Compassionate Conservation Clashes With Conservation Biology: Should Empathy, Compassion, and Deontological Moral Principles Drive Conservation Practice?

Conservation status and cultural values of sea turtles leading to (un)written parallel management systems in Fiji

Globally and locally, conservationists and scientists work to inform policy makers to help recovery of endangered sea turtle populations. In Fiji, in the South Pacific, sea turtles are protected by the national legislation because of their conservation status, and are also a customary iTaukei resource. Centered on our interview-based study at Qoma and Denimanu villages, parallel management systems coexist, where both the (written) national legislation and the (unwritten) customary iTaukei rules determine the time and the quantity of sea turtle harvest. In addition, non-governmental organizations and academic institutions may influence local sea turtle management by providing scientific awareness and helping divert the economic values from the meat to the living animal. We suggest that the government and non-governmental organizations emphasize community management of sea turtles, and work alongside the customary chiefs and their fishing clans to understand the real harvest (eventually by allowing quotas) and to monitor the recovery of South Pacific sea turtles in Fijian waters.

Compassionate Conservation is indistinguishable from traditional forms of conservation in practice

Animal welfare and ethics are important factors influencing wildlife conservation practice, and critics are increasingly challenging the underlying ethics and motivations supporting common conservation practices. “Compassionate Conservationists” argue that all conservationists should respect the rights of individual sentient animals and approach conservation problems from a position of compassion, and that doing so requires implementing practices that avoid direct harm to individual animals. In this way Compassionate Conservationists seek to contrast themselves with “Traditional Conservationists” who often express consequentialist decision-making processes that ostensibly aim to dispassionately minimize net animal harms, resulting in the common use of practices that directly harm or kill some animals. Conservationists and other observers might therefore conclude that the two sides of this debate are distinct and/or that their policy proscriptions produce different welfare outcomes for animals. To explore the validity of this conclusion we review the ethical philosophies underpinning two types of Compassionate Conservation—deontology and virtue ethics. Deontology focusses on animal rights or the moral duties or obligations of conservationists, whereas virtue ethics focusses on acting in ways that are virtuous or compassionate. We demonstrate that both types permit the intentional harm and killing of animals when faced with common conservation problems where animals will be harmed no matter what the conservationist does or does not do. We then describe the applied decision-making processes exhibited by Compassionate Conservationists (of both types) and Traditional Conservationists to show that they may each lead to the implementation of similar conservation practices (including lethal control) and produce similar outcomes for animals, despite the perceived differences in their ethical motivations. The widespread presence of wildlife conservation problems that cannot be resolved without causing at least some harm to some animals means that conservationists of all persuasions must routinely make trade-offs between the welfare of some animals over others. Compassionate Conservationists do this from an explicit position of animal rights and/or compassion, whereas Traditional Conservationists respect animal rights and exhibit this same compassion implicitly. These observations lead to the conclusion that Compassionate Conservation is indistinguishable from traditional forms of conservation in practice, and that the apparent disagreement among conservationists primarily concerns the effectiveness of various wildlife management practices at minimizing animal harm, and not the underlying ethics, motivations or morality of those practices.

Ethical opportunities in deep-sea collection of polymetallic nodules from the Clarion-Clipperton Zone

Infrastructure supporting the transition of human societies from fossil fuels to renewable energy will require hundreds of millions of tons of metals. Polymetallic nodules on the abyssal seabed of the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), eastern North Pacific Ocean, could provide them. We focus on ethical considerations and opportunities available to the novel CCZ nodule-collection industry, integrating robust science with strong pillars of social and environmental responsibility. Ethical considerations include harm to sea life and recovery time, but also the value of human life, indigenous rights, rights of nature, animal rights, intrinsic values, and intangible ecosystem services. A "planetary perspective" considers the biosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, extends beyond mineral extraction to a life-cycle view of impacts, and includes local, national, and global impacts and stakeholders. Stakeholders include direct nodule-collection actors, ocean conservationists, companies, communities, interest groups, nations, and citizens globally, plus counterfactual stakeholders involved with or affected by intensification of terrestrial mining if ocean metals are not used. Nodule collection would harm species and portions of ecosystems, but could have lower life-cycle impacts than terrestrial mining expansion, especially if nodule-metal producers explicitly design for it and stakeholders hold them accountable. Participants across the value chain can elevate the role of ethics in strategic objective setting, engineering design optimization, commitments to stakeholders, democratization of governance, and fostering of circular economies. The International Seabed Authority is called to establish equitable and transparent distribution of royalties and gains, and continue engaging scientists, economists, and experts from all spheres in optimizing deep-sea mineral extraction for humans and nature. Nodule collection presents a unique opportunity for an ambitious reset of ecological norms in a nascent industry. Embracing ethical opportunities can set an example for industrial-scale activities on land and sea, accelerate environmental gains through environmental competition with land ores, and hasten civilization's progress toward a sustainable future. Integr Environ Assess Manag 2022;18:634-654. © 2021 The Authors. Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Society of Environmental Toxicology & Chemistry (SETAC).

The Relative Role of Knowledge and Empathy in Predicting Pro-Environmental Attitudes and Behavior

Planet Earth is undergoing unprecedented levels of environmental degradation and destruction at a global scale. Incentivizing people to adopt behaviors that are compatible with a sustainable future will help address the current ecological crisis. However, it is first necessary to understand the psychological drivers of pro-environmental behavior. Here, we examined whether greater levels of environmental knowledge and empathy predicted higher levels of pro-environmental behavior in an Australian population sample. We aimed to advance our understanding of the psychological variables that motivate people to act in pro-environmental ways, while also advancing the ongoing debate amongst conservation scientists regarding the relative importance of fostering empathy. Correlational analyses revealed that objective, verifiable knowledge was a strong predictor of pro-environmental attitudes and behavior. Empathy also correlated positively with pro-environmental attitudes and behavior, but with a dissociation with respect to its cognitive and affective components. Multivariate analyses revealed that knowledge was a stronger predictor of both pro-environmental attitudes and behavior after controlling for individual variation in cognitive and affective empathy. This finding casts doubt on the claim by compassionate conservationists that fostering empathy is the key to solving the current environmental conservation crisis. Future research should aim to extend the present findings by testing whether a more exhaustive test of participants’ environmental knowledge and other measures of empathy, including empathic competencies and the recently developed Emotional and Cognitive Scale of the Human–Nature Relationship (ECS-HNR), yield the same dominance of knowledge over empathy.

What is valued in conservation? A framework to compare ethical perspectives

Perspectives in conservation are based on a variety of value systems. Such differences in how people value nature and its components lead to different evaluations of the morality of conservation goals and approaches, and often underlie disagreements in the formulation and implementation of environmental management policies. Specifically, whether a conservation action (e.g. killing feral cats to reduce predation on bird species threatened with extinction) is viewed as appropriate or not can vary among people with different value systems. Here, we present a conceptual, mathematical framework intended as a tool to systematically explore and clarify core value statements in conservation approaches. Its purpose is to highlight how fundamental differences between these value systems can lead to different prioritizations of available management options and offer a common ground for discourse. The proposed equations decompose the question underlying many controversies around management decisions in conservation: what or who is valued, how, and to what extent? We compare how management decisions would likely be viewed under three idealised value systems: ecocentric conservation, which aims to preserve biodiversity; new conservation, which considers that biodiversity can only be preserved if it benefits humans; and sentientist conservation, which aims at minimising suffering for sentient beings. We illustrate the utility of the framework by applying it to case studies involving invasive alien species, rewilding, and trophy hunting. By making value systems and their consequences in practice explicit, the framework facilitates debates on contested conservation issues, and complements philosophical discursive approaches about moral reasoning. We believe dissecting the core value statements on which conservation decisions are based will provide an additional tool to understand and address conservation conflicts.

The virtue of compassion in compassionate conservation

The role of ethics is becoming an increasingly important feature of biodiversity conservation dialogue and practice. Compassionate conservationists argue for a prohibition of, or at least a strong presumption against, the adoption of conservation policies that intentionally harm animals. They assert that to be compassionate is to care about animals and that it is antithetical to caring for animals to intentionally harm them. Compassionate conservationists thus criticize many existing conservation practices and policies. Two things together challenge the philosophical foundation of compassionate conservation. First, compassionate conservationists ground their theory in virtue ethics, yet virtue ethics permits exceptions to moral rules, so there cannot be an in-principle prohibition on adopting intentional harm-inducing policies and practices. But not all compassionate conservationists advocate for a prohibition on intentionally harming animals, only a strong presumption against it. This leads to the second point: compassion can motivate a person to adopt a harm-inducing conservation policy or practice when doing so is the best available option in a situation in which animals will be harmed no matter what policy or practice is adopted. Combining these insights with the empirical observation that conservationists regularly find themselves in tragic situations, we arrive at the conclusion that conservationists may regularly advocate for harm-inducing policies and practices from a position of compassion. Article Impact Statement: Compassionate conservationists should accept that the virtuously compassionate person may adopt harm-causing conservation policies.

A critical review of the compassionate conservation debate

Compassionate conservation holds that compassion should transform conservation. It has prompted heated debate and has been criticized strongly. We reviewed the debate to characterize compassionate conservation and to philosophically analyze critiques that are recurring and that warrant further critical attention. The necessary elements of compassionate conservation relate to the moral value of sentient animals and conservation and to science and conservation practice. Although compassionate conservation has several nontraditional necessary conditions, it also importantly allows a degree of pluralism in values and scientific judgment regarding animals and conservation practice. We identified 52 specific criticisms from 11 articles that directly critique compassionate conservation. We closely examined 33 of these because they recurred regularly or included substantial questions that required further response. Critics criticized compassionate conservation's ethical foundations, scientific credentials, clarity of application, understanding of compassion, its alleged threat to conservation and biodiversity. Some criticisms, we found, are question begging, confused, or overlook conceptual complexity. These criticisms raise questions for critics and proponents, regarding, for example, equal versus differential intrinsic moral value of different sentient animals (including humans), problems of natural and human-caused suffering of wild animals and predation, and the acceptability of specific conservation practices within compassionate conservation. By addressing recurring and faulty critiques of compassionate conservation and identifying issues for compassionate conservation to address, this review provides a clearer basis for crucial ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue about ethics, values, and conservation.

Emotion as a source of moral understanding in conservation

Recent debates around the meaning and implications of compassionate conservation suggest that some conservationists consider emotion a false and misleading basis for moral judgment and decision making. We trace these beliefs to a long-standing, gendered sociocultural convention and argue that the disparagement of emotion as a source of moral understanding is both empirically and morally problematic. According to the current scientific and philosophical understanding, reason and emotion are better understood as partners, rather than opposites. Nonetheless, the two have historically been seen as separate, with reason elevated in association with masculinity and emotion (especially nurturing emotion) dismissed or delegitimated in association with femininity. These associations can be situated in a broader, dualistic, and hierarchical logic used to maintain power for a dominant male (White, able-bodied, upper class, heterosexual) human class. We argue that emotion should be affirmed by conservationists for the novel and essential insights it contributes to conservation ethics. We consider the specific example of compassion and characterize it as an emotional experience of interdependence and shared vulnerability. This experience highlights conservationists' responsibilities to individual beings, enhancing established and widely accepted beliefs that conservationists have a duty to protect populations, species, and ecosystems (or biodiversity). We argue compassion, thus understood, should be embraced as a core virtue of conservation.

Examining cultural structures and functions in biology

Scientific culture and structure organize biological sciences in many ways. We make choices concerning the systems and questions we study. Our research then amplifies these choices into factors that influence the directions of future research by shaping our hypotheses, data analyses, interpretation, publication venues, and dissemination via other methods. But our choices are shaped by more than objective curiosity-we are influenced by cultural paradigms reinforced by societal upbringing and scientific indoctrination during training. This extends to the systems and data that we consider to be ethically obtainable or available for study, and who is considered qualified to do research, ask questions, and communicate about research. It is also influenced by the profitability of concepts like open-access-a system designed to improve equity, but which enacts gatekeeping in unintended but foreseeable ways. Creating truly integrative biology programs will require more than intentionally developing departments or institutes that allow overlapping expertise in two or more subfields of biology. Interdisciplinary work requires the expertise of large and diverse teams of scientists working together-this is impossible without an authentic commitment to addressing, not denying, racism when practiced by individuals, institutions, and cultural aspects of academic science. We have identified starting points for remedying how our field has discouraged and caused harm, but we acknowledge there is a long path forward. This path must be paved with field-wide solutions and institutional buy-in: our solutions must match the scale of the problem. Together, we can integrate-not reintegrate-the nuances of biology into our field.

Animal Harms and Food Production: Informing Ethical Choices

Simple Summary

Consideration of animal welfare in food choices has become an influential contemporary theme. Traditional animal welfare views about food have been largely restricted to direct and intentional harms to livestock in intensive animal agriculture settings. However, many harms to animals arising from diverse food production practices in the world are exerted indirectly and unintentionally and often affect wildlife. Here we apply a qualitative analysis of food production by considering the breadth of harms caused by different food production systems to wild as well as domestic animals. Production systems are identified that produce relatively few and relatively many harms. The ethical implications of these findings are discussed for consumers concerned with the broad animal welfare impacts of their food choices.

Abstract

Ethical food choices have become an important societal theme in post-industrial countries. Many consumers are particularly interested in the animal welfare implications of the various foods they may choose to consume. However, concepts in animal welfare are rapidly evolving towards consideration of all animals (including wildlife) in contemporary approaches such as “One Welfare”. This approach requires recognition that negative impacts (harms) may be intentional and obvious (e.g., slaughter of livestock) but also include the under-appreciated indirect or unintentional harms that often impact wildlife (e.g., land clearing). This is especially true in the Anthropocene, where impacts on non-human life are almost ubiquitous across all human activities. We applied the “harms” model of animal welfare assessment to several common food production systems and provide a framework for assessing the breadth (not intensity) of harms imposed. We considered all harms caused to wild as well as domestic animals, both direct effects and indirect effects. We described 21 forms of harm and considered how they applied to 16 forms of food production. Our analysis suggests that all food production systems harm animals to some degree and that the majority of these harms affect wildlife, not livestock. We conclude that the food production systems likely to impose the greatest overall breadth of harms to animals are intensive animal agriculture industries (e.g., dairy) that rely on a secondary food production system (e.g., cropping), while harvesting of locally available wild plants, mushrooms or seaweed is likely to impose the least harms. We present this conceptual analysis as a resource for those who want to begin considering the complex animal welfare trade-offs involved in their food choices.