] [Indexed: 05/18/2023]
Abstract
Claims that plants have conscious experiences have increased in recent years and have received wide coverage, from the popular media to scientific journals. Such claims are misleading and have the potential to misdirect funding and governmental policy decisions. After defining basic, primary consciousness, we provide new arguments against 12 core claims made by the proponents of plant consciousness. Three important new conclusions of our study are (1) plants have not been shown to perform the proactive, anticipatory behaviors associated with consciousness, but only to sense and follow stimulus trails reactively; (2) electrophysiological signaling in plants serves immediate physiological functions rather than integrative-information processing as in nervous systems of animals, giving no indication of plant consciousness; (3) the controversial claim of classical Pavlovian learning in plants, even if correct, is irrelevant because this type of learning does not require consciousness. Finally, we present our own hypothesis, based on two logical assumptions, concerning which organisms possess consciousness. Our first assumption is that affective (emotional) consciousness is marked by an advanced capacity for operant learning about rewards and punishments. Our second assumption is that image-based conscious experience is marked by demonstrably mapped representations of the external environment within the body. Certain animals fit both of these criteria, but plants fit neither. We conclude that claims for plant consciousness are highly speculative and lack sound scientific support.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jon Mallatt
- The University of Washington WWAMI Medical Education Program at The University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83844 USA
| | - Michael R. Blatt
- Laboratory of Plant Physiology and Biophysics, Bower Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ UK
| | - Andreas Draguhn
- Institute for Physiology and Pathophysiology, Medical Faculty, University of Heidelberg, 69120 Heidelberg, Germany
| | - David G. Robinson
- Centre for Organismal Studies, University of Heidelberg, 69120 Heidelberg, Germany
| | - Lincoln Taiz
- Department of Molecular, Cellular, and Developmental Biology, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA
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Mallatt J, Blatt MR, Draguhn A, Robinson DG, Taiz L. Debunking a myth: plant consciousness. PROTOPLASMA 2021. [PMID: 33196907 DOI: 10.1007/s00709-026-01579-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/10/2023]
Abstract
Claims that plants have conscious experiences have increased in recent years and have received wide coverage, from the popular media to scientific journals. Such claims are misleading and have the potential to misdirect funding and governmental policy decisions. After defining basic, primary consciousness, we provide new arguments against 12 core claims made by the proponents of plant consciousness. Three important new conclusions of our study are (1) plants have not been shown to perform the proactive, anticipatory behaviors associated with consciousness, but only to sense and follow stimulus trails reactively; (2) electrophysiological signaling in plants serves immediate physiological functions rather than integrative-information processing as in nervous systems of animals, giving no indication of plant consciousness; (3) the controversial claim of classical Pavlovian learning in plants, even if correct, is irrelevant because this type of learning does not require consciousness. Finally, we present our own hypothesis, based on two logical assumptions, concerning which organisms possess consciousness. Our first assumption is that affective (emotional) consciousness is marked by an advanced capacity for operant learning about rewards and punishments. Our second assumption is that image-based conscious experience is marked by demonstrably mapped representations of the external environment within the body. Certain animals fit both of these criteria, but plants fit neither. We conclude that claims for plant consciousness are highly speculative and lack sound scientific support.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jon Mallatt
- The University of Washington WWAMI Medical Education Program at The University of Idaho, Moscow, ID, 83844, USA.
| | - Michael R Blatt
- Laboratory of Plant Physiology and Biophysics, Bower Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK
| | - Andreas Draguhn
- Institute for Physiology and Pathophysiology, Medical Faculty, University of Heidelberg, 69120, Heidelberg, Germany
| | - David G Robinson
- Centre for Organismal Studies, University of Heidelberg, 69120, Heidelberg, Germany
| | - Lincoln Taiz
- Department of Molecular, Cellular, and Developmental Biology, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA, 95064, USA
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Black D. The global workspace theory, the phenomenal concept strategy, and the distribution of consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2020; 84:102992. [PMID: 32771955 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.102992] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/15/2019] [Revised: 05/27/2020] [Accepted: 07/13/2020] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dylan Black
- Xi'an Jiaotong University, 28 Xianning W Rd, Jiao Da Shang Ye Jie Qu, Beilin Qu, Xian Shi, Shaanxi Sheng, China.
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Feinberg TE, Mallatt J. Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap. Front Psychol 2020; 11:1041. [PMID: 32595555 PMCID: PMC7304239 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01041] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/21/2020] [Accepted: 04/27/2020] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Abstract
The role of emergence in the creation of consciousness has been debated for over a century, but it remains unresolved. In particular there is controversy over the claim that a "strong" or radical form of emergence is required to explain phenomenal consciousness. In this paper we use some ideas of complex system theory to trace the emergent features of life and then of complex brains through three progressive stages or levels: Level 1 (life), Level 2 (nervous systems), and Level 3 (special neurobiological features), each representing increasing biological and neurobiological complexity and ultimately leading to the emergence of phenomenal consciousness, all in physical systems. Along the way we show that consciousness fits the criteria of an emergent property-albeit one with extreme complexity. The formulation Life + Special neurobiological features → Phenomenal consciousness expresses these relationships. Then we consider the implications of our findings for some of the philosophical conundrums entailed by the apparent "explanatory gap" between the brain and phenomenal consciousness. We conclude that consciousness stems from the personal life of an organism with the addition of a complex nervous system that is ideally suited to maximize emergent neurobiological features and that it is an example of standard ("weak") emergence without a scientific explanatory gap. An "experiential" or epistemic gap remains, although this is ontologically untroubling.
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Affiliation(s)
- Todd E. Feinberg
- Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, Psychiatry and Neurology, New York, NY, United States
| | - Jon Mallatt
- The University of Washington, WWAMI Medical Education Program, The University of Idaho, Moscow, ID, United States
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12
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Maher C. Experiment Rather Than Define. TRENDS IN PLANT SCIENCE 2020; 25:213-214. [PMID: 31892457 DOI: 10.1016/j.tplants.2019.12.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/04/2019] [Revised: 11/13/2019] [Accepted: 12/10/2019] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Chauncey Maher
- Philosophy Department, Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA 17013, USA.
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